ERRATA AND CORRIGENDA.

Page 91,	line 12,	*for* conception,	*read* [illegible]
„ 106,	„ 28,	„ § XXII.,	„ § XI[illegible]
„ 165,	„ 11,	„ § LIV.,	„ § LV[illegible]
„ 170,	„ 13,	*for* § LI. and LII.	*read* § LII[illegible] and [illegible]
„ 171,	„ 5,	„ § XXXV.	„ § XXX[illegible].
„ 248,	„ 3,	„ Note N.	„ Note [illegible]
„ 299,	„ 19,	„ Note P.	„ Note [illegible]

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

MUSCULO-MOTOR
IMP
WILL
Objective Phenomena
MENTAL LIGHT
DUTY.
IMPULSE
O-MOTOR



Diagram of Mind- and Life-Cells, and of the connexion and sequence of Mental Phenomena in Psychical Organisms.

See page 299 et sequent.

Vincent Brooks Day & Son Lith.

LUX E TENEBRIS;

OR,

THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

A THEORETIC ESSAY.

"Philosophy is for free minds."
"Only in law will the soul find freedom."
—*Goethe.*

LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., 57 & 59 LUDGATE HILL.
1874.

TO

THOSE WHOM HE HAD MOST IN REGARD WHILE WRITING IT,

TO HIS CHILDREN,

This Essay

IS INSCRIBED BY ITS AUTHOR;

IN THE HOPE,

THAT IN THE DIFFICULT JOURNEY OF LIFE THEY WILL AT ALL TIMES

BEAR IN MIND THE LAW OF RECTITUDE;

AND THAT,

WHETHER ENGAGED IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH,

OR IN THE PATH OF PRACTICAL CONDUCT,

THEY WILL ALWAYS ENDEAVOUR TO STAND UPRIGHT,

AND TO WALK STRAIGHT.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.—CONSCIOUSNESS.

CHAPTER II.—PHYSICAL.

CHAPTER III.—PSYCHICAL.

CHAPTER IV.—SOCIAL.

CHAPTER V.—SPIRITUAL.

LUX E TENEBRIS.

INTRODUCTION.

ONCE—it is now more than thirty years ago—to the writer, while engaged in studying the structure of the human brain, and endeavouring to unravel its intricacies, the thought occurred:—What if the anatomy of this organ, and the part it plays in relation to the mental phenomena—phenomena which through its action are called into existence—were fully revealed to us, so that to each mental faculty its appropriate brain-structure were assigned, and the connection of all the parts with each other ascertained?—Should we, through such knowledge, be enabled to perceive and correct our mental errors and illusions—just as a knowledge of the structure and function of the eye enables us to correct our optical illusions—and thus, by using the organ intelligently, and in accordance with its capabilities, learn to think and act correctly, and so not only procure for ourselves individually, with reference to this organ and its all-important function, that comfort and happiness which ensue with reference to every other organ when its function is discharged rightly, but also

collectively live harmoniously and peaceably with each other? In short, do not all our individual and social miseries result from our ignorance of the functions of the brain and of the mental laws which are related to it?—of the science of psychology? Pursuing this line of thought, the further reflection occurred, that in the case of the brain, as in that of the other organs of the body, knowledge of function would never be arrived at by the study of structure alone. The structure of the lungs, even exhibited by the most thorough dissection, would never have revealed their function, if the air—both that which enters the lungs and that which passes out—had not been first analysed by the chemist: nor could the function of either the heart or the stomach have been ascertained, if attention had not been directed also to what enters and passes through those organs—to the food, the chyme, the chyle, and the blood. So with the eye:—if the laws of light had not been investigated, the theory of vision would never have been deduced from its structure. It seemed clear that the same method which had been applied successfully to the other organs of the body should be adopted with the brain; that to understand its function—the awakening of consciousness in the mind—the things which enter it from the outer world through the avenues that communicate therewith—the organs of sense—and, passing through it, are returned again to the outward world in an altered form by the organs of expression and action, should be examined and analysed; and as such things, and the changes that they undergo and produce while

acting on, and being acted on by, the mind in their passage through the brain, are not to be got at in their material form, but are only cognisable by the phenomena which they produce in consciousness, it seemed necessary that such examination should be performed by the proper analyst of those phenomena, —by the *metaphysician.*

The conclusion then having been arrived at, that the ascertaining the function of the brain was a matter of paramount importance, and that a method existed by which it might be attained, accomplishment seemed easy; for the subject-matter, consciousness, lay within reach: not requiring, like that of the physical sciences, either favourable and rare opportunities, or the aid of elaborate and costly instruments of research. The work seemed already done.

Time, which dispels illusions, confirms truth: it also sobers enthusiasm. Whatever advantage we possess in having the phenomena of consciousness always at hand for study, is more than counterbalanced by the unsubstantial nature of such and the extent of the subject. To grasp firmly with the mental muscles the ideas which exist in the mind, resolve them into their elements, compare them with each other, form judgments and deductions, and combine them rightly into well-cohering structures of truth, requires as much—probably far more—expenditure of brain-power than is made use of while employing the muscles of the body in performing the same processes on material things; while, to carry the process through the whole range of consciousness

—to show how from *physical* facts *physical* truth is educed—how by means of both of these *psychical* consciousness is awakened and *psychical* truth discovered—how eventually, from the whole, *spiritual* facts are discerned, and *spiritual* truth conceived—and, lastly, how all these conceptions act as motives upon the will and determine the conduct—to perform this achievement *adequately* might well overtax the most strenuous efforts of the strongest mind.

Nor is much assistance to be obtained from other sources. It is true that physical facts—through the application of the right method to the phenomena—are rapidly flowing in, and physical truth is being arrived at. But the connection of such with psychical and spiritual truth, and the necessity of applying the same method of investigation to each, are far from generally perceived; and the result is, that in these latter departments of knowledge scarcely a proposition of any importance exists, which is not disputed by authorities of equal weight; and the main difficulty in dealing with these subjects is in the getting rid of impediments and prejudices which already occupy the ground, and which their influence has created.

A knowledge, therefore, of the facts of consciousness can only be obtained by personal investigation, whether for the purpose of discovering afresh, or of verifying views presented from other sources. But to have thus learned the facts which belong to one branch of the subject—the psychical—to have acquired personal experience of sentiment, desire, passion, we must have lived; for sentiment, desire, passion,

are to be found only in life, which is made up of them.

Nor is it given to any of us, save perhaps a fortunate few, to direct for ourselves our course in life, or choose the port which is to be our destination. Suddenly, untrained and unequipped, we are launched —perhaps plunged—into the stream; and, while struggling with the current, it is as difficult to make observations on the elements of which it is composed, as it would be for a steersman in a troubled sea to study the laws which regulate the art of navigation, or a swimmer in similar circumstances those of the art of swimming. We hasten to disencumber ourselves of the plans and schemes which we had proposed at starting as the objects of our voyage, glad to reach in safety any haven, "*et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.*"

For the time which has elapsed since the design of the present work was conceived, and for the incompleteness of what has been accomplished, the above causes—all of which have been in operation—must be made accountable. It must be held to be —to pursue the metaphor which has been used—not the rich freight crowned with which it was hoped the vessel would return from its outward quest, but only something saved from the wreck. Of the particular results obtained, whatever their value may be, this however may be said:—they have been honestly obtained; they do not represent foregone conclusions; being in some important particulars the very opposite to what the writer had anticipated. He therefore entertains for them no undue partiality,

but puts them forward resting on their own merits alone, and is quite ready to abandon any or all of them if shown to be untenable. At the same time, for many of them, the support of eminent authorities might, if necessary, have been adduced. The hypothesis of the *mind-cell* may seem at first sight strange and fantastic; but *any* hypothesis respecting the mind must of necessity appear strange, and there is no more antecedent improbability in the supposition that the functions of mind are performed through the instrumentality of a mind-cell, than in that of the functions of life being performed through the instrumentality of a life-cell—which we know to be the fact. For the verification of the premiss on which the hypothesis rests, that all the phenomena present to the psyche and cognisable by it—whether of sense or of thought—are mental phenomena, and therefore contained within the mind itself, the writer has referred to the well-known facts of cerebral physiology; but he might, if he had chosen, have strengthened his argument with the names and authorities of Berkeley and Ferrier, Mill and Huxley, and of many other distinguished metaphysicians and philosophers. (See Note A, Appendix.)

The thesis that the *will* and conduct are always and under all circumstances determined by influences not dependent on the psyche itself, but situated outside it, and to be referred in every instance for their ultimate cause to the One Source from which all influences, whether moral or physical, primarily emanate, rests on facts of consciousness within the reach of every one who will take the trouble to verify

them; but it might be supported by names and authorities of the highest rank both in metaphysics and theology; being, to go no further, substantially identical with the view implied in Article 10 of the Church of England.

The analogy that exists between the *intellectual light* by means of which we discern ideas, and the physical light through the medium of which we perceive objects of sense, has been acknowledged in every age, from Plato downwards. But this analogy is supposed to be only a fanciful one, and while the one light is held to be real, the other is believed to be a mere figure of speech—a metaphysical fiction, invented for rhetorical purposes. It is argued in the present work that the analogy is a true one; that the intellectual light as really exists as the physical; and that the two resemble each other closely in every respect—in origin, in locality, in laws, and in purpose. Both exist in, and are phenomena of, the mind-cell—the one shaping therein our objects of sense, the other our ideas; both are produced by cerebral excitation—the one of the sensorial ganglia, the other of the intellectual; both are governed by laws which appear to be analogous, and which make on the psyche similar requirements, in order that the objects which they respectively present in the mind-cell may be rightly and fairly viewed—on its physical eye and bodily faculties with reference to the objects of sense, on its intellectual eye and mental faculties with reference to objects of thought—the requirements of uprightness and circumspection; both fulfil similar purposes—the one presenting in

the mind fact, the other truth; and both pass into each other insensibly—ideas becoming sometimes so vivid as to be confounded with objects of sense, and these latter again becoming so faint and indistinct as not to be distinguished from ideas.

Again, respecting *rectitude*:—this duty of preserving uprightness or rectitude is generally admitted with regard to conduct. *Moral rectitude*, as it is called—the obligation of shaping our actions in accordance with our honest beliefs, is felt by all to be binding—by those who evade it as well as by those who obey; but the same obligation is not so generally admitted or felt with regard to our thoughts and intellectual operations. The duty of diligence and accuracy with respect to facts, both in bringing them in from the outer world and in extracting truth from them, is far from generally admitted, and indeed, with regard to some important subjects, is practically disallowed. But this latter obligation—rectitude of thought—is even more important than *moral* rectitude, which, without it, is not only useless, but even does harm. When it is clearly perceived that all happiness depends on right conduct, that right conduct cannot be accomplished unless right conceptions have been formed in the mind, and that to the formation of these last a knowledge of truth is absolutely necessary, then the importance of possessing truth will be understood; it will be valued as the chief good, and, in order to obtain it, intellectual rectitude will be habitually cultivated.

Lastly, with regard to the law which regulates the growth of science and the development of truth in

the mind:—That the progress of knowledge is from the confused to the distinct, is a proposition admitted by all—by Hamilton as well as by Comte; and that, *cæteris paribus*, the more simple things will be unravelled and comprehended first, is self-evident. The explanation which this doctrine furnishes of the evolution of the sciences, and of the order of their emergence out of the intellectual chaos, was first seen by Comte, and has been borrowed by the writer from him: but he ventures to hope that in the application of it he has not laid himself open to the objections, apparently of sufficient weight, which have been brought by Mr Herbert Spencer against the mode in which M. Comte has enunciated that doctrine.

Notwithstanding, however, these authorities, to which more might be added if necessary, it is the object of this work, as has been said, to rest these and every other particular conclusion which it contains, not on authority, but on the arguments which are put forward, and to permit them to stand or fall, relying on these alone. It has aimed—and the author is sanguine enough to think not altogether without success—at throwing a light into the psychical part of our nature, by illustration borrowed from the physical. But what it further aims at—and by its success or failure in this respect it claims to be judged, whatever may be the fate of particular propositions—is to show, by reasonings based on the facts of consciousness—facts open to all who may think it worth while to study them—the truth of the following propositions—propositions which are not fully or sufficiently appreciated, not only by the

public generally, by whom they are scarcely perceived at all, but even by persons of liberal education; while they are believed by the writer to be both true and so important that their perception and adequate recognition seems to him to be the great want of the age:—

1. That there is such a thing as *truth.* That there is a Cosmos—an organisation cohering and developing by law, and including within itself all things, both physical and psychical; and that the plan of this Cosmos, the facts that it presents, and the laws of its constitution and development, constitute truth.

2. That there is such a thing as *right*, both physical and psychical. That physical right consists in the harmonious relations of physical things to the mind and body of man, so as to produce in him happiness as far as relates to the physical world; and that psychical right consists in the harmonious relations of psychical things to each other, so as to produce in them happiness as far as relates to their mutual relations. That although right exists in the Cosmos, yet it only exists therein *potentially;*—its elements are there, but in the wrong order, requiring to be developed and re-arranged: just as the elements of the flower exist in the bud, or of a disciplined army in a disorderly rabble.

3. That man has at his command faculties by means of which he can perceive, and form correct notions in his mind of, the elements out of which right is composed, as they exist in the Cosmos, and can combine them mentally into ideal conceptions of right: and further, that he can introduce

into the Cosmos and realise therein such ideal conceptions, and so get rid of disorder and wrong, and produce order and right; his success in this work depending on the fidelity of his perceptions to the truth contained in the Cosmos. That when he has accomplished this work, evil and wrong will disappear; perfect happiness, both moral and physical, will exist; and the reign of right be established;—but not before. For his is the agency through which, according to the plan of the Cosmos, order is to be perfected: the human mind and brain having been developed for this purpose.

4. That the possession of truth is the only certain method of obtaining happiness, and that, therefore, its acquisition is the proper object to which the faculties of the mind should be directed. But that, although the faculties of man are adapted for this purpose, the necessity of so using them is not perceived from the first by him, but the lesson requires to be learnt in the school of experience. This is not the case with other animals. Their objects of desire exist ready formed, lie low, and are attained by following inclination only: but with man it is different. Man is the animal of unsatisfied desires; his objects do not exist ready to hand, but have to be conceived first in his mind as ideals, to be realised by art. The first conceptions of good which he forms, spring from things which are rooted in his own self, or which lie immediately around him,—necessities which concern his very existence. In his search after the means to supply these wants, he raises his eyes from the low and near to the distant, and as he

elevates them, becomes acquainted with higher objects —with the different forms of pleasure, with beauty and moral goodness—and thus conceives desires which conflict with the lower and control them. While seeking to gratify these contending desires, facts accumulate in his mind, their relations to and connection with each other are perceived, and conceptions of truth formed. And the conception of truth once formed, it is perceived to be the highest object of all; not only as affording the means of supplying every other, but as affording in itself the noblest gratification to the human mind—the contemplation of the Cosmos.

5. That this process of mental development and training is constantly going on, both in the life of a man and in that of a nation. Just as the physical man has emerged from a physical chaos, so is the moral man emerging from a moral chaos. The path of knowledge, like everything else in nature, is regulated by law, and we advance in it, not in any direction we may choose, but in a certain, regular order, according as the way is open to us. And as in the physical development a plan and an order can be discovered, and laws regulating the process, the record of which has been preserved in geology; so of the mental development record is being prepared and preserved in history, to be deciphered by the future psychologist. The arts and sciences are victories of the human mind in its struggle with circumstances, but they are related to each other, and the order of conquest depends on this relationship, and cannot be altered by the human will. Each man tries to express and

realise the conceptions of good that he has formed: —the voluptuary his conceptions of pleasure—the man of taste and sentiment, of beauty and nobleness —the philosopher, of truth—and the result is *art*. Art is the result of the efforts of man to realise his desires—to convert the ideal into the real. From the efforts of the artisan to realise physical good, result the useful arts; from the efforts of the educator and the statesman to realise moral and political good, the social arts; and from the efforts of the thinker and the artist to express and feed the mind with the views of truth and noble sentiment which they have conceived, or to present to the imagination pictures more interesting than those existing in reality, result philosophy, literature, and the fine arts.

And every art in its early stage is necessarily imperfect. Through defective knowledge, the ideal is either imperfectly conceived or inadequately represented. The artisan fails to satisfy the requirements of the body, the educator and statesman to produce private and public virtue, the artist's creations exhibit false fact and false sentiment, and the theories of the philosopher untruth. But as facts come in, the truths inscribed upon them are read, and science begins. Science is perceived truth: the various sciences form one organised whole, truth—an organic growth, the parts of which are put forth in a regular order, not dependent on the human will, but determined by the Cosmos of which it is the expression, and to the parts of which the several sciences correspond.

The path of progress is steep and difficult, and the ascent gradual, the several sciences forming the steps. The simple and more elementary truths are first reached, and from these we ascend to the higher and more complex—from the region of inanimate matter to that of life, and from the region of life to that of mind; each step enabling us to perceive the truth lying immediately above. And knowledge being power, as science advances, art, which is its outcome, advances also, and improves in proportion: the conception of the artist, with his increasing knowledge, becoming more perfect, and his method more correct. (See Note B, Appendix.)

6. That in the history of this development a critical period has arrived, and that on our conduct with regard to it our progress and future welfare depend. A firm footing has been gained on the physical, and already from its highest summit, where it touches the region of mind, we are enabled to survey that region into which the next step will take us. Are we prepared to take that step, or are we to remain for ever stationary in our present position, "letting 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would'"?—That is the question which is presented to our age and our generation. If, taking for our motto *Excelsior*, we proceed manfully, adopting the same method which has enabled us to scale the heights of the physical, we shall meet with the same success: we shall attain to a knowledge of the laws which regulate the actions of moral beings; and such knowledge will lead to right moral results, teaching us how to procure moral good, just as knowledge of the physical laws has

taught us how to procure physical good. We shall understand each other, and, having learnt the laws which unite human beings, be enabled to live together harmoniously.

But if, either through inertness or fear to disturb the crude notions which a superficial survey of the subject has formed, we refrain from inquiring more deeply, then all progress must cease; our present condition of moral and social disorder will continue, and psychical concord and happiness be impossible. Moreover, physical happiness will be impossible also. To apply physical truth so as to secure physical happiness requires *co-operation.* It would be as impossible for an individual, however learned, to procure physical good for himself by his own unassisted powers, as it would be for a single hero, however well equipped, to conquer and hold a province. Organisation and mutual help are necessary in both instances. Competition and the struggle of selfish interests will never secure physical good. Competition is so far preferable to monopoly that, by the antagonism which it involves, it developes strength, while monopoly enervates by the want of such antagonism; but both of them are equally hurtful to the weak:—the one by excluding them from the conflict, the other by crushing them in the struggle. Until co-operation and organisation of labour are accomplished, physical happiness, *as a general condition of society*, is impossible; men will, either from ignorance, thoughtlessness, or wilfulness, injure each other, either by sins of omission or commission.

But co-operation cannot be obtained unless there is moral agreement. While a moral chaos exists, men will strive or compete with each other, and physical science only increases the force of the weapons which they use. But once moral agreement secured, physical good will follow; for all will co-operate in applying the results of physical discovery for the general good. Physical knowledge without moral is altogether nugatory.

Progress, therefore, is rendered imperative by an inexorable law of nature, decreeing that the lesser good is not to be realised until the greater has been earned, and that the desires after happiness which have induced us to enter on its path are not to be satisfied until the termination of that path has been reached.

That the present is not an unfavourable time for entering on psychical and moral investigation, many considerations concur in suggesting. Never was inquiry on every subject more free than now; while, on the other hand, science has both raised for us a platform—physical knowledge—elevated on which we can survey the territory to be invaded, and has forged for us a weapon—the method of inductive reasoning—by means of which we can take possession of the same. The conquest is within our reach, if we will raise ourselves to our full height;—we have the power, if we have the will.

"It is our will
Which now enthralls us to permitted ill;
We might be otherwise; we might be all
We dream of, happy, high, majestical."

"Those who try may find
How strong the chains are which our spirits bind,
Brittle perchance as straw."

And not only have we freedom, but powerful motives are urging us on to the inquiry. While all the arts which relate to physical things are, owing to our advanced physical science, prosecuted with considerable success, all those which have for their object the mind, and depend on moral and psychical knowledge, result only in failure: a fact which alone justifies the conclusion that our notions on such matters require rectification. At a period when mental and nervous diseases exist in an unprecedented degree, our physical hygiene and therapeutics, with references to such diseases, signally fail, through want of the requisite knowledge of the laws of brain-action; while our moral hygiene and therapeutics are still more lamentably defective. Vice and ignorance flourish as ever, baffling all the efforts of the educator and the philanthropist; pauperism and political and social strife show that now, as much as ever, the members of the same community are incapable of properly understanding and sympathising with each other; and, in an age when the most humane sentiments abound and are expressed, that monstrous product of the misunderstanding of nations, war (made more horrid by science itself), setting at naught all our moral preaching and statecraft, is as ready to break out among the most enlightened and polished nations as when they were mere hordes of savage and bloodthirsty barbarians: while what intensifies

the misery of the position we are in, is that, owing to the superior enlightenment and the critical and sceptical tendencies of the age, old illusions which formerly imposed upon our understanding and masqued the horrors of these things, are being fast dissipated; and we are beginning to see them in all their deformity, and to experience shame at a state of things which we feel *ought to be*, and are beginning to suspect *might be*, otherwise. The above are powerful motives urging us onward; especially when combined with that noblest one of all—the desire of knowledge for its own sake. Whether they will be sufficient to overcome immediately—they are sure to ultimately—the obstructing forces, custom, opinion, prejudice, selfish interests, indolence, and all the other influences that always oppose progress and tend to keep things as they are, time will show. The faculties exist, and the opportunity. Have we the will? If we use our freedom aright, and direct our faculties to the noblest objects, such freedom will remain and such objects be attained. But if we permit the unworthy motives to prevail, and basely abandon our reason, then that will happen to us which happens to all, whether individuals or nations, who sell their birthright for inferior good, and stoop to low objects—we shall fall under the tyranny of some vice, and, the freedom which we now possess being taken away, shall sink deeper into the mire, there to remain until some generation shall arise strong enough to recover freedom, and virtuous enough to use it rightly. And it will be of no use to pray to Jupiter to help

us. "Heaven helps those who help themselves," and it was a saying as old as Socrates, that "The gods will never procure for men good which they have the power of obtaining without their assistance."

The reasoning by which the above propositions are supported, is to be found in the ensuing chapters, to which all who care to study them are referred. That such persons will be numerous, is not supposed. The great bulk of mankind are absorbed either in procuring the necessities of the day or in pursuing material good, and, as long as they are undisturbed in such pursuits, care little about theories of truth, for the understanding of which many have, through long disuse, lost the necessary faculty. To use their reason is the one thing which from their infancy they are forbidden to do. A certain view of truth has been set before them, and they have not been permitted to withdraw their eyes from such to the original from which it was taken. It is as if a *picture* were taken from its proper place, and made use of as a *blind*, to shut out the light and hide the landscape, for which it is to act as a substitute. Were this all—if views of truth were only intended to satisfy the heart—no harm would be done; as one view might answer such purpose as well as another. But this is *not* all. The use of truth is to guide the conduct; and to seek it is not a matter of choice or inclination, but a sacred duty. Wrong theory always involves wrong practice, and from this follow wrong results and every misery. Moreover, these persons do mischief not only by acting erroneously, but by endeavouring

to shut out truth from others. But to reason with such is useless: to let in the light suddenly only dazzles the unaccustomed eye: they must be left to the influence of time and circumstance—

> "Though from our birth the faculty divine
> Is chained and tortured—cabin'd, cribb'd, confined,
> And bred in darkness, lest the truth should shine
> Too brightly on the unprepared mind,
> The beam pours in, for time and skill will couch the blind."

There are also the more cultivated class of cynics and sceptics, who ask, with the polite Roman governor, "What is truth?"—who believe that right and wrong are accidents; reason and wisdom, names; goodness and virtue, dreams: they see the darkness, but do not believe in the existence of light. With these the author has no quarrel: their eyes are at any rate open, and if he fail in making them see, the fault will be not theirs. To convince them he can scarcely expect: all he asks of them is to pardon his weakness in believing that "there may be words which are things—hopes which will not deceive:"—that "Goodness is no name, and Happiness no dream."

Lastly, there is a party, now fortunately a numerous one—the party of Progress—who believe that eyes were given us to see with, and venture to use them. With them, truth, goodness, happiness, wisdom, reason, virtue, are not mere counters invented for the convenience of society, and bearing any value that conventionality may attach to them, but coinage of intrinsic value, although the inscription defining such has been almost effaced by frequent

use. By persons belonging to this party, the present work will be fairly and candidly judged. To them the author would say, addressing them in the words of Petrarch,—"I, in truth, do not seek so much to impose a law on others, as to explain the law of my own mind; which let whoever may approve thereof, abide by; let him who may not approve, reject."

To many of them it may contain no new truth; and from such, all he asks is to deal leniently with its imperfections for the sake of its intentions: but he has reason to think that to some the method of investigation at least may be of use; that it may assist them by pointing in the direction in which they are to travel—perhaps helping them a little on the road.

But in any case, whatever may be the fate of his work, the author will never regret the time and labour he has spent on its production. It owes him nothing. Let immature and sickly poets sentimentalise about the chilling and disenchanting effects of "cold philosophy:" he has experienced none of such. It has *unwoven* for him *no rainbows, clipped no angels' wings;* and, if it has dispelled any illusions, they have been mostly of the hobgoblin kind. It has brought far more than it has taken away. It has beguiled many a dull hour, soothed many an anxious one: and he parts with it now as he would from an old friend with whom he had passed many years of his life. (*See* Note C, Appendix.)

CHAPTER I.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

§ I. ALL existing things of which we have any direct cognisance are—by a classification based on nature and reality—divisible into two classes—those that do, and those that do not, manifest consciousness.

§ II. Consciousness is the one essential attribute of mind. We cannot conceive the existence of consciousness without the existence also of a mind to which it belongs; nor can we conceive the existence of a mind not possessing the property of consciousness.

§ III. Consciousness and knowledge are convertible terms. There can be no consciousness with out knowledge of such consciousness; nor can there be any knowledge without consciousness of such knowledge.

It is true that knowledge may exist in the memory without being present to consciousness, but this is *potential*, not *real*, knowledge :—a possibility, not an actual state : just as sleep is potential consciousness.

The proposition also that no consciousness can exist without a knowledge of such consciousness, must be so far qualified as to be understood to be limited to those beings that possess a brain proper, or organ of knowledge. In beings low down in the animal scale, which appear to possess only an organ of sense,

there can be neither knowledge nor memory; yet they probably possess sensation, which implies consciousness.

§ IV. Our knowledge, then, is composed of the various phases and modes of our consciousness; and interrogating consciousness is the same thing as reflecting on the subjects which constitute our stock of knowledge.

§ V. Our knowledge consists of three kinds:— 1. Knowledge of *things or facts* directly perceived through the senses, and of the ideas, feelings, and other modes of consciousness flowing from and induced by such perception. 2. Knowledge of *statements of facts* received by us through our senses from other persons who profess to have had direct cognisance thereof; and of the opinions and sentiments of other persons respecting facts. Of this kind of knowledge, therefore, our perceptions are indirect. 3. *Inferences* deduced by the reason and formed in our minds from and out of the things contained in the above two classes.

§ VI. The first kind of knowledge is to be accepted by us without dispute: the facts which compose it are the basis of all knowledge. Once ascertained, they are not to be impeached; there is no appeal against them. Inferences drawn from them may mislead, but the facts themselves remain unshaken. The second kind of knowledge must be compared with facts belonging to the first class: either with respect to the subject-matter which constitutes it, or respecting the persons from whom it proceeds; also with other statements on the same subject. In other words, it is to be verified. The third kind of

knowledge depends for its value on the correctness of the facts from which it is deduced, and on the accuracy of the process of deduction; also deductions from it—the consequences it involves—are to be practically tested: and it is to be accepted or not, according as it does or does not appear to be contained in, or to flow from, certain and verified facts, and to correspond in its practical consequences with the results of observation and experiment.

§ VII. A man's knowledge then, so far as it is real, and not mere opinion, ultimately rests on, or consists of and is reduced to, facts either directly perceived, or verified by direct consciousness. Of the ideas and notions contained in his mind, no part is real or absolutely reliable but such as can be traced to this root. The rest is only conjecture, opinion, unverified statement more or less probable, or verified falsehood.

§ VIII. The amount of certain knowledge, therefore, that a man possesses, depends on his perceptive powers; on the things presented to him to be perceived, or his opportunities; and on his capability of drawing inferences from his perceptions, and of following a train of reasoning. And it follows that, although the amount of absolute knowledge men possess varies according to their several natural capacities and their opportunities, yet every man has some such fund to which he can on occasion appeal; and that such knowledge, be it much or little, is all that he has to light him on his way,—constitutes his sole certain revelation. Also that whatever knowledge exists which has not either been directly per-

ceived by him, or verified, or deduced from facts known or verified by him—is not knowledge to him: it is the same to him as if non-existing—to him it is no revelation.

§ IX. Every man, therefore, has a revelation within himself, more or less; a testimony to which he can appeal:—*the testimony of consciousness.* And he who wishes to know what certain knowledge he possesses, must interrogate consciousness.

§ X. Consciousness has been revealed to man in three forms, or, in other words, there are three revelations of consciousness:—a physical revelation; a psychical; and a spiritual: and all existing things of which we are conscious belong to one or the other of these three.

Things presented to our perceptions as objects of sense, with our ideas, notions, and conceptions (*See* Note D, Appendix) respecting such things, make up the physical revelation. This class of things includes our own bodies, and comprises all its material surroundings. It is customary to apply to such things the term *physical* (from *phusis*, nature), in accordance with the prevalent, but questionable, practice of limiting the word *nature* to objects of sense. The facts of which this class of things is composed constitute the physical world, and form the subject-matter of the physical sciences.

The second form of consciousness, or the psychical revelation, is composed of things the existence of which is made known to each person either directly, through his organic sense (*See* Note E, Appendix), which reveals to him his own personal existence as a

being possessing consciousness, connected with a physical body, and the subject of various forms of sensation and feeling; or indirectly, through his outward senses, which, revealing to him other bodies more or less similar to his own, thereby furnish to his reason grounds for inferring the existence of other beings also possessing consciousness and connected with such physical bodies. Such beings, not being directly perceived by him, necessarily only exist in his mind as notions or conceptions. To this class of things the word *psychical* (from *psyche*, soul), may perhaps without impropriety be applied; and it will be so used in this treatise. Of the beings which compose it, all that we know is, that each of them manifests in a greater or less degree the phenomena of consciousness.

The last division of consciousness—the spiritual—consists of things which are perceived neither through the internal organic sense, nor through any of the outward senses, but are presented to the mind only through the medium of notions and conceptions deduced by the reason from facts furnished by the two other forms of consciousness. Such things, presenting themselves (usually, at any rate) in no physical bodily form cognisable by the senses, may be rightly called *spiritual.*

To each of the above three forms of revelation, the statements and criteria of truth contained in §§ V., VI., VII., equally apply. The soundness of this proposition will not probably be at once admitted by every one with respect to the third form—the spiritual revelation; or at least only so far as that branch of it extends which is called natural theology,—a branch of theology

which it is usual to limit to such considerations only as observations of the physical world could suggest—a limitation which, however, cannot be maintained, for the psychical world, or that of mind, unquestionably forms a part of nature, and everywhere, and at all times, notions on spiritual matters have originated from psychical observation. As the conclusions of natural theology are not professed to be based on other grounds than observations of fact, all must admit that to such the proposition stated above will apply; but a little reflection will show that it is equally applicable to the so-called *supernatural*. I perceive certain physical phenomena that seem to contradict well-known natural laws based on general experience;—am I to conclude that something supernatural has occurred, or am I not? That I perceive the phenomena is a fact of consciousness that must be accepted; but is the inference such fact appears to lead to correct? The phenomena which have entered my consciousness may not comprise the whole of the fact that has occurred: it may be a natural event not comprehended, and which, if fully understood, would be found to be in harmony with the laws of nature. Or some of the circumstances may have been suppressed by artifice: it may have been a juggler's trick. Or, lastly, my senses may be in disorder, and the phenomena have had no existence outside my own consciousness. All of these points must be cleared up before I form my conclusion. If all these suppositions are negatived, and the facts perceived by me point to but one conclusion, I am then—but in such case alone—compelled by my reason to accept such conclusion, and to believe that I have witnessed a supernatural occurrence. Again:—the phenomena have occurred, say, to another person, and I am asked to believe them on his testimony, either direct, or transmitted through other persons. I must in such case consider, was *he* imposed upon by his senses?—or by artifice?—or by nature not manifesting herself fully? Also, is his testimony trustworthy?—must I believe that the phenomena he describes *really* entered his consciousness?—is he imposing wilfully?—is he an accurate observer? If his statement has stood the application of these tests, then I must believe. If I have detected the fallacy, then I disbelieve. If I have been able neither to prove nor disprove the statement, then I suspend my judgment.

§ XI. In every difficulty or perplexity then, our only legitimate appeal is to the facts of our consciousness; or in other words, to our reason:—for our reason is the medium through which the appeal is made. All reasoning starts from, or is based on, facts of our consciousness—either facts directly perceived, or verified statements. Starting from these in the first instance, trains of thought travel in every direction from conclusion to conclusion; each terminus forming a starting-point for fresh trains: and these various stations, thus established in the mind, constitute the grounds or reasons on which we base our opinions and justify our conduct. And the method of interrogating consciousness is the same, and depends on the same principles, whether the appeal is made to the objects of thought or to those of sense. The man who is seeking either to understand the objects around him, or to proceed on a difficult and obscure path, must, whether in the world of *thought* or in that of *sense*, so regulate his attitude—mentally in the one case, bodily in the other—as to secure for himself and maintain the following conditions:—1. *Uprightness;* so as to command the whole range of the horizon possible to him. 2. *Circumspection;* he must look around him, survey surrounding objects impartially, giving each its due attention, and so avoid partial views. 3. He must be *vigilant*, lest some fleeting occurrence escape him, or some event take him by surprise. 4. He must not only be circumspect, but must keep in sight the things beneath him—must give them their due attention; taking care,

however, while stooping to them, not to lose self-control. And sometimes, when night has overtaken him, and no light reflected from the objects around and beneath reaches him to guide his steps, he is driven to lift his eyes upwards in search of any heavenly bodies that may be visible, and to regulate his course by their unerring indications.

And if these are clouded also and the darkness is complete, then all he can do is to grope his way empirically, guided only either by things with which he has come into actual contact—his personal experience—or by such hearsay as may seem most in accord with his personal experience—with his own impressions. And above all—being a necessary condition of all the rest—he must preserve *freedom* of movement, and perfect *equilibrium;* by which alone he can guard against a fall, and secure at all times just views.

And the result of the appeal will depend on the manner in which it has been made, and on the occasion which has called it forth. If all the circumstances of the case have been present in the sphere of consciousness and within the range of clear vision, and the eye has been *rightly* directed, then they will be duly perceived, and right judgments formed thereon. If they have lain either altogether out of the mental range, or at such a distance that no distinct perception could be obtained, then either *ignorance* will exist about them, or only confused notions; and no conclusion will be arrived at: the observers in such case can only guess. If, lying somewhat nearer, they are seen imperfectly,

some of the features being left out and others appearing different from the actual fact, then *erroneous* conclusions will be formed. Or, lying within the range of clear vision, they may be misunderstood from *carelessness;* or, although obvious, be unattended to through *negligence.* Or, lastly, there is the case in which the eye of the observer has been unduly attracted—fascinated perhaps—by some object or set of objects; so that others have been altogether excluded from view, or at least have not received their due share of attention. This class of persons includes both the dreamer with eye fixed on some distant and lofty object—perhaps in the clouds, and the low-minded man, who minds only earthly things. Such men *will* not—and sometimes, enslaved by habit, *cannot*—use their reason. They both of them fail in their judgments through folly; and the low-minded man is base as well.

Using the reason, then, means applying the mental eye to the facts of our consciousness: and the conditions which interfere with its successful action are ignorance, carelessness, and wilfulness. Our "sins, negligences, and ignorances," are the true source of all our errors and miseries; and as we have it in our power to avoid the first two of these, we are for them *personally* responsible. The causes which produce them—at least the *proximate* causes—lie in our own persons, and not in circumstances.

§ XII. The duty of a man therefore, whether in hunting for truth or in seeking to act rightly, is to give the facts of his consciousness due attention, and to form his opinions and guide his conduct

according to the voice of reason thus elicited. That is his whole moral duty—to obey his reason. He who does this is a conscientious man. The conscience is the faculty or sense which is affected pleasurably or painfully according as one is or is not conscious of having performed rightly this duty. It is concerned equally in the pursuit of speculative truth and in the practical conduct of life. The voice of the conscience is the response of the soul to the revelations of consciousness respecting the manner in which this duty has been performed.

In asserting that it is the duty of a man to use and be guided by his reason, it is not intended that he is to admit no opinion into his mind and to perform no act until such opinion or act has been submitted consciously to a reasoning process: such a proceeding would be altogether impossible to accomplish, and the attempt would only render him a useless and insufferable pedant. What has been said is, that in every *difficulty* and *perplexity* this process should be performed. By far the greater number of our notions of the everyday events of life—whether founded on our own impressions or on the statements of others—have been formed without sufficient proof, and are, in a great measure, taken on trust. And very reasonably so; for the import of most things is so trifling that their verification is not worth the labour. It is only when the phenomena are exceptional in their character or grave in their import, that the reason requires to be set in action. And the more exceptional and important the phenomena, the more careful and searching should be the inquiry. These propositions cannot be denied, yet the very reverse system has been, and still is, on many subjects, both inculcated and acted upon. While on matters of minor importance we are encouraged to, and praised if we, exercise our reason; on others, containing statements altogether transcending ordinary experience, and involving consequences most important, it is sought to restrain its free exercise, or even to prohibit it altogether. And the

principle which it has always been attempted to substitute for it is *authority;* not the authority which submits its credentials to examination, and rests its claims for trust on reasonable grounds, but that which refuses altogether to be questioned. Even in physical researches, the free use of the reason is interfered with whenever its conclusions come into collision with established views. Thus Galileo's demonstration of the movement of the earth was, for a time, suppressed by authority; and thus, even in our own day, it is abundantly evident that much, at any rate, of the opposition which Mr Darwin's theory of the Origin of Species encounters, springs from the fact that it interferes with notions propounded by authority. Still more evident and effective is the opposition of authority to reason when we come to questions involving moral or theological views—the subject-matter of the last two of the three divisions of consciousness spoken of above. It would be easy to show that, with regard to the first of these two, there are moral and social questions of vital importance, concerning which our ideas and opinions are utterly confused and contradictory, yet into which any attempt to intrude the reason would, by many persons, be resented as if an attack on humanity itself were intended; while the spiritual revelation is openly asserted and maintained to be one made through no natural faculty whatever, and to rest on grounds with which the reason has nothing to do. Authority is a principle rightly resorted to with those who either have no reasoning faculty or will make no use of it—with the immature, the insane, or the vicious; but to apply it to those who are trying to use their reason, is as if those who had eyes were told to shut them and follow the first voice they heard. To follow leaders is right, and to put trust in them is right also; but those only are to be trusted who prove, by facts visible to the eye, their claim to the title. Doubtless those who teach that reason should be subordinate to authority, and not authority to reason, are actuated by an honest fear lest reliance on a human faculty should lead to error; but this arises from an imperfect conception of the nature and true function of the reason. They, in fact, tell us to avoid fallacies by getting rid of the faculty which is expressly given us to preserve us from fallacy.

It will be one of the objects of the present work to show that *all* the revelations of consciousness are revelations made through

the natural faculties—either of actual facts, perceived directly through the senses, or of truth, evolved by the reason from such facts—and capable of being verified in the same manner and by the same method ; and that in all alike we are bound to "give a *reason* for the faith which is in us."

It having been shown that the facts of consciousness are the source of all our knowledge, and that moral duty consists simply in directing our attention *in the right manner* to such facts, and interpreting them by the reason ; it now remains to consider separately each of the primary divisions into which it has been stated consciousness can be divided.

CHAPTER II.

PHYSICAL.

§ XIII. The most elementary fact of consciousness, and that which almost of necessity we must assume to be the first in order of time, is the consciousness of our own existence. This fact is revealed through the organic sense, or that sense through which enter consciousness all facts which are represented as belonging to, or occurring within, the conscious being itself;—all phenomena of which self is perceived to be the subject. Bodily pain and pleasure, in all their endless varieties, and, at a later period of our conscious experience, emotion and feeling of every kind, belong to this head. That such a sense or faculty exists is certain, as it is a distinct fact of consciousness; and it is also certain that it depends on material change in the body itself, and is performed through the instrumentality of a material organ or set of organs, although the precise seat in the body of such organs may not be absolutely determined; for it is an admitted physiological truth that all the facts of consciousness are dependent for their existence on the action of material organs. As, however, the operation of this faculty and the facts which belong to it relate to the psyche itself—to the

psychical revelation—the proper place to discuss them will be under that head.

The facts of the physical revelation enter the mind exclusively through the avenues of which the five *external* senses, as they are called, are the portals. They all belong to the *objective* class of phenomena, presenting objects to be perceived by the conscious being as things distinct from itself; in contradistinction to *subjective* phenomena, all of which are excluded from this category. The human body itself belongs to this objective class, being—like all other physical things—an object presented to the external senses; and our knowledge of its existence is obtained through their instrumentality alone. A being, deprived of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, would not be aware that he had a body; although he might be conceived feeling all the sensations which are usually called "bodily." By the exertion of the five external senses and the internal organic sense combined we perceive that our body exists, and that we exist connected with and dependent on it in some mysterious way. When we talk of bodily sensations, we speak loosely. It is the psyche that feels: the body no more has sensations than it has thoughts and emotions.

§ XIV. Although, however, the body does not feel, yet the proximate cause of sensation and of every feeling to which the psyche is subject—of all subjective phenomena—lies within it, and such subjective phenomena are awakened in consciousness through a bodily organ. And the same may be said of objective phenomena. All the objects that we

perceive through the external senses are in like manner awakened in consciousness through material bodily organs: the only difference in the two cases being, that while in the subjective class of phenomena, the fact is presented as existing in the body itself, wherein its exciting cause actually lies; in the objective class, it is presented as existing not in the body but in surrounding things, and its exciting cause (usually at least) actually resides in things outside the body.

In the body, therefore, the proximate cause of both the objective and the subjective phenomena is to be found. This being so, a brief digression on the nature of the body itself, its position in the physical world and relation to other things, and the manner in which our existing physiological notions justify us in conceiving that it acts as a connecting medium between the worlds of mind and of matter—may not be without use in assisting us to understand the nature of the physical revelation and the mode of its communication.

§ XV. The human body is the crowning point of the physical world: it is the highest structure of the highest order of physical things, to which things, however, it in every respect and entirely belongs. It is formed on the same plan in every particular as that of other organised beings, only more elaborate and complete; its mode of production is similar to that of other organisms; its laws of development are the same; and the functional phenomena which it exhibits are analogous,—the same in kind, but differing in degree; it presents the same history,

obeys the same laws, and comes to the same end. It also is formed of the same materials. The human body is composed of matter which, originally inorganic, has passed into and become organic in the vegetable, and a portion of which sometimes has also been further elaborated in the animal;—in short, of food. The vegetable is formed directly out of the inorganic kingdom of matter; the herbivorous animal out of the vegetable; the carnivorous animal out of the herbivorous; and man, the omnivorous, out of both the herbivorous animal and the vegetable. He therefore, physically speaking, stands in relation to these two as an effect to a cause. Their organic matter entering his body, and there submitted to the action of certain of its organs whose proper function it is so to act, is more highly elaborated and organised, and in the form of blood, is distributed to every part of the body; of which blood, one portion being decomposed by the oxygen of the air in the course of its circulation through the body, and restored again to the inorganic kingdom, gives back to the organism the force which it had received from it in its upward progress from that kingdom, and thereby furnishes it with its dynamic supply; while the remaining undecomposed portion affords the material necessary for the maintenance of the integrity of the organs through which the dynamic element acts.

Now, were this all, the human body would be merely a more elaborate vegetable—a structure extracting from the material around it just sufficient for its growth, maintenance, and reproduction—a

combination of molecules of matter in perpetual change, and exhibiting, through the mutual actions and reactions of the constituents of the molecular current which is constantly passing through it and which composes it, the phenomena which we call *Life;*—and serving no other purpose.

But to vitalise food, and out of it to maintain and reproduce itself, is neither all, nor the chief part of, the purpose for which the human body exists and which its food enables it to fulfil. What the vegetable does indirectly and by sacrifice, that the vegetable-like organs in the human body—those which in structure and function are analogous to the vegetable—do directly and in fulfilment of their normal purpose,—viz., create and maintain by their work another and a higher organisation. Just as the kingdom of life springs out of the inorganic kingdom, so does the kingdom of mind spring out of that of life. The one fundamental attribute of mind is, as has been said, consciousness. Now this consciousness, all experience tells us, always exists in connection with a peculiar structure, *nerve-matter.* There is no evidence of consciousness existing apart from this matter: also, with a few doubtful exceptions, where-ever the nerve-matter exists, consciousness exists also. Moreover, these two things always co-exist, as to development, in the same proportions. Even in the lowest grades of the animal kingdom which exhibit any sign of nerve-structure, there is reason to believe that some feeble consciousness is present, and, as the nervous system advances in development in the higher grades of animals, consciousness and mental

phenomena develop in the same proportion. And further, experience also tells us that no modification of, or change in, consciousness can occur—whether such change be effected by the action of surrounding things on the conscious being, mind being the passive element concerned therein; or by the action of the conscious being on outward things, mind being the active element—without such change or modification of consciousness being associated with material change in the nerve-matter. Lastly, a further investigation of the phenomena informs us that this connection of consciousness with nerve-matter does not exist throughout the entire nervous system, but occurs only in those central masses of nerve-matter, or ganglia, which collectively constitute the *brain*. Impressions from without—the undulations of the imponderable ether which fall on the retina of the eye; those of the elastic air which strike the ear; the volatile, odorous, material particles which enter the nostrils; the sapid constituents of the food which, dissolved in saliva, are distributed over the palate; and the more or less solid substances which we handle, or which come into contact with the surface of our bodies;—together with those produced by the physical change and organic action taking place within the body itself, do not as such enter into the sphere of consciousness at all; but the changes produced by them on the extremities of the nerves of the several organs of sense give rise to currents which, electric-like, proceed along those nerves to the central brain-masses or ganglia, and there—acting on the molecules of phosphorus, nitrogen,

carbon, hydrogen, &c., which, held together by organic force at high tension but in unstable equilibrium, compose those masses—give rise to changes (chemical, electric, or *sui generis,*) which, by a mysterious process altogether inscrutable and inconceivable to our minds, are perceived as *phenomena* within that sphere, being therein translated into colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and the various modifications of touch and of organic sensation,—in short, into all that forms the elementary facts of our consciousness.

§ XVI. That the material seat of all our sensations and perceptions is in the brain (including in that word the sensory ganglia), not in the organs of sense, is one of the most certain of physiological truths. Excitement of the sensory ganglia—either by the action of medicinal agents or by pathological bodily conditions—will give rise in consciousness to phenomena similar in every respect to those produced by impressions from things outside the body, even when no such impressions are received through the organs of sense; and conversely—if the medium of communication between the sensory ganglion and its organ of sense be cut off, an impression on such organ will not be perceived, nor give rise to any phenomena in consciousness. The phenomena of dreams, delirium, hallucinations or illusions of the senses — spectral, auditory, &c. — also anæsthetic pathological conditions, afford ample evidence of this truth. And the statement is equally true of the subjective or psychical phenomena of consciousness. That the *proximate* cause of our subjective conscious-

ness resides in the brain, and not in the other parts of the body, is proved by the fact that consciousness of the subjective existence of a limb and sensations of pain referred to it are experienced after the actual material limb has been removed from the body; and conversely—perceptions of the subjective existence of different portions of the body may be lost to consciousness, while such portions still exist objectively; as when a limb is felt to be dead, while still forming a part of the body. The presence of a fact in consciousness—whether a sensation or a perception—a subjective or objective—psychical or physical fact—only proves an excited condition of the brain-structure. Its existence as a fact is to be admitted; but what it indicates is altogether matter of inference, to be determined by investigation into the circumstances with which it is connected. As a rule, we accept the obvious inferences from our perceptions as correct, because experience shows that they usually are to be depended upon; and it is only when our suspicions are excited that we question them, and apply our reason to the case. The slightest reflection also will confirm the other proposition stated above, that light, colours, sounds, tastes, &c., are phenomena existing in the mind-sphere and belonging to the mental, and not to the material, factor in consciousness. There is no conceivable analogy between such phenomena and the organic material action taking place in the brain, whether such action be supposed to be of an electric character or to consist in chemical changes in the phosphorus, nitrogen, carbon, &c., which make up its material. Modern science is

reducing our notions of *all* material action to the simple one of imperceptible molecules of matter in various phases of motion. Such conditions can neither be exhibited to sense nor conceived in thought as identical with the phenomena which are presented to us in consciousness. The two classes of things are fundamentally distinct, and will not admit of comparison.

The conclusion that the seat of the physical phenomena perceived in consciousness is the mind, not the outside material world, may be demonstrated in another way. The perceived object must be situated either in the outside material world—be, in fact, the actual material thing; or within the material body—in the organ of sense or its ganglion; or it must be in the mind itself. That it is not the actual material thing has been shown already; for it is sometimes present when this is absent, and sometimes absent when this is present; and our reason tells us that things of which this can be said, must be distinct from each other. Neither is it situated within the body; for this is contradicted by the direct testimony of consciousness, which represents it as differently placed with regard to the body. It follows that both it and the body, as perceived in consciousness, are situated in the mind—are mental phenomena; and the facts justify the conclusion that such phenomena have as their proximate cause cerebral change, and usually, as their remote cause, outside material fact.

And if the physical perceptions are phenomena of mind, it follows from a precisely similar line of

reasoning that our sensations are mental phenomena also. That such sensations do not depend for their existence on the material structure to which they are referred has already been demonstrated; while that they occupy the sphere of consciousness equally with the physical phenomena must be admitted. If therefore that sphere be a mental one, they must be mental phenomena.

§ XVII. The conclusion must therefore be accepted as based both on reason and on the direct testimony of our perceptions, that both the physical objects which we perceive and our so-called "bodily sensations," are strictly mental phenomena; and, this admitted, it will be unnecessary to add that the other phenomena of consciousness—objects of thought as well as objects of sense, emotions as well as sensations—are all mental phenomena also. They are all phenomena existing in the mind entirely, although there is abundant physiological and pathological evidence to show that all of them always require for their production the condition of material change taking place within the brain. Until we have reflected on the subject, we confound the perceptions excited by material things with the things themselves that excite such perceptions. When science has corrected this error and taught that matter—the cause of physical consciousness—is a thing unattainable by direct perception, and that, necessarily, all that we can ever know respecting it must be derived from the physical phenomena which it occasions, then some men have run into the opposite extreme, and denied its existence altogether.

The existence of matter is an inference of reason from the facts of consciousness, and it therefore belongs to the third class of knowledge spoken of in § V. It is a fact of consciousness, but a rational one: a deduction, not an axiom of sense. But this class of knowledge is as certain as any other. The existence of matter is as certain as that of mind, but its nature is quite beyond our reach.

§ XVIII. As the whole of the physical phenomena of consciousness are mental, not material,—phenomena belonging to and developed within the mental sphere, not obtruded into it from the material world,—it follows that the physical facts which each person's consciousness presents to him—his physical consciousness—exist to such person in a form peculiar to himself; that his objective physical perceptions are as much his individual property as his thoughts, ideas, &c. are; and that such physical perceptions only resemble those of another person so far as the two occupy the same stand-point, and possess brains and organs of sense structurally and functionally in the same condition.

§ XIX. Each man's consciousness, then, is a distinct thing, separated from every other man's, as are the several flowers on a plant, the several fruits on a tree: separate, but united through the common medium, matter, which connects them with each other and with the parent trunk. Matter and mind are therefore inseparably connected. Mind and matter are words used to convey ideas of two things which consciousness presents as distinct, and which must be considered as the fundamental elements of

thought, but of the absolute nature of which we are and must remain equally ignorant; since no sense exists by which they can be presented directly in consciousness. All that we are cognisant of is the phenomena which their mutual action on each other occasions, and, by reasoning on these phenomena, we infer that the one, in the form of brain, is the common source of the forces by which such phenomena are generated, and the other the common receptacle in which they are comprehended or contained. And thus, on the very threshold of inquiry, we are taught the important lesson, which every step of advance confirms, that we are quite unable to conceive the absolute nature of any one thing; but that all our knowledge is phenomenal only. All we know on this subject of matter and mind is, that there is on the one hand the highest material product, brain; and on the other, mind; and that these two are co-related. That whenever the former exists, rightly organised and supplied with the conditions requisite for the performance of its functions, the latter exists also. That whenever the functions of the material organ are interfered with, the phenomena of the mental factor are deranged; and that, if the functions of the material factor are suspended or destroyed, the phenomena presented by the mental factor cease also.

The ancient controversy respecting the nature of mind, whether material or immaterial, has in modern times, until recently, been permitted to sleep; a condition which many causes have contributed to produce. The moralist and theologian, long accustomed to base their dogmas on authority alone, have viewed with

comparative indifference all theories deduced either from physical science or from metaphysical speculation. The metaphysician, hedged in on all sides by the dogmas of theology, which he was not free to transgress, has been engaged for the most part in pursuing phantoms, the productions of the fogs which his close and darkened territory has so prolifically engendered; while the cultivator of physical science has been slowly and painfully plodding on his way, collecting his facts and generalising thereon, guided by the sure light of inductive reason. And the result is, that opinion is gradually drifting into materialism. In the process of inquiry it has been ascertained that the two classes of things into which all phenomena are divided, the physical and the psychical, depend alike for their manifestation on a material thing, the brain; and, as it has been taken for granted by the physical inquirer, for want of sufficient metaphysical knowledge, that the former—the physical phenomena—have a material basis, logically, and as a natural consequence, the opinion is growing in his mind that the psychical phenomena have a material basis also. Both classes of phenomena are situated in the same sphere, and hold towards the brain a similar relationship. If that sphere be a material one, then both of them are material phenomena. Or put it in another way:—If the physical things which are presented in consciousness as objects of sense, and which impress the mind as such, be in truth the very identical material things which impress through the material organs of sense the brain-substance, then the mind itself—the thing impressed by such objects—must be, by a parity of reasoning, that substance; and materialism results. And the effect of such reasoning upon the mind of the physical inquirer is much increased by the fact, that the influence of considerations which might be advanced against such view from other sources is so weakened as to be virtually of no avail. Metaphysics he has been accustomed to consider a mere mist-land, in which fancies are taken for realities, and into which whoever ventures will be lost; while the same cause, the advance of physical science, which is impelling him in this materialistic direction, is, gradually but infallibly, bringing about another thing, viz., the downfall of all dogmas, theological or otherwise, which do not rest on a rational basis. This question then of the materiality or otherwise of the physical phenomena of consciousness becomes one of vast importance, involving among

other things the question of the immortality of the soul—the psyche. For on the one hand, if the view of the materiality of these phenomena be adopted, then it will be impossible to escape the conclusion that the thing conscious of these phenomena is material also ; and that all the other phenomena of consciousness, whether objective or subjective, are material ; and that when the material organ, the brain, undergoes dissolution and dispersion of its elements, the mind and all its contents suffer disintegration and annihilation. On the other hand, if the view be taken that these physical phenomena are objects called into existence within the mind itself and formed out of its substance—so to speak, then the subjective phenomena must also be viewed as having mind and not matter as their basis ; and room will be left for the reception of conclusions respecting this unknown essence, mind, which considerations drawn from other sources may induce us to entertain.

§ XX. In the brain, then, the two elements into which all things of which we possess any knowledge are ultimately resolvable, matter and mind, come into contact; and in the human brain the highest forms of each: and by the mutual action of these two elements all the phenomena of consciousness are produced. The human brain is the highest product of the material world. In its structure, material organisation is exhibited in its most elaborate form, and physical force stored up in its highest intensity; and whenever any part of this structure undergoes change or any portion of this force is let loose, then some object is perceived or some feeling experienced in the mind. If the action occur in the sensory ganglia, then the object perceived is one of sense, and the feeling a sensation. If the material change occur in the higher brain-masses, then the object perceived is an idea, and the feeling a sentiment or

emotion. And the vividness of the mental phenomena depends on the intensity of the cerebral action. If the force let loose be abundant and of high tension, then the perceptions and ideas are numerous and brilliant, and the sensations and emotions keen and strong. If the cerebral action be slow and feeble, then the perceptions are dull and the feelings torpid. If the cerebral action be unimpeded and harmonious, then the perceptions and feelings are untroubled and agreeable. If the cerebral action be impeded and discordant, then the perceptions and feelings are disagreeable and confused. On the amount and rapidity of generation of this nerve-force—this cerebral electricity, on the part of the brain whence it issues or in which it operates, on the concordance of its action with the brain-structure, the mental condition depends. On this it depends whether our perceptions and our thoughts be brilliant or dull, clear or confused, rapid or sluggish; whether we ourselves are tranquil or emotional, apathetic or passionate; exalted with joy or prostrated by grief; intoxicated with pleasure or agonized with pain. All the phantoms, apparitions, appearances, phenomena, or by whatever name they are called, that come and go "in the soul's haunted cell," are but the coinage of the brain, although the mind furnishes the substance upon which the stamp is impressed and the region in which the coin is set in circulation. And conversely, whenever mind takes the initiative and acts through the will—whether in the realm of thought or that of sense—force is let loose, and change of structure occurs in that part of

the brain which supplies the material instruments through which it operates. Now it is to maintain the incessant dynamic action thus going on in the brain in connection with the mental operations, and to repair the waste caused thereby, that the food of the human body is mainly applied. Compared with what is required for this purpose, that portion of the food prepared by the assimilative organs which is appropriated for their own wants and for those of other organs not concerned in producing mental phenomena, is altogether insignificant. Nutrition, which is an end in the vegetable and lower animal, is a means in man. We eat to live, not live to eat. Our life is mental, not vegetable.

The crowning point, then, of the human body, that for which all the other parts exist and to which they are tending, is the brain—the material condition of both physical and psychical consciousness. And thus from the inorganic kingdom—from the dust of the earth—a structure is reared in which matter and mind come into contact and blend, and there is

> "One first matter all,
> Endued with various forms, various degrees
> Of structure, and, in things that live, of life :
> But more refined, more spirituous and pure,
> As nearer to Him placed or nearer tending,
> Each in their several active spheres assigned,
> 'Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
> Proportioned to its kind. So, from the root
> Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
> More aery, last the bright consummate flowers,
> Spirits odorous breathes ; flowers and their fruits,
> Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed,
> To Vital spirits aspire, to Animal,
> To Intellectual."

Having thus been put in possession of what may be considered in the main a fair representation, as far as it goes, of the present state of knowledge respecting the part the human body plays with reference to the phenomena of consciousness, the reader will be in a better position to follow the analysis of such phenomena, and the inquiry may be proceeded with.

§ XXI. The facts of the Physical Revelation enter consciousness, as has been said, through the avenues of the five external senses. Impressions from without, whether from our own bodies (which with reference to the seat of consciousness, the brain, may be considered to be *without*) or from material things distinct from our bodies, strike on the outward extremities of the nerves of sense, and there give rise to nerve-currents which are transmitted to the cerebral extremities of these nerves, and are received at those parts of the brain which are called the sensory ganglia, and which united constitute the sensorium; and simultaneously with the arrival of these nerve-currents, objective phenomena, in the form of objects of sense, spring up in consciousness: if the optic ganglia be acted upon, colours and lights and shades; if the auditory ganglia, sounds; if the olfactory, smells; the gustatory, tastes; the ganglia of touch, tactile phenomena. And the affection produced on the senses by such phenomena depends on the effect produced by the nerve-current on the sensory ganglia. If this effect be in accordance with its structural organisation, so as to elicit and call into energy harmoniously its functional capabilities, then, agreement existing between the impressing thing

and the thing impressed, the resulting phenomena are harmonious — as when a musical instrument receives impressions in accordance with its structure and functions—and the object perceived in consciousness is *agreeable* to the senses. If the impression on the sensory ganglia be discordant with its material organisation—act, as it were, against its grain—then, its function being impeded, a consciousness of disagreement is experienced, and the object perceived is sensuously *disagreeable.* Sensuous pleasure and displeasure, then, depend on the agreement or disagreement of the organic action set up in the sensory ganglia with the organisation of such ganglia; action taking place in accordance with structure producing the one, action taking place antagonistically therewith the other, and between the two extreme points of the agreeable and the disagreeable there exists every grade of each until the medium of indifference is reached. To by far the greater number of our perceptions we are sensuously indifferent, and they would be altogether passed over without notice, were it not that many of them by their presence call up in consciousness, or suggest, other things already existing in the mind, between which and themselves there may happen to be affinity. In this way this class of objects produce a far greater effect in consciousness than any sensuous excitement is capable of causing, and they are in fact the most important class of all the objects of sense. Other phenomena of the subjective kind, besides those of the sensuously pleasing and displeasing, may be produced in consciousness by impressions of a physical

character made by outside things on the nerves of the body. As when the impression has been of such a nature as to disorganise the structure in which such nerves are distributed, or by its violence or long continuance to exhaust or impair the function of the organ of sense, or of its sensory ganglia: in such cases the organic sensibility is roused and corporeal sensations are excited. These subjective phenomena are in every case probably produced through the agency of a special system of nerves which, distributed throughout the body, telegraph to the brain, and thence to the mind, all corporeal affections of any importance, whether agreeable or disagreeable, occurring in structures with which they are connected. And it is further noteworthy that in proportion that subjective phenomena, whether sensuous or corporeal, are excited in consciousness by an impressing thing, in the same proportion does objective perception of such thing become dim, so as sometimes to be altogether lost; every kind of consciousness being absorbed in that of feeling.

External impressions then, to attract notice, must either suggest ideas or excite sensuous or corporeal feelings in the mind.

If the brain consisted only of the sensory ganglia, the phenomena of consciousness would be limited to this revelation of sensations and of objects of sense, and our inquiry would here terminate. And this no doubt is pretty nearly the actual condition which obtains in the lower invertebrated animals, which present no trace of cerebral hemispheres, and whose cerebral organs comprise little or nothing higher than sensory ganglia and their appendages. Such have neither ideas, memory, thought, or will; and their consciousness is necessarily limited to that of the things actually

present to sense. But in the higher invertebrata and in vertebrated animals, another and more important set of organs, the hemispheres or intellectual ganglia, present themselves; and these in man are as much, in relative magnitude and complicity of structure, above the sensory ganglia, as the extensive and complicated stock of ideas stored in his memory exceed the actual amount of objects present at any one time to his sensorial consciousness. It is these organs that are principally concerned in the production of the phenomena that belong to the human consciousness; the sensory ganglia constituting only the portals through which such phenomena pass.

§ XXII. Impressions on the senses, then, which are too feeble to excite vivid phenomena in consciousness, and which suggest no idea, are passed over altogether, and the phenomena which they occasion in consciousness are unobserved; while those which excite the organs of sense sufficiently, are noticed and form a starting-point for other phenomena. The vividness of the impression attracts the attention of the mind to the object which has occasioned it, and thus a *perception* is formed in the mind of such objects; the object of sense is perceived. Instantaneously with the cessation of the outer impression the object of sense vanishes from consciousness, but there remains in the mind a feeble shadow of the same, an *idea*, lodged in the memory, where it remains latent, like an undeveloped photograph, but liable to be recalled to consciousness by any other idea entering the mind, which, being related to it in some way, may have an affinity for it, and, through its attraction develop it again or rouse it from its dormant condition—or, as it is customary to say, may *suggest* it. Every repetition of the external impression on the organ of sense produces a fresh perception,

and a fresh idea of the thing perceived; and these successive ideas as they arrive, or are formed, combining with the original one, the resultant idea grows more and more complete, forming a more and more perfect *notion* of the outward thing from which the impressions proceed; just as a copy is formed by a draughtsman by repeated touches. An *object of sense*, then, is a fact or phenomenon of consciousness produced by an impression made by or proceeding from an outward material thing on the organ of sense. A *perception* is an attended to object or fact of consciousness. An *idea* is an image or shadow of a perception. And a *notion* is the result of one or more acts of perception—the sum of the ideas in the mind respecting anything which has at any time been an object of perception. And such notion is more or less complete and accurate in proportion to the opportunities which have been offered favourable to the perceiving process, the amount of attention bestowed, and the perfection of the organs of sense and brain-ganglia employed. A notion, therefore, should be more perfect than any individual perception, for it is the sum of many.

The mental condition of *attention* is either an active state of the mind, taking place through the intervention of the will—in which case we say "the attention is directed to such and such a thing;" or a passive state, taking place without, or even antagonistically to, the agency of the will—and then we say that "the attention is called or attracted to such and such a thing," or that "it forces itself on the mind" or "strikes the attention." In the former case, in which the mind is active and operates through its voluntary powers, an idea is always the immediate exciting cause, and the material instruments involved in the process are those ganglia of the brain which are concerned in the conservation of

ideas and in the mental operations; in the latter case, the exciting cause may be either an intense sensation or a vivid object of sense, or an emotion produced by a vivid idea; and the motive force is performed as in the former instance, only without the intervention of the will.

The perceptions which the mind receives from outward things at any time, depend as much on its own condition at the time at which they are received as on the outward things which are their source. They vary with the powers and capacities of the organs of sense in different minds, and perhaps still more with those of the organ of ideas. Also, according as the mind is occupied with other subjects, or disengaged and free to perceive; according as the brain is fatigued and feeble, or fresh and energetic; stupefied with narcotics, or excited by stimulants; and especially, according to the stock of ideas which it possesses stored in the memory and ready to be called up by suggesting impressions. How different are the perceptions formed in the child's mind and those of the instructed, experienced man, when witnessing the same scene! To the child almost all the objects presented would be equally novel, and those would be most attractive in which the sensuous or sensational element predominated. By the man these would probably be passed by altogether as familiar and trite, and the attention would be more likely to be directed to the less striking parts of the scene, sensationally speaking—to objects which, situated more profoundly and more remote from the surface, and underlying as it were the more superficial parts, would be capable of awakening in the mind, by suggestion, the largest amount of ideas; and, perhaps, of adding to them, modifying them, and rendering them more complete.

§ XXIII. Through the perceptive faculty, therefore, we obtain notions of the physical thing—the *what.* But further: through the same faculty we perceive that the phenomena around us are constantly changing; that events are passing, and that everything proceeds from some other thing or combination of things to which it seems to owe its existence; and thus we form a notion of cause and

effect. And with this notion of *cause* we are led to associate the further notion of *force*, by the perception of force or power of which we are conscious, either when we act through our bodies on the material things around us, and produce change in them, or when material things act on us. Hence the notion of cause invariably and necessarily suggests that of force. And as a consequence of this habit of viewing things in their relation to each other as cause and effect, in forming a notion of a thing, we seek to find, in order to complete such notion, not only *what* it is, but *whence* it proceeds. Again: we also perceive that everything is capable of acting in some way on other things; that it is not only itself a produced phenomenon, but that it is able in its turn to produce: and hence we are led to inquire what its properties and capabilities are; what effects it can produce on the things around it; what phenomena it will occasion; and to what results it is tending: and so we are not satisfied with our notion of a thing until we have also asked and received an answer to the question, *whither*. The What? the Whence? and the Whither? are the three questions which we seek to obtain an answer to through our perceptive faculties, respecting every physical fact or phenomenon which has been presented to our notice, and of which we are endeavouring to form a notion. When these questions have been answered we have obtained all the knowledge that our faculties permit us to receive respecting such fact. It is *understood.*

§ XXIV. The next of the processes by which a knowledge of the physical world is revealed in the

mind is that of *reflection.* It is the one to which the term *intellectual* (*intus*, within, and *lego*, read) should, in strict propriety be limited. The ideas and notions collected by the process of external perception, and conserved in the memory, are re-collected, and submitted to an intellectual or *reading-within* process—that of internal perception. Viewed by the intellectual light which, reflected by the objects of thought, reveals them to the mental eye by a precisely similar process to that by which the sensible light reveals in the mind the objects of sense, these re-collected notions are compared with each other: certain features are perceived in everything to be peculiar to such thing, and certain other features that it possesses are perceived to exist in other things as well: and they are thus arranged in groups according to their likenesses. And in the same way, in each group certain phenomena are observed to be peculiar to the group, and certain other phenomena to belong to other groups also; and these groups are then in the same manner combined also into larger groups, according to their points of resemblance: and thus, by this method of *classification*, all known things at last become connected with each other in a certain order in which each holds a distinct place, determined by the phenomena which it presents and the relations of resemblance and difference which these bear to the phenomena presented by other things,—the points of resemblance connecting and the points of difference separating them. And as this classification becomes more and more perfect, and our notions of the things which compose

it grow more and more complete, certain rules and a certain definite plan begin to be perceptible in its several parts or groups; and at last one great system or plan begins to dawn upon the mind, the parts of which plan are perceived to have certain relations of proportion to each other, so that—as far as the plan is understood—on a thing being presented to our notice we are enabled from some of its parts to affirm the rest, and to put it in its right place in such plan. Now this system—so far as it is truly formed—is not an arbitrary invention of the mind, a mere fiction of the brain for the purpose of holding together the ideas; it is a real objective thing—a system of physical truth—the true plan on which physical things are formed—the true relationship in which they stand to each other. All things in this system are connected with each other by links of affinity or resemblance, so that between no two things there would be, we are led to believe, if the whole were known, any gap; but each would pass into the other by a succession of minute differences; and things at the extreme end of the scale be connected by insensible steps. This process of classification seems to take place at first unconsciously in the mind. By some law of brain-action, it would seem that the ideas which enter first are attracted to each other by their points of resemblance without any effort of the mind taking place; and the total amount of ideas not being great, there is abundant capacity for the whole. But as ideas multiply, the mind becomes burdened, and a conscious effort is made to find points of resemblance, and systems of classification are invented

to relieve the memory. Such systems are at first necessarily imperfect. As long as the facts of any department of knowledge are imperfectly perceived, true classification is impossible. Phenomena which lie on the surface presenting themselves first, things are necessarily at first associated by such superficial appearances. But many phenomena which lie on the surface of a thing are either accidental only and do not belong to the true nature of such thing, or, belonging thereto, do not belong to that part of it which is distinctive and characteristic; and thus things become associated which, superficially resembling, are really profoundly distinct; and things are separated which, really and essentially, belong to each other; and so the resulting classification is incoherent and confused, presenting incongruity and contradiction, and discordant to the intellectual contemplation.

As however our notions of things become more complete, the profounder points of resemblance and difference are perceived as well as the superficial, and such things only are classed together as really belong to each other. And thus the resulting classification grows more coherent and harmonious; the intellectual eye passes from one part to another without break or impediment, and the mind derives the pleasure which the free discharge of function always produces.

§ XXV. Classification, then, is the result of a law of the brain by which like ideas are mutually attracted, and differing ideas repelled, and by it the mind is enabled to hold together and preserve the notions which it is constantly forming of outward

things. And this process is always going on in our minds, consciously or unconsciously, as new ideas enter; and thus the mind is not overwhelmed by the infinite number of physical things which surround it, and with which through its perceptive faculty it comes in contact; but the more rapidly right perceptions of such things enter, the more distinctly is the truth which lies in such things perceived, and the more rapidly does the growth of physical science—the expression of physical truth in the mind—proceed.

And the same law holds good respecting the *forces* which exist, and which produce *events*. Having in the manner described (§ XXII.) gained notions of the different physical forces, we compare these also together, and discover in them resemblances and differences, and classify them also, rising higher and higher from the less to the more general, until we attain to the conception of one common and universal force, diffused through and pervading all matter, of which common force all the particular ones that we are cognisant of are phases or modifications, according to the circumstances under which each acts. And just as in the system of things we discover a plan, capable of being understood by the reason, and of serving as a guide to us when so understood; so, in the system of forces, we find regular and unchanging laws, capable of being measured and calculated upon; so that by the aid of such laws, when understood, under any given condition the results may be predicted. And if in the physical system of the universe we are unable to see *why* such results should flow from such causes, and such

forces obey such laws, and are obliged to content ourselves with the fact without inquiring the reason, this arises from the limitation of our perceptive faculties, which are unable to convey to us complete notions of matter and force which form the elementary subject-matter of physical science; for in the case of the pure mathematics, the elements—the unit, the point, and the line—being perfectly comprehensible by the mind, so that complete notions of such elements may be contained therein, all the possible combinations of such elements may also be perfectly comprehended and conceived, and seen *necessarily* to flow from their premises; so that the mind being in possession of the whole of the premises, the whole of the conclusions—every possible conclusion—can be deduced therefrom by the logical or reasoning process—by that process by which the intellectual eye is able to travel, without break of continuity in the lines of vision, from one notion or conception to another; from a whole to its parts; from the parts to the whole; from premises to conclusions, from principles to consequences, and *vice versâ;* and from two conceptions to elaborate a third;—without any reference to, or aid from, without: and thus the mind, being in possession of the whole truth, feels that at every step it is on firm ground, and that all its conclusions, if rightly deduced, are as certain as their premises; and the reason is perfectly satisfied. Doubtless, if the physical subject-matter—matter and force—could be reduced to as perfect an analysis as the mathematical, so that equally complete and simple

notions of its elements could be formed in the mind, all the consequences of their combinations, which we now learn from observation and experiment alone, would also be as perfectly conceived and understood by the mind, and would be attainable by, and flow from, the *à priori* and necessary deductions of the pure reason.

§ XXVI. Through the mental faculty of external perception, then, we acquire physical facts; through that of internal perception, physical truth, *i.e.*, science. Science is perceived truth; and the process of internal perception, or reflection, by which it is obtained, is named reasoning. This process, which, as far as regards the mental attitude necessary for its proper performance, has been already described (§ XI.), has been analysed and reduced to two parts, induction and deduction. By the first of these processes (described at length in § XXIV.) facts are grouped together under principles or general facts, and these again under principles yet wider and more general.

By the second process, as each principle is arrived at by induction, all the facts which underlie it and all minor principles which it includes are deduced, and the entire portion of truth which it covers completed. Thus by these two processes—basing principles on facts, and building these again into larger and more comprehensive principles—covering fresh principles and fresh groups of facts, the great structure of truth daily grows.

The process of classification and of reasoning—inductive and deductive—may be illustrated in various ways. Thus truth may be compared to a tree; the leaves being the facts, the twigs the

minor or less general principles, and the branches the major or more comprehensive principles. By the inductive process the eye travels from the leaves to the twigs, from those to the branches, and thence to the stem : by the deductive process, having arrived at a branch, it travels along such, and deduces all the twigs and leaves in succession which hang from, or depend upon, that branch. Or it may be compared to a book in an unknown tongue which we are endeavouring to decipher ; the letters and words representing the facts elementary and compound, and the sentences and larger paragraphs, the propositions, simple or complex, which such letters and words contain. At first only a few of the words are made out, and we conjecture ; then enough are made clear to suggest the meaning of the sentence ; and at last from the several sentences combined the whole is interpreted. Or it is as if we were seeking to put together the scattered fragments of an architectural building and so to arrive at the plan of the whole. Fragments harmonising together would suggest first subordinate features, and, from these, larger features would be arrived at. And often, in the course of the investigation, when there is a breach of continuity in the facts—the meaning of certain words in the sentence not being made out, or certain fragments of the building being wanting—the gap has to be filled up by a supposition or *hypothesis*, and if such hypothesis be well conceived, then the view of the plan of the structure, or meaning of the sentence—*its theory*—turns out to be correct—is found to be in harmony with the other parts ; and the theory is substantiated. If the hypothesis be incorrect, the theory is false ; and the facts must be investigated again for grounds for a fresh view.

§ XXVII. The human brain, then, is the highest product of the physical world. To it the physical forces converge as to a focus, and in its structure material organisation reaches its culminating point. Of this structure the intellectual ganglia constitute the main portion, the sensory ganglia are the portals, and the nerves of the senses the avenues. For each one of the five forms in which the matter which is the basis of the physical world exists—the solid, the

liquid, the volatile, the gaseous, and the imponderable —a special avenue of sense is provided. Into these avenues the actual material world never enters, but as each of its forms strikes at the outer gate of its appropriate sense, a nerve-current excited by such impression is transmitted along such avenue, first to the sensory and thence to the intellectual ganglia. And as the action thus excited is propagated through the brain, from ganglion to ganglion and from cell to cell, the phenomena of the physical world enter the mind; appearing at the entrance as objects of sense, and remaining as ideas. And as these ideas accumulate in the mind—word by word, sentence by sentence, chapter by chapter—the inscription presented thereon is made out and the truth deciphered. And as our notions of the *separate* facts are perfected and become intelligible, in the same proportion does our notion of the *universal* fact, which is made up of such separate facts, develop. Thus through the brain a transcript of the physical world is taking place—a transcript of the fact, of the system involved in the fact, and of the rule or law by which such system is produced and maintained, and is developing —a *transcript of physical truth.* And the cultivators of physical science are the transcribers. And when the time has come—as come it will, for the workers are always going on, and the work is growing— that the transcript is complete, and every fact of the physical world recorded, then in the human mind *a microcosm*—a complete notion of the physical Cosmos —the physical *macrocosm*—will exist, and the Physical Revelation be completed.

CHAPTER III.

PSYCHICAL.

§ XXVIII. In the manner that has been described the physical Cosmos is revealed,—the first of the revelations of consciousness of which the truth which lies in the phenomena is disclosed to the mind. And simultaneously therewith, and through its agency, another and more important revelation is going on: —the psychical. Our notions of physical things are not formed within our minds as dry cognitions merely, but, as they form, through the stimulation which the cerebral impressions that have produced them exercise on the brain and thence on the mental nature, they act on that nature, awakening therein various phenomena—sensations, emotions, and other phases of feeling of which the conscious being perceives itself to be the subject; and thus the conscious being itself—the *Ego*, or *Psyche*—is brought into the sphere of consciousness as a subject for contemplation; and, while the physical world is being revealed to us, we are also being revealed to ourselves. And of this psychical revelation, as of the physical one, the starting-point is the human body. Just as it is one of the first and the most constant of the objects presented to our senses, so are subjective phenomena associated with it the earliest and most invariable of the occurrences of our psychical history.

That a consciousness of our own existence is probably the earliest of all the phenomena of consciousness; that this consciousness is obtained through the inner, organic sense; and that this organic sense not only informs each of us of his own existence as a conscious being, but also of every change in or modification of such existence—has been already stated. It has also been stated that this organic sense depends, like every other sense, on the action of a bodily organ; that the proximate cause of all the phenomena which it presents is, like that of the physical phenomena, material change taking place in the brain; and that all the phenomena which enter consciousness through it, like those which enter through the external senses, lie within the mind itself—within the sphere of consciousness—and are therefore essentially *mental* phenomena—modifications of the mental substance, so to speak, although such modifications are produced by material change taking place outside that sphere. The two classes of phenomena, the physical and the psychical, agree in being essentially mental phenomena, and in being dependent on material change for their cause; but they differ in this:—that whereas the one class, the physical, are presented in consciousness as belonging to things outside the self—the conscious being—and do in fact, for the most part, depend for their exciting cause on things external to the material body; the psychical phenomena are presented as belonging to the conscious being itself, incorporated and resident in the physical body, and do in fact depend for their cause on conditions of the material bodily organs; such conditions being only

remotely connected with or dependent on the action of external things.

§ XXIX. It being premised, then, that the whole of the psychical revelation is made through the organic sense, and that the first thing presented in the order of time is the consciousness of corporeal existence, we proceed to consider how this presentation takes place. The human body, forming part of the physical world, is, like every other part of that world, the seat of change constantly going on. Forces are acting on and passing through it, and events are happening in it. These processes are performed in all the more complex animal organisms through the intervention of nerves and ganglia, but as these ganglia are not situated in the brain, but are dispersed throughout the body, no direct consciousness is usually excited in the mind by their action, and the changes which they effect are for the most part unperceived therein. But this is by no means always the case. The function of many important organs are never performed without phenomena entering the mental sphere and being experienced as sensations by the psyche; and these psychical phenomena, like the physical which have entered through the external senses, are either agreeable or disagreeable, according as the action set up in the bodily organs is harmonious or discordant with their structure; free or impeded; and according as the nervous tension of the ganglia concerned is high or feeble. Moreover, even in those cases where the function is habitually performed unconsciously, when such function is *unduly* excited or impeded, or the organic structure strained or damaged, sensations are excited. In this

manner a series of phenomena of which self is felt to be the subject are constantly entering consciousness. Being referrible to the body as their seat, they are usually called bodily affections; and by moralists sometimes *carnal* or *sensual:* they may perhaps be sufficiently distinguished by the word *organic.* They include all the sensations induced by the opposite conditions of health and disease, all the bodily appetites, the "muscular sense," and sensations of vigour and fatigue, heat and cold, and all bodily pleasure and pain from any source whatever.

As the material seat of all feeling is in the brain, the centre of organic sensation must be located there, and these organic sensations—or rather, the nerve-currents that occasion them—must be conveyed thither by special nerves, proceeding either directly from the bodily organs whose disturbance has given rise to them, or from the ganglia of such organs. It is customary to apply the term *organic* to the nerves of these ganglia—to the so-called sympathetic nerves—but it appears to the writer that it would be more convenient to name these latter nerves *nutritive*, *secretory*, *vascular*, &c., according to their functions, and to apply the term *organic* to those nerves whose office it is to awaken in the psyche organic sensations.

§ XXX. The organic then are the earliest of the psychical phenomena. And the second in order of time are the *sensuous*, comprising all that class of affections which physical objects of sense external to the body immediately excite in us. That objects of sense are produced in consciousness by impressions received at the ganglia of the external senses,

and that, when such impressions are of sufficient force, such objects excite in the mind pleasurable or disagreeable sensations, has been already stated; and it has been also stated that, while the character of the object of sense was determined by the nature of the impression and of the particular ganglion impressed, the character of the affection produced in the psyche by such object depended on the mode in which the impressed organ responded to such impression. As this sensuous class of psychical phenomena depend for their existence on excited or disturbed conditions of the external perceptive organs, and as it is the province of the organic sense to render us conscious of the structural and functional conditions of all our bodily organs, it follows that this class of phenomena also must enter consciousness and be perceived through the internal organ of sense.

§ XXXI. The third class of affections which physical things excite in us are the *æsthetic* (*aisthesis*, perception). It has been seen how a material impression arriving at a sensory ganglion, gives rise in the sphere of consciousness to the phenomena of an object of sense, which object, when the impression has been transmitted from the sensory to the intellectual ganglion, becomes a perception. Now just as the impression on the sensory ganglion gives rise in consciousness, under certain circumstances, to sensuous feelings which are experienced by the psyche as associated with the object of sense, so does the impression on the intellectual ganglion give rise under similar circumstances to æsthetic feelings, which are experienced by the psyche as associated with the perception. Thus a new sense or faculty is brought to

light in the mind—the æsthetic faculty or sense of *taste*, as it is called—and a new quality is discovered in the object perceived, the quality of *beauty;* and, as these terms are often made use of rather vaguely, a little further inquiry respecting what is implied by them may be of use.

The mind is a vast reservoir, which, by the action of the perceiving faculty, already described, and of the conceiving faculty, to be described presently, is being gradually stored with an immense number of notions and conceptions of outward things and of their relations to itself; and of good and ill, potential or actual. And as every fresh idea enters through the senses, it modifies, corrects, confirms, or completes, and tends to render perfect, the notions already existing there of the thing from which it proceeds; or it serves as the foundation of some altogether new notion: these notions, so formed, varying in quality in each case, according to the capacity and excellence of the mental faculties, the training and opportunities; and constituting the stock of knowledge. Now, just as the impressions on the external perceptive organs excite in consciousness agreeable and disagreeable sensuous feelings, according as there is concord or discord between the impressing thing and the organ impressed; so these perceptions received into the intellect—the internal perceptive organ—affect the mind agreeably or disagreeably according as the entering perception is or is not in harmony with the notions and conceptions already existing therein. If the fresh perception agree with the existing ideas and notions which it, by suggestion, has called into consciousness, and, still

more, if it heighten or tend to render them more complete and perfect, then there is pleasurable excitement, more or less, according to the nature of the perception and the ideas so suggested. If, on the other hand, the entering perception be perceived to be contradictory or inferior to the notions respecting it already existing, then there is a sense of disagreement: a perception of deficiency is experienced, and the intellectual faculty is unsatisfied and disturbed. The æsthetic faculty, then, is that sense by which we judge of the agreement or disagreement of perceived objects with the notions of excellence proper thereto existing in the mind. Like all the other mental faculties it exists in very different proportions in different persons; varying with the delicacy and power of the perceiving organ and the amount of culture bestowed. In the child and barbarian it is necessarily deficient; in each case the mind being, from want of instruction and attention to the subject, void of the ideas and notions necessary to form the standard of comparison.

The sense of beauty (physical beauty) is caused by, and consists in, the complete and entire satisfaction of the æsthetic faculty while the conscious being is contemplating an object—whether an object of sense or an idea. The Beautiful is a quality perceived as existing in, and belonging to, the object itself, not in any sensation, idea, or sentiment, excited or suggested by such object. It is therefore strictly objective, and all sensuous or sensual feelings —all subjective elements—must be eliminated from our conception thereof. So also must all gratifica-

tion derived from any idea suggested by, or associated with, such object, or from any conception to which it may give rise. No object therefore is to be considered beautiful because it is capable of exciting pleasure in any one of the senses—as fruit by its taste; or of suggesting to the mind such pleasure through a perceptive organ—as fruit through the organ of vision; nor on account of its commercial value, as being rare and difficult to procure; nor for its utility as a mechanical instrument; nor on account of its exhibition of ingenuity—of ingenious adaptation of means to an end—as in the case of an elaborately contrived mechanism; nor any object of nature or art for its conveying to the mind instruction, or expressing ideas of a novel or exciting kind, or noble conceptions of moral goodness and excellence; —none of these, however much the feelings they suggest or produce may transcend any derivable from direct perception of physical objects, can be classed under the category of physical beauty. Of the mineral kingdom, the diamond; of the vegetable kingdom, the rose; of the animal kingdom, the human body;—each of these in their perfection may be considered an instance of the Beautiful. Each of these, moreover, may suggest or excite in the mind ideas capable of producing in it various affections and emotions, in addition to the gratification which the direct perception of its presence, formed through the sense of sight, causes to the æsthetic faculty: the diamond may suggest ideas of money-value; the rose of delicious scent; the human figure, ideas and conceptions giving birth to sentiments of every

range and variety, from the highest and noblest moral emotions down to the lowest animal instincts, according to the expression which it may wear or have stamped upon it, or to the disposition of mind of the beholder; but these feelings and emotions so awakened neither constitute nor increase the effect of the *beauty* of the object, however much they may add to the pleasure felt by the beholder. Nay, so far as they operate at all, they diminish such effect, or even destroy it altogether; not by obliterating its presence in the object—for beauty is beauty whether seen in a fiend or an angel—but by dimming the perceptive faculty: in accordance with the psychological law, that feeling blinds perception. The æsthetic faculty cannot be exercised in any high degree by him in whose mind sensuous and sensual ideas prevail. Voluptuousness and sensuality are incompatible with taste. To the unchaste mind the sense of beauty is impossible.

An object then is beautiful which produces perfect satisfaction to the æsthetic faculty, and, for this effect to be produced, it is necessary that no disturbing element exist, either in the object itself or in the mind of the beholder: but there is requisite more than this; there is requisite a harmony between the qualities of the object perceived and the powers and endowments of the perceiving faculty which is brought to bear on it. Whether such a thing as absolute and complete beauty be possible—beauty to which no grace could be added, and from which no deformity could be subtracted—it will be time to inquire when a mind

has been found capable of taking cognisance of and defining such absolute and complete perfection. Theoretically, both may be possible: practically and as matter of fact, neither have yet manifested themselves. The degree in which the æsthetic faculty exists in the minds of perceivers varies as much as the degrees of beauty vary in the objects perceived. Omitting for the present variations produced by those disturbing influences already alluded to, and which, as a fact, exist and operate more or less in almost every case, when, the mind being occupied by feelings springing from other considerations present to it, the æsthetic faculty is more or less in abeyance;—omitting such cases as these, and assuming it to be exercised in each instance in its fullest ability and energy, there are scarcely two persons in whom it exists in the same measure. There are subtle degrees of perfection and imperfection in things which can only and hardly be detected by the highest grades of faculty when cultivated to the utmost; and it follows that to such mind what appears to others, less gifted and less cultivated æsthetically, as beautiful, must be frequently seen to be full of defect; and what appears insipid and uninteresting to be full of beauty. The proverb '*de gustibus nil disputandum*' is well known, but it does not follow that therefore *taste* has no law; it follows only that the æsthetic faculty, like every other that the mind possesses, exists in variable measure, and that he to whom much has been given, and who by assiduous cultivation avails himself of that much, will attain to and derive from the use of

this æsthetic faculty the utmost enjoyment which such faculty is capable of affording him.

Beauty then is the presence in an object of the mind's conception of physical excellence: it exists whenever there is perfect harmony between the entering perception and the mental contents—between the organs of external and internal perception. Not content with this fact, inquirers have pursued the subject further, and sought to ascertain in what this harmony consists; and, directing their attention to the outward thing and generalising on the phenomena which it presents, have endeavoured to attain to the laws upon which æsthetic enjoyment, when produced by physical things, depends. And they have succeeded in reducing the facts to a few leading principles, any of which being absent or deficient in the phenomena which an object presents would proportionately diminish its beauty, and *vice versâ*:—Thus, for an object to be beautiful, there must be perceptible in the phenomena which it presents—1. *Unity;* there must be one complete whole, to which all the several parts are subordinate. 2. *Variety;* the more numerous the parts perceptible in such combination, the greater the pleasure to the perceiving faculty. 3. *Proportion;* the parts must be arranged with reference to each other according to a certain rule or order, and the more intricate and subtile the arrangement, the more will the pleasure be enhanced. 4. *Symmetry;* whatever pleasure is produced by the perception of one side of a thing must be balanced by a corresponding amount on the other side. 5. *Purity* or *Chasteness;* the beautiful

thing must be perfect throughout,—be unadulterated with degrading admixture. 6. *Infinity;* there must be absence of all perception of limitation, either in the intricacy of its structure or texture, or in the undulations of outline and surface. In all of which conditions of the Beautiful one common principle may be discerned: viz.—that in everything which the object perceived presents to the perceiving faculty, whether of outline, surface, form, colour, or texture, no impediment or limitation to its function be caused. If the perceived thing be inferior in any respect to any of the notions or conceptions already existing in the mind respecting such thing, then the object viewed is not beautiful to such perceiving faculty—does not satisfy its ideas: and *vice versâ.*

The laws of taste or the æsthetic faculty are practically recognised by mankind in the control of the organic instincts and appetites, and of sensuous enjoyment generally. All the physical elements of corporeal gratification are unpleasing to the perceptions. Hence the organic functions of the body are performed in private and under every restriction of decency. Hence, in the satisfying of the demand for food and drink, the highest culinary art masks the sensual part by calling into activity the sensuous, and stimulating the higher functions of taste and smell; and the highest culture goes yet further, though still in the same direction, and surrounds convivial repasts with objects gratifying to the eye and the ear, as flowers, music, &c., and with agreeable and diverting sentiment, but taking care to keep to subjects bordering on the sensuous, and not to strike too high a note. Hence

also the appetite of lust, which, if exhibited naked and undisguised, would lower us to the level of the beast, is ennobled by being—when rightly exercised—associated with the most elevating emotions of the soul. Also, as all objects which excite sensuous feelings, if indulged in unduly, dim the perceptive faculty, correct and chaste taste points out that they are to be used in moderation and under severe restriction: thus we find that only uncultivated and vulgar minds indulge in such to any extreme degree; the real lovers of the Beautiful keeping the sensuous element in subordination. And the same law of taste holds good with reference to the things which belong to the intellect, and to the feelings which such things produce,—to ideas, emotions, and the expression of thought and sentiment. If ideas too exciting and affecting are indulged in, the mind is agitated unduly by its own feelings and passions, and correct perception is impossible. In regulating thought and language, then, sentiment must be kept under due control and right subordination, and severe chasteness preserved, or the attainment of intellectual beauty will be impossible.

In the foregoing remarks on the pleasures which are caused in the mind by the action of the æsthetic faculty, attention has been limited to that kind of pleasure which is produced by the perception of absolute concord between the thing perceived and the existing ideas in the mind, and to which the name *beautiful* properly belongs. This may be called the *direct* pleasure produced by the æsthetic sense. The *indirect* pleasures which our perceptive faculties obtain for us have been altogether unnoticed. Yet these latter are so vast in range and so powerful in degree that, compared with them, the effects proceeding directly from our

perceptions are altogether trifling. Excluding entirely those things which interest us either by suggesting ideas concerning our personal welfare, or by increasing our knowledge—the bearers of good and of light—and confining ourselves strictly to such as produce æsthetic gratification, the indirect modes in which objects of sense affect us are infinite. They amuse us by presenting us with phenomena rare and startling, with events occurring in unusual and unexpected sequence—with the interesting, the strange, and the sensational. They suggest entertaining trains of thought, stimulating the imagination and giving rise to novel conceptions and agreeable emotions—to the picturesque, the romantic, and the sentimental. And at the same time they may be the means of, and indeed can hardly avoid, either indicating the presence or suggesting ideas of that high form of excellence which is called psychical, and which in its perfection constitutes psychical beauty—a form to be more particularly alluded to hereafter—the perception of which, even in the slightest degree, affords pleasure of far higher kind than the highest pitch of that which physical beauty even in its most perfect forms is capable of producing. Lastly, when to this list is added the immense effect which is produced by an agency which has yet to be described—*sympathy*, an agent which may be set in action by inanimate things acting through the imagination, and which is so powerful in its action that through it objects of sense of the rudest kind, and even actually forbidding to sense, may be rendered interesting; when all these things are taken into account, the truth of the above proposition as to the respective powers of the direct and indirect pleasures produced by the action of the æsthetic faculty must be admitted. In truth, when all has been said, it must be confessed that physical beauty, *per se*, is comparatively a poor thing. Without the psyche, it is but a frame without the picture; a setting without the gem; a lamp without the light; a scabbard without the sword. It is not only fleeting, but it palls before it fades; and the mind of the beholder, wearied by the limitation of its perceptions and unsustained by higher objects, suffers from *ennui*, or finds diversion in ideas of a grosser kind which such objects may suggest. A landscape without indications of animated life; a face without signs of thought or feeling; a building without associations of human interest; a tree or plant which can by no play of the fancy be

endowed with psychical attributes;—all soon cease to interest, although the conditions upon which physical beauty depends—symmetry, proportion, and the rest—be all there. On the other hand, the manifestation of psychical excellence will light up the least attractive face, ennoble the most meagre form. Features, from which intellectual toil or soul-passion have effaced every line of beauty, yet, by their very disfigurement, affect us the more profoundly: by exciting sentiment, a nobler and stronger power.

§ XXXII. The *emotional* or *pathetic* are the fourth class of affections which physical things entering the mind produce in consciousness. Springing from a somewhat deeper root in the mind than the æsthetic class, they hold the same relation to it in this respect that it does to the sensuous class of phenomena. As æsthetic feelings are occasioned by objects of sense which have caught the mental eye and become perceptions, so are emotional feelings caused by ideas which perceptions have suggested. It has been stated that a large proportion of the objects present to our senses are not striking enough to be perceived at all, unless there are present in the mind ideas which, being associated with them in some way, have an affinity for them and attract them. It has also been stated that when complete notions of things exist in the mind, ideas of the effects that such things will produce—their *Whither*—also exist. This being the case, the mode in which emotions are excited becomes intelligible. Many objects not in themselves striking are capable of producing events full of agreeable or painful interest. Such objects being presented to the senses suggest in consciousness ideas of their consequences, and these ideas produce the class of

affections we are speaking of—joy, grief, hope, fear, &c.: the affections resulting from the presence of an idea bearing much the same ratio in vividness to the sensation resulting from the presence of an object of sense, that the idea itself does to such object of sense. Emotions then are to sensations what ideas or objects of thought are to objects of sense. Both of them are affections of the mind, or rather of the psyche, and both of them are called into being by impressions from external things on the cerebral organs: the seat of the impression being, in the case of sensation, one of the ganglia of external perception; in the case of emotion, the intellectual ganglion or that of internal perception. And both of them are pleasurable or painful according as the physical impressions received at the sensory and intellectual ganglia affect these organs harmoniously or discordantly. Emotion differs from sensation in that, its seat in the brain being more remote from the external thing, the source of the impression, than is that of sensation, such impression acts less directly; the immediate cause of the emotion being the train of ideas and conceptions of which the perception of the external thing is only the first link. Emotion also, though less vivid in character than sensation, seems to touch the psyche more nearly, and, owing to the multitude of ideas which a single agreeable or disagreeable one can conjure up, is capable of affecting it more profoundly: the suggested ideas allying themselves with the original one, reinforcing it, and intensifying its force. This is true even of physical things (and it is of the effect of physical things that

we are speaking), the idea of a physical pleasure or pain—of an agreeable or disagreeable sensation—being often more affecting than the actual sensation itself: but it is of moral emotions, excited by moral sentiments, that the proposition especially holds good. The most frightful bodily torture is frequently braved, and the most exquisite physical gratification renounced, to gratify a cherished sentiment or save it from outrage and dishonour.

§ XXXIII. The fifth and last class of the affections excited in the conscious being by the entrance of the physical revelation into the mind is the theoretic or contemplative (*theoria* contemplation). The feelings, pleasurable and painful, which belong to and constitute this class, are occasioned neither by the presence of an object of sense, nor by a perception of an object, nor by ideas suggested by a perception, but by the relations, harmonious or otherwise, which are perceived to exist between the ideas with which the mind is stored. How, by the process of reflection, the notion of truth is formed, growing and developing with every fresh accession of ideas, has been already explained (§ XXIV). As this notion of truth enlarges, the mind expands with it, and a sense of additional light and power is felt. And this condition of the mind, more elevating and ennobling to the conscious being than any of the others, has, like them, its agreeable and disagreeable phases; and in its case, as in theirs, such phases may be referred to either free or impeded cerebral function for their cause. If a thing or an event is perceived imperfectly, so that we are unable to form

a satisfactory notion thereof, our perceptive faculty is functionally impeded, and we suffer the intellectual dissatisfaction which doubt or uncertainty respecting a *fact* produces. Also, if, facts being clearly perceived, we are unable, in consequence of something being wanting, to perceive their true relations to each other, so as to place each of them in its right place in our intellectual system and to comprehend the truth which they collectively contain,—in short, if we fail to perceive their true theory,—then we suffer in this theoretic faculty the mental pain which the sense of intellectual limitation and incapacity produces. On the other hand, if we have rightly perceived the facts and comprehended their theory, then we feel the gratification and sense of power and unrestrained energy which the unimpeded exercise of our highest faculty produces, as well as that which is occasioned by the addition made to our conception of that system of truth which it is the highest pleasure of the mind to contemplate.

*Ἡ δὲ τελεια εὐδαιμονία θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια. * * * * τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακὰριος, τοῖς δ'ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιάυτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. Τῶν δ'ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας.*

"But perfect happiness is a contemplative activity. For to the Gods the whole of life is blessed; but to men only so far as a resemblance of such kind of activity belongs to them. But of other animals none possess happiness (of this sort), since in no respect do they participate in contemplation."—Arist.: *Ethics*. (Note F.)

§ XXXIV. *Corporeal* sensations agreeable or disagreeable, resulting from the harmonious or discordant relations of the vital structures of the physical organism with the ganglia that regulate their functions; *sensuous* feelings agreeable or disagreeable, resulting from the relations, harmonious or discordant, of physical things outside the body with its organs of external sensations; *æsthetic* feelings agreeable or disagreeable, resulting from the agreement or disagreement of impressions transmitted through the organs of external sensations to the organ of the intellect with those already received there; *emotional* feelings agreeable or disagreeable, resulting from the harmonious or discordant relations of ideas suggested by perceptions received through the organs of external sensation with our notions of physical good; *contemplative* feelings agreeable or disagreeable, resulting from the agreement or disagreement which we perceive to exist in our intellectual notions, and from the sense of free or impeded action of our thinking faculty occasioned thereby;—in short, all the feelings agreeable or disagreeable, occasioned by bodily comfort and discomfort, whether external or internal, and by the perception of physical beauty, physical goodness, and physical truth, and of their opposites—these are the five classes of psychical phenomena which are awakened and revealed to our consciousness while becoming acquainted with the physical world. Further:—as it is the presumed function of the organic sense to render the psyche conscious of organic changes and modifications occurring in the physical organs of the body with

which it is incorporated, and as the sensory and intellectual organs of the brain which are concerned in the higher psychical manifestations are as much bodily organs as those which give rise to the lower, it would appear that all these psychical phenomena—these phases of feeling—whether high or low, must be presented in consciousness through the organic sensé. It must be distinctly understood that nothing positive is affirmed here respecting this sense beyond the fact that it exists, and that its functions are discharged like those of the other senses through the instrumentality of a special physical structure. That emotions and sensations exist; that such emotions and sensations are referred to and represent the conscious being, constituting what is called the *ego*, the *self*, the *psyche;* and that the conscious being—the *ego* —is distinct from the things of which it is conscious —from the *non-ego*—are facts of consciousness. It is also a physiological fact that consciousness is the function of the brain, and that the different phenomena of consciousness are produced by distinct cerebral structures. The function of presenting the *ego* being distinct from that of presenting the *non-ego*, the structures which perform such function should also be distinct. By what series of structures or ganglia it is discharged, it is for the anatomist and physiologist to determine. As the sense ranges through all the extent of our consciousness, including all our affections and feelings, no doubt the range of structure in the brain must be proportionably wide. As emotion and sentiment have reference to ideas, and are manifested only by the higher animals,

it is probable that the anatomical seat of the corresponding structure is to be found in those masses of brain which are peculiar to such higher animals; while, as sensuous and corporeal sensations are common to all animals, the seat of such must be looked for in those structures which belong to all animals alike. It is noteworthy that the phrenologists all concur in referring the feelings and moral sentiments to the middle and posterior parts of the brain; and however superficial and unphilosophical their analysis of the mental phenomena may seem, yet it must be admitted that practically their statements are often in accordance with fact.

§ XXXV. Thus then are produced and perceived in consciousness the two classes of phenomena, the physical and the psychical: the former representing the physical body and its surroundings—the *non-ego;* the latter, the conscious and perceiving psyche—the *ego.* This latter class stands in the relation to the former—viewed in the order of sequence—of an effect to a cause; and the two classes have this further relation—that, although always co-existing, the presence of either in its highest degree of intensity appears to be incompatible with the co-existence of the other in the same degree. If our bodily and sensuous feelings are too acute, the clearness and distinctness of our external perceptions are diminished in proportion. So also, if we are agitated too much by our feelings, our thoughts become confused and our intellectual notions indistinct. Emotion prevents reflection, just as sensation does perception. The "pathetic fallacy" obscures the theoretic faculty,

just as the suffused eye dims vision. As long as the impressed thing—the physical basis of the psyche—retains its organic *composure* or composition, the more intense its functional activity, the more vivid are the objects perceived. But if it suffer decomposition, or *discomposure* under the action of the impressing thing, all clearness of perception, whether intellectual or sensorial, is impossible. To perceive truly composure of mind is requisite, and this depends on the presence of physical composure. In psychical matters, as in physical, the less decomposure the more light. (Note G.)

> "They that have power to hurt and will have none,
> That do not do the thing they most do show,
> Who, moving others, are themselves as stone,
> *Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow;*
> They rightly do inherit heaven's graces,
> And husband nature's riches from expense;
> They are the lords and owners of their faces,
> Others but stewards of their excellence.
> The summer's flower is to the summer sweet,
> Though to itself it only live and die;
> But if that flower with base infection meet,
> The basest weed out-braves his dignity:
> For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds,
> Lilies that fester, smell far worse than weeds."

§ XXXVI. But the mind is not a mere mirror, presenting only reflections of the outer world to the sensitive, emotional psyche. It issues a coinage of its own, or, rather, the phenomena which have entered it become impressed with the characters of the mint into which they have been received. The operation of the intellect seems to be mainly a dissecting or analysing one, whereby the perplexed web formed by the confused and disorderly mass of ideas which

have entered from without is unravelled and its component parts separated and distinguished by a classification which arranges them according to their degrees of resemblance. Now the elementary notions, physical and psychical, thus obtained are, by a further process of a different character taking place within the mind, recombined, according to their nature and the subtile affinities which they possess for each other, into *conceptions* altogether new, and more perfect than the forms in which they originally entered the mind, and more exciting to the psyche. Thus are formed within the mind new creations—*ideals*—the amount of perfection possessed by which depends on the degree of perfection in which the elementary notions which compose them, and which have been derived from things which have entered from without, exist, and on the power of the conceiving faculty. This faculty of creating—of forming out of the mental ideas new combinations—popularly known under the name *imagination*—should properly be designated the *conceiving faculty*, in contradistinction to the processes of external and internal perception which might respectively be designated the *perceiving* and *discerning* faculties (*per*, through, and *capio*, take; and *dis*, apart, and *cerno*, see). It is probably the highest faculty which man possesses, and seems to consist in a process exactly the converse to that performed by the intellect. The perfection then of these new creations depends on the accuracy and perfection of the operations of the intellect and imagination combined, and thus, just as it is necessary physiologically that our bodily food should be digested

and broken up into its organic elements before these can be assimilated and recombined into those higher organisations which, formed by the vital processes within us, compose our bodily structure and maintain our physical life; so is it necessary that our mental food should also be digested, or separated and broken up, before it can be built into the conceptions which form our mental life.

In this manner each man's consciousness is constantly becoming furnished with new contents, varying with the powers of the conceiving faculty which organises them, with the nature of the food, and with the digestive power. And these new conceptions are more complete and satisfying—each to the sense to which it appeals—than the realities which have entered direct from the world without; and, although they have no actual existence apart from the mind in which they are formed, yet they have, so far as they are truly formed, a potential existence; their truth or falsehood and possibility of realisation or the contrary being dependent on the conformity or non-conformity of the intellectual notions out of which they have been formed with the existing realities of the outer world which those notions are supposed to represent. The conceptions of the imagination then depend for their accuracy on the notions of the intellect. If these latter are correct, then the former, being based on right principles, are sound and capable of realisation, opportunity offering. But if false elements have entered into them, they are unsound, and worthless in practice.

In what this conceiving faculty exactly consists, and through what agencies it operates, is not easy to say. It seems to be in its essence involuntary, though capable of being set in action by a suggesting idea called up by the will. Ideas of the sensations and feelings excited by our perceptions are formed in our minds, and remain in our memory after the excitement caused by their presence has subsided; and, as successive things enter the mind and stimulate its faculties anew, such feelings return, and these ideas, receiving accessions with every renewal of the feeling, grow to be more and more complete, and notions of the pleasing and displeasing, more and more full, are created.

Thus a demand is set up for more complete and satisfying objects than the realities presented by the outside world can furnish:—for the body more bounding vigour; for the senses more thrilling pleasure; for the perceptions more exquisite refinement; for the heart a fuller sense of joy; for the mind more perfect illumination. And as these excited psychical states return from time to time—whether in obedience to some organic law of periodicity, as we know to obtain in the case of the corporeal appetites, or excited by the accident of some suggesting idea—the mind, strung to a higher pitch by these conceptions of good which have grown up within it, seems to exercise some influence or force on the notions which it contains derived from the real world; disintegrating them and causing their elements to re-arrange themselves in ideal groups in harmony with such conceptions. The mind can at will, as

has been stated, produce these excited psychical conditions, by calling up (through its active powers, to be considered hereafter), the suggesting ideas, and so rouse the imagination into activity; but, having set it at work, its power extends no further. It cannot control results, such being dependent on causes already described. The imagination and intellect then stand in this relation to each other: the former cannot be exercised happily on any subject, unless the latter has first been employed rightly on such subject. Thus no new conceptions of corporeal or sensuous gratification can be correctly formed, unless the several bodily sensations which enter into it have at some time or other been experienced; no new beauty can be conceived, unless the natural beauty in which its elements exist have been first perceived; no new utility or physical good can be contrived or invented, unless the qualities of the things to be made use of have been first ascertained, as they occur in nature; and lastly, no manifestation of the conceiving process can take place in that, its highest department of all, wherein its office is to minister to the theoretic faculty and offer to it the subjects of contemplation which are its special food—whether such manifestation consist in anticipating by brilliant hypothesis the slow inductive process and, by supplying the wanting fact, catching at the principle before all its grounds have been brought in evidently through the senses; or by a converse process, the principle being obtained, in following up its consequences and so arriving at facts which, although never yet revealed to the senses and existing only in fiction, shall be as true as any

reality;—no such manifestation, it is certain, can take place, unless the hypothesis on which such new principle rest, or from which such new facts have been deduced, have first been formed out of materials supplied by the real world through the senses.

These two faculties then, intellect and imagination, must work hand in hand to constitute true *genius*. United, they can accomplish anything: separated, they are either barren or positively hurtful: for of the higher of the two, imagination, it may be said that, without intellect (in conformity, with the law that the conception of the best is the worst), it only serves to fill the world with false taste, false invention, false sentiment, and false theory — misconceptions and abortions of the mind, which, not being rightly organised, perish as soon as they come to light; while of intellect without imagination the worst perhaps that can be said is, that it is barren—that it produces no crops. Nay, it is in some measure useful, as serving the not unimportant office of destroying, by its criticising, analysing power, the false conceptions which the imagination may have given birth to. The function of the intellect, then, is to sit in judgment on the things presented to it; whether such things are views of actual nature, or new creations formed out of these by the mind of the artist. The function of the imagination is to form out of the intellectual notions new creations. The conceptions of the artist are the offspring of his mind—

"Where—
Where are the forms the sculptor's soul hath seized?

In him alone. Can nature show so fair?
Where are the charms or virtues which we dare
Conceive in boyhood and pursue as men,
The unreached Paradise of our despair,
Which o'er informs the pencil and the pen,
And over-powers the page where it would bloom again?"

§ XXXVII. Through the imagination then, the mind conceives of *good* in more perfect modes and unmingled with the evil with which it is associated in everything which nature presents to our senses:— of corporeal and sensuous good, or those pleasures which arise from the consciousness of the unimpeded action of the vital organic functions taking place within the body, and from the sense of harmony between external things and the senses which are cognisant of such; of æsthetic good, or the pleasure which the perception of excellence in an object causes; of emotional good, or the pleasures produced by the agreement of our perceptions with our desires; and of theoretic good, or the pleasure produced by the contemplation of pure truth, unmingled with doubt or uncertainty. And in like manner, and by the same process of imagination, the mind abstracts and exhibits to itself in forms and degrees more unmixed and intense than occur in reality the *evil* that in every department of nature corresponds to, and is associated with each kind of good; such conceptions filling it with disgust and aversion, just as those of good attract and delight it. Thus the imagination by its action intensifies the effect on the mind of the good and evil that is mixed up in nature, increasing the attractive power of the former and the repulsiveness of the latter; and so, by these two

processes going on in the mind, the intellectual and the imaginative, two structures are gradually and simultaneously arising in consciousness,—the Real and the Ideal:—the former slow in growth, incomplete, rude, imperfect, only partially apparent, and showing in what is visible a mixed and chequered web of good and evil—the good for the most part rudimentary only amidst a preponderance of the evil—but inflexible, immutable, inevitable, threatening, cruel, terrible; presenting its sphinx-riddle, to be understood and solved, not evaded: the latter rapid in growth, attractive, specious; but inconsistent, incoherent, unsubstantial, unstable, fleeting, evanescent, illusive, save only when rooted in, and drawing its support from, the former; but then, fruitful, abundant, satisfying; supplying the true and only key for the problems presented by the former. And as the growth of the real—the true notion of the outward fact—advances, then the false hypothesis on which the illusory parts of the ideal are based is discovered and upset, and illusions disappear. Thus the knowledge of age dispels the illusions of youth; the knowledge of one generation the illusions of a former one: so that almost the whole fabric would vanish, were it not that as one structure goes, another arises, having a deeper root in reality. Thus as our knowledge of real truth grows, our conception of ideal, potential truth grows also. And these ideal notions and conceptions constitute a series of *motives* which, either as desires on which the heart is set or as aversions from which it revolts, put in action the mind, and bring into play its active powers which

will next be examined. By the imagination, then, the mind is filled with ideal conceptions, "airy shapes," which, if untruthfully or incompletely formed, exist only as "desiring phantasies," unable to be brought forth and become "habitants of earth;" thoughts which haunt the soul with dreams of happiness, such as "prompt the eternal sigh for which we wish to live or dare to die;" but which, if truly rooted and rightly deduced from the real facts of nature, either grow to be actual realities, introducing into the things around us new order and beauty, or, expressed in the language of literature and art, and conveyed into the minds of all with capacity to receive them, produce therein new emotional and contemplative enjoyment, and so fulfil the function which has been assigned to them in language conveying more literal truth than any prose is capable of expressing :—

> "The beings of the mind are not of clay;
> Essentially immortal they create
> And multiply in us a brighter ray,
> And more beloved existence: that which Fate
> Prohibits to dull life in this our state
> Of mortal bondage, by these spirits supplied,
> First exiles, then replaces what we hate,
> Watering the heart whose early flowers have died,
> And with a further growth replenishing the void."

§ XXXVIII. Thus far the mind has been represented chiefly as a passive thing, the recipient merely of impressions produced by things existing outside it, and of ideas, notions, and conceptions formed within itself out of these impressions; such formations springing up within it spontaneously and whether it will or no. But the mind is more than

this: it is an active force, reacting on the outside world, and impressing thereon its own characters. It is not content with viewing the conceptions of good that it has formed within itself as idle dreams, but it seeks to realise them; to convert into them the less agreeable facts of the outer world, and thus by art—in the words of Lord Bacon—to "adapt the *shows* of things to its own desires." That it may accomplish this, it is provided with instruments or organs which it may use at will, and, by means of these organs, it operates on the outer world of which it has perceptions, and on its own ideas and notions; modifying, directing, and controlling each.

And in order that it may act on these two different classes of phenomena, the objects of sense and the objects of thought, the instruments that it possesses are divisible into two sets:—1. An organ or set of organs which, as their action takes place altogether within the brain and is hidden from view, may be called *internal*. Their field of action is the intellectual ganglia and that part of the brain which is concerned in the production of the psychical phenomena which are manifested in connection with intellectual operations. By means of this set of organs the mind operates on its ideas: turning the intellectual eye on them; grasping them; manipulating them as it were; and endeavouring, by forming them into various combinations, to render them more satisfactory to itself—in short, *thinking*. Also, by means of these same organs or faculties probably, the mind, or rather the conscious being, operates on itself; preserving composure and self-control under

emotion, and guiding and regulating its mental movements so as to secure equilibrium and uprightness and to put forth and maintain effort under arduous circumstances. 2. A set of instruments which may be called *external*,—as their field of action is in the outside world, by operating on the things of which they produce changes in the sensory ganglia and corresponding changes in the phenomena of sense within the sphere of consciousness. By their means the outer eye is directed to surrounding material objects, and these objects are grasped, modified and re-arranged by the bodily muscles, so as to bring them into conformity with the ideas and notions that exist in the mind. Thus the ultimate effect of the action of both of these sets of organs is to produce changes in cerebral ganglia, and, through them, in the phenomena of consciousness:—in the sensory ganglia and phenomena of sense, by the action of the external set; in the intellectual ganglia and phenomena of thought, by that of the inner set; but they differ in this: whereas the first or internal set act directly on the intellectual ganglia, and the operation is entirely a cerebral one; the primary action of the second or external set is on the musculo-motor ganglia which give rise to the bodily movements, and between these ganglia and the sensory in which the final changes occur, the nerves, muscles, and other organs of the motory apparatus of the body are interposed, as well as the material things of the outer world on which these operate.

Now to this faculty which the mind possesses of

setting in action these two sets of organs the name *will* is given. When the mind consciously thinks with its brain or acts with the muscles of the body, it *wills.* It can put these powers in action *if it will.* It can *at will* alter the current of its ideas, or act on the physical things around it. If it do not put forth this effort—this will-force—then it receives passively the impressions, intellectual and sensuous, which act on it; its organs of will, whether intellectual or corporeal, either remaining absolutely inert themselves, or manifesting only motions and affections of an involuntary character in which the mind takes no initiative.

That the mind possesses faculties such as have been described above, is indisputable; it is a fact of consciousness. That such faculties are exercised through the medium of physical instruments is in accordance with all physiological and pathological experience which concur in teaching that *all* the facts of consciousness are dependent for their manifestation on physical organisation. Through what structures of the brain, however, these functions are performed is not as yet agreed upon. With respect to the first set of instruments alluded to above—the *ideo-motor* as they may be called—nothing whatever is positively known. The theatre in which they operate—the part of the brain which corresponds to the mental ideas and feelings—is, with much amount of probability, supposed to be ascertained; but respecting the physical instruments we are quite in the dark. Of the second set of instruments—*the musculo-motor*—we possess more knowledge. The theatre of

their operations is the physical body itself, and the external world; and the instruments of volition in direct connection with these—the voluntary muscles of the body and their nervous and motor ganglia are tolerably well known. But here also, respecting the strictly cerebral portion on which the mind immediately acts, we are still left to conjecture.

§ XXXIX. The action of the will in controlling the corporeal and intellectual operations, and in influencing the ideas and objects of sense, will be better understood by calling to mind those movements which the conscious being is subject to, both corporeally and intellectually, in which the will is not concerned. That such affections take place is matter of daily experience. They may be divided into two classes:—1. The habits; the movements constituting which, originally instituted by the will acting under the influence of a definite intellectual conception, have become habitual and, whenever the conception—the prime-mover—is present, take place spontaneously, without any volitional intervention. 2. The passions; in which the usual instruments of volition are called into play by some stimulus quite independent of the will, and in which conditions—the mind being either taken by surprise or overpowered—these instruments act without, or even in opposition to, volitional agency. Instances of each of these classes of involuntary affections are familiar in each of the two regions in which the will acts—the sensorial and the intellectual. Habitual movements of the first class occur when a man takes a walk in a direction in which he has been in the habit of walk-

ing. His familiar conception of the objects around him and their relations to himself guides his muscles without any conscious effort of his will or any sustaining action of his mind, which may all the time be occupied with a train of thought or reverie. And it sometimes happens that he is carried by his muscles in this habitual direction even contrary to his purpose; the intention which he had impressed on his mind at starting not being an habitual one, to preserve it in view constant attention of the mind was required, and this attention not being bestowed, owing to other ideas and trains of thought distracting his mind, the more familiar conception proved the stronger. Standing; walking; the physical movements involved in reading, writing, talking—in short, in all the daily routine of life—are instances of movements, originally volitional, become involuntary through habit. The thoughts are exercised on the subject of the book we are reading, of the speech we are uttering, or on the object we wish to arrive at, without any conscious attention to the letters which our eye is following, the words our lips are expressing, or the movements our limbs are making; of all of which actions the power of performance was originally acquired by much pains, although now accomplished without an effort.

The instruments by means of which the will acts on the body and through it on the things of the outer world are implicated in other operations, in which the will takes no part, besides those already mentioned. Some of them are concerned in the periodical actions which go on in the body in con-

nection with the discharge of the vital functions, in respiration, the ingestion of food and excretion of waste, and in the more occasional ones of sneezing, coughing, &c., over all of which the control of the will is very limited. They are liable also to be set in action by sensuous or corporeal disturbance, the mind being either passive or resisting with all its will. And the whole system of voluntary muscles is liable to be involved in those violent bodily disorders which manifest themselves by spasmodic or convulsive action, when the will is altogether dethroned, and the mind is either unconscious, or, if conscious, as powerless to control them as it is the beating of the heart; while the whole body is thrown into a frightful condition of *physical* passion.

And the two great classes of involuntary actions in which the instruments of the will are concerned, the habits and the passions, are illustrated quite as abundantly in the case of those which operate in the shadowy phantom-land of ideas as in that of those which deal with the more substantial tangible things of sense. Here, as in the former instance, the mind travels with ease along an habitual track of thought, without anxious volitional effort, and scarcely cognisant of the several stages by which it arrives at its conclusions. Here, also, under the influence of habit, it strays from the line which it had proposed to itself at starting, and wanders into the beaten, familiar path. Also, in the case of reverie or day-dreaming, the habitual dreamer is carried from one idea to another, along a whole train of cherished memories and fancies, exercising as little mental control over the current of his

thoughts as in his nightly dreams he does over his sleeping visions and hallucinations.

And here too, an idea, by its unexpectedness, may startle the mind with temporary surprise, or, by its force, and the weight of the consequences which it involves, may agitate it to its very centre; either overwhelming it in the depths of despair, or throwing it into passionate convulsion that may well compare with the worst that the parallel records of physical pathology could furnish. In the last class of cases the organic force which is let loose by the cerebral shock usually ultimately finds its exit by the channel of the voluntary nerves and muscles of the body, where it finds vent in laughing, sobbing, disturbance of the breathing, acts of physical violence, or in some physical utterance having reference to the passion which has produced it: or it may spend itself on an involuntary muscle—disturb or break the heart; or vent itself on the visceral system—affect the appetite and the different secreting organs—the lachrymal glands, &c. Such instances go far to prove the common material basis which belongs as a necessary condition to all the phenomena of consciousness—those to which the term *mental* is usually limited as well as those which are called *corporeal* and physical—the objects of thought as well as the objects of sense.

The influence of habit over conduct, and the irresistible supremacy of passion over the mind once abandoned to its sway, are subjects of the deepest interest; for it is to these sources that every vice that afflicts mankind is to be traced. All the errors in thinking arise from wrong management of the instruments that regulate the movements of the mental eye and guide the mind to

its conclusions, just as all errors in walking arise from wrong management of the instruments that regulate the physical eye and guide the muscles of the body in its physical path. Rigid adherence to preconceived and long-entertained notions respecting the line of travel, with stubborn refusal to pay attention to the objects which lie on the road, and which, once seen, would correct error; inconsiderate haste in choosing objects of pursuit on the surface attractive, without taking care first to discern either their real nature, or the means by which they are to be attained; negligence as to the coming event; habitual limitation of the vision to near and low things;—the stubbornness of the bigot; the folly of the visionary; the heedlessness of the improvident; and the narrowness and selfishness of the miser and the voluptuary;—all are caused by wrong habits produced by wrong training of the instruments which are under the control of the will. The human being learns to think, as well as to walk, early in life; and its habits, thus early formed, are either lasting or only unlearnt by bitter experience. "As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined;" and the mind, its native freedom already gone, starts on its journey the slave, and by and by to be the victim, of its habits, and pursues its course, blinded by prejudice, befooled by illusion, heedless of the future, bent on the low,—according to the habit which it has been taught or acquired before setting out: and usually it is only when it is too late—when the wanderer is already lost in the labyrinth, entangled in the net, or caught in the pit-fall; when the coming catastrophe is already imminent and inevitable, or the Dead-Sea fruit actually in the mouth,—that the mind perceives the good that it has missed and the calamity that its evil habit has occasioned. On the other hand, a mind perfectly trained to habits of rectitude, circumspection, deliberation, and vigilance—a condition, theoretically at any rate, quite possible; for good habits can be acquired, like bad, by practice—would avoid all the above errors; would neither miss the right object through want of perception, nor embrace the wrong through want of consideration: but, betrayed by no illusion and surprised by no event, would proceed on its way, erect and free, coming to no misfortune through its own fault, but in all circumstances selecting the best object and arriving at the highest good to which a path was open. That instances of such perfect training of the mental faculties are not met with in real life is

nothing to the purpose; at least until the above principles have been perfectly applied. It is sufficient to show that the principles are true, and that in proportion to the extent to which they have been acted upon are the results obtained. The analogy between bodily and mental progress or procession has already been dwelt upon (§ XXII.) when describing the right method of using the reason, when engaged either in extracting truth from facts or in applying it, when obtained, to practical matters. If it were generally understood that such analogy is not only complete in every respect, but that in both cases the process is performed through the instrumentality of physical structures essentially similar in nature and governed by similar laws; and that mental and bodily training are, *mutatis mutandis*, dependent on similar principles; the efforts of educators and moral trainers to get rid of vice would be applied with more effect, and moral science would become an actual fact.

§ XL. The mind, then, has instruments at its command, and every sane mind is free to use these instruments to the full extent of their range, although such freedom may be practically limited to a very narrow compass by want of use or wrong management. By means of these instruments it has the power of acting: of producing change; of *willing*. But the strongest mind, however free and well-disciplined, cannot will without a motive. The will is the mind —or rather, the conscious being in action, and to put it in action, some motor force is required. Now, the motives which set the conscious being in action, are the various desires which the notions and conceptions which have been formed in the mind in the manner described have excited. The satisfying of some appetite; some sensuous attraction; the providing for some want; the gratification of some sentiment; the completion of some conception of beauty or truth; and, lastly, the fulfilment of some duty;—these are the various

motives which press on the psyche or conscious being, and cause it to act.

And the psyche is impelled to act, not only by the conception of some good, but also, and equally perhaps, by the concurring conception of the corresponding evil operating in the same direction. Thus we seek to satisfy an appetite, as much to relieve a pain as to obtain a pleasure; we provide for the future, as much to escape a threatening danger as to secure an agreeable prospect; we cultivate taste and sentiment, as much because we have an aversion for ugliness and baseness as because we admire beauty and love goodness; and we pursue truth, as much because darkness is gloomy and dangerous as because light is cheerful and pleasant. And thus, as these conceptions of good and evil, awakened and suggested in accordance with the laws of thought, arise in the mind, a series of desires and aversions are constituted, attracting and repelling the conscious being according to the degree of distinctness in which they are presented in his mind. The mind can be no more set in action without a motive than a physical thing can be without a force being applied to it. And, like physical things also, motives differing in force are required to set in action different minds. Light and unstable ones are moved by the slightest things, while it requires motives of weight to operate on, or alter, more stable characters. Also, as with physical things, if several motives are acting in the same mind at the same time, it moves in the direction of the stronger, or, rather, in the direction of the resultant of all such forces—in the direction of the least resistance. Now these various motives differ very much in the influence

which they exert on the mind, whether attractive or repulsive, and this difference is one rather of kind than degree, depending not so much on the relative intensity in which they severally may happen to be present, as on the organ or faculty on which their action is exerted. The psychical faculties differ in rank, and an appeal to a higher faculty takes greater effect than one to a lower. Thus the obligation of providing for the wants of the morrow is a motive operating more powerfully on those who perceive it than the gratification of the appetites of the day; beauty, when perceived, and the requirements of taste, when felt, exercise a more potent influence on the heart than mere sensuous enjoyment; and the satisfying of the craving for truth—of that faculty which prompts us to penetrate the obscurities, and solve the mysteries of the things around us; to know the What, the Whence, and the Whither, and to struggle out of the darkness into light—once experienced, is more powerful still than any, or all combined, of the preceding.

All that has been said in the above paragraph is that the highest motive present always determines the *will;* it is not stated, nor does it necessarily follow, that it always determines the *conduct.* The will-force is always thrown into the scale of the highest motive in action; but, owing to weakness of character or the force of circumstances, we sometimes act against our will: lower motives overcome the will-force, and, in such cases, though we *desire* to go in the direction of the higher motive, such desire results only in an impotent wish.

§ XLI. But to secure happy results it is not enough to have efficient instruments at command, to abound with noble conceptions, and to be in

possession of a heart susceptible of the loftiest sentiments. Man is not a mere contemplator: he is a part of the Cosmos in which he exists. On it his body depends for its daily food, and from it he draws his mental life; and on his rightly understanding the Cosmos, his relations to it, and the laws which regulate these relations, his well-being depends, both mental and bodily: for the welfare of these two is inseparably connected: if the body be not nourished, the mind languishes for want of strength; if the mind be not fed, the body perishes for want of light. And the Cosmos is only presented to him in detail: very limited portions come within the range of his senses at a time, and of such he catches but imperfect and transient glimpses. Such portions constitute his surroundings or *circumstances.* These circumstances are perpetually in more or less rapid change: in them are the elements out of which his notions of truth and conceptions of right—so far as they are sound—are found, and they also furnish the only materials with which his conceptions of good have to be realised. On his circumstances, therefore, and on his mental attitude or behaviour with regard to them—not on the conceptions of his imagination—his condition depends. The right attitude to be adopted by the conscious being towards his circumstances has been already fully described (§ XXII.); it consists simply in regulating the mental eye and guiding through it the mental action in accordance with the laws of reason. Reason is the light of the mind. Just as, in the world of sense, light proceeding from its source, the

physical sun, is diffused throughout and reflected from the various objects of the horizon, and there are laws of vision in accordance with which the physical eye must be directed in order to obtain correct and just views; so, in the world of thought, the intellectual light, proceeding from *its* source, is reflected from the various objects which occupy the mental sphere, and there are laws of thought in accordance with which the intellectual eye must be directed for similar purposes. If these laws are complied with, then the action of the mind is successful both in speculation and in practical matters;—it extracts constantly from its surroundings the utmost good they are capable of yielding to it: its notions of truth and conceptions of right are sound, and its practical conduct attended with happy consequences. If, on the other hand, these laws are violated, then it misses the good with which the circumstances were fraught: its notions and conceptions are false, and its conduct productive of evil in proportion. From the circumstances, then, in which the mind is placed it gathers truth and secures joy; from them also it receives correction. In all situations there is but one path of right—the path of progress. Its end is not seen, but it is recognisable by the superior excellence of the objects which it presents to view. Such objects, however, are often distant, and for their perception elevation of the intellectual eye is required. The paths of error, on the other hand, are numerous and accessible to all; but they either terminate in some inferior object or lead to some disaster. The low-minded and careless continually

deviate into them, until by sharp experience they have learnt to perceive and correct the bad habit which is the cause of their misfortunes.

It is necessary that it should be clearly understood that when it is said that every man has it in his power, by obeying the laws of reason always to extract from his circumstances the utmost good possible, the words "circumstances" and "best" are used in a relative, not in an absolute, sense. By "circumstances" is meant, not the total amount of actual realities which are outside and surround a man and affect his welfare, but only the total amount of things, whether objects of sense or objects of thought, that lie, connected by the laws of perception, external and internal, within the range of his faculties; and by "best," the best possible to the individual perceiver. Outside truths do not enter an individual mind so as to be presentable to consciousness, either because such mind is not capacious enough to comprehend them, or has not had opportunity to collect them. Thus many truths comprehensible readily by the mind of a Goethe or a Newton would be too lofty or too extensive to be contained by many, perhaps the majority, of other minds. Also the simplest truths indicated by objects present to the senses would be as obscure and as much hidden from minds of the greatest capacity, if there had been no opportunity previously of forming the notions necessary for the comprehension of such, as the meaning of a Greek book would be to the mind of a person unacquainted with the language: for, if no notions respecting a thing exist in the mind, no notions can be excited by the presence of such thing. The circumstances then of a man, in the sense in which the word is here used—the amount of things presentable to his mind at any time—are determined by such man's mental capacity, by the opportunities he has had of furnishing his mind with ideas, and by the manner in which he has availed himself of such opportunities. To such things, and to such alone, does the proposition above stated respecting the laws of reason apply. A man is only able to apply these laws to what lies within the range of his vision. Of things outside his mental horizon he is necessarily ignorant. If he has made the most of his opportunities, he will be right to the extent of his capacity: his notions will be sound,

and his practice proportionally correct: he will have fulfilled the law of duty—have obeyed his reason—and if he err, it will be from ignorance, which is unavoidable, not from his own fault.

§ XLII. In the objects which surround it then, its circumstances, the mind finds its motives for action; and the noblest object which it perceives is that which exercises on it the greatest force. And whether such object is also the best one that the circumstances comprise, depends on the mental habit. When the right habit exists, the attitude adopted by the mind or psyche is such that no object escapes the intellectual eye, but, every circumstance receiving due attention, the best present is perceived, and the best course that the circumstances permit is selected. If, on the other hand, a wrong mental habit exists, then there is no security that the best object will be perceived, and the mind is liable to error. The reason then is the rightful ruler of the will—its legitimate sovereign. And the mandate of this sovereign is recognised whenever it is heard. And the duty of the psyche is always to give *due* attention to its surroundings—to the things which have entered and are present within its sphere of consciousness—whether objects of sense or objects of thought—to place itself in such an attitude that the light flowing from them can be received:—the position of *rectitude.* The law of duty is rectitude, and he who recognises this law and obeys it is the truly upright, moral man. Morality is duty to the facts of consciousness; obedience to reason.

§ XLIII. Reason, then, is the light which,

reflected from objects within the mental sphere, presents them to the intellectual eye and enlightens the psyche; and duty is the obligation of directing the intellectual eye to such objects in order to see them rightly by the light of reason. And the true and only monitor by which a man can be trained to fulfil the law of duty and make use of reason is the *conscience.* Conscience is the sense which is affected, agreeably or otherwise, when the attention of the psyche is directed to its own actions and conduct; the faculty which manifests pleasure or pain when the process of self-inspection is being performed. When a man perceives that from his conduct injurious consequences have proceeded, he feels regret, and when he further perceives that it was in his power to have acted otherwise, he suffers remorse. So also the pleasure that he experiences at the perception of good is enhanced much by the consciousness that it is the product of his own act. The consciousness of having done one's best mitigates the smart of adversity and increases the joy of prosperity. And in this manner alone can a man be taught the obligation of obeying the law of duty. When he has once learnt that by making a proper use of his faculties he can escape every evil that is avoidable, secure every possible good, and in every case save himself from self-reproach, he will obey the right mental law and seek to regulate his understanding and his actions by the light of reason. But, until this obligation has been clearly perceived by him, it is useless, by threats of punishment or hopes of reward addressed to any lower sense, to hope to make

him act rightly. To attempt to correct low habits and produce uprightness by appealing to low motives is as fallacious as it would be to attempt to make a cripple straight by setting him on crutches. Until the conscience has been reached, nothing in the way of correction has been gained. Its voice is the only motive capable of producing rectitude.

This endeavour to find out what is right and to do it constitutes *virtue*. Virtue, or *manliness*, is the effort of the psyche to attain and preserve rectitude; to avail itself of all the reason that it possesses, and do the best thing that the circumstances will permit. Virtuous conduct is both the noblest and the wisest course, for it is not only the one best calculated to gain the best possible object, but it is also certain to secure self-respect as well. Virtue is therefore true *wisdom*.

§ XLIV. And it is noteworthy that, when the right habit has been acquired, and the psyche is erect and free, the influence of the reason and the conscience is unperceived and the law of duty is obeyed unconsciously. A man in perfect health physically, and well trained, watches with his mental eye the objects around him and obeys their indications without conscious effort; and knows no more of conscience and virtue than he does of the nerves and muscles of his body. If, practically and as a matter of fact, the case appears to be different; if duty seems disagreeable and virtue painful, requiring for their performance the constant stimulus of the conscience, while this last is supposed to be a dull and obdurate sense, difficult of access and requiring

to be roused by loud and reiterated appeals, and sometimes only to be approached indirectly by unpleasant applications addressed to other senses; it is because the true meaning of the words, duty, conscience, virtue, is often altogether lost sight of in their conventional one. In the conventional morality, duty means obedience, not to reason, but to authority: not to that which is right, but to that which is established: not to the law of nature, but to the law of custom: not to some noble object which elevates the mind and attracts the heart, but to some repulsive thing, degrading the psychical stature and dulling the feelings. And the appeal to the conscience is attempted, not by the only road by which it can be reached, the understanding, but by low and narrow channels. Mean motives, fear and prudential considerations affecting the self, are brought to bear on the mind, and such influences are in the majority of cases effectual enough; for men elevated above the mean are of necessity exceptional, and the multitude stoop readily, finding sufficient to engross their attention and employ their thoughts within the narrow horizon to which their views are confined. And not only do they crouch themselves before the object that enslaves them, whether creed or social institution, and bear, without feeling their weight, its leaden laws, but they are assiduous in breaking other natures to the yoke—to them easy enough: seeing nothing better, they have no temptation. But to nobler spirits such duty is degrading; such virtue painful and contracting to the limbs. As the psyche raises itself, the horizon expands, and the weight and

restriction of the chain is felt in proportion. Objects outside the prescribed limits attract the heart, and then a struggle is established between inclination and authority; and obedience to law becomes painful, and virtue—conventional virtue—difficult and, sometimes, impossible.

And as long as the reason is not appealed to, such cases resolve themselves into a question of balance of forces, and the conscience is not involved. But if the question is referred to the reason, then its decision is accepted by the psyche as final; the conscience pronounces its verdict, and, as far as the will is concerned, the contest ceases. If reason and authority be seen to be on the same side, then obedience is accorded willingly, and coercion is unnecessary. If, on the other hand, they be opposed, then right is perceived to lie on the side of resistance, and rebellion becomes a duty; there is, equally as on the opposite supposition, no conflict in the mind, and the question is, not whether the forbidden object is to be pursued, but how it is to be attained. But it is not enough that reason should be on the side of authority: their coincidence must be made evident. To secure willing obedience the appeal must be made to it, not to authority. Things which do not appear are, with reference to the mind, as if they do not exist; and, if the reasons are not pointed out, they might as well be absent.

The practice of virtue, then, in the proper sense of that word, would be, to minds healthy and rightly developed, easy and even delightful; and, were men

properly trained in their youth, such cases would be the rule; for man is born with a mind as free as his body is from vicious habits, and there is no reason why the mental powers should not be trained to act as rightly as the muscles of the body: but at present they are the exception, if indeed they exist at all. Scarcely any one grows up without having acquired some bad habit—some depraved form of appetite or sentiment, or some narrow and contracted mode of thought—interfering with the freedom of the will; and it is only after much bitter experience that his attention is called to the fact, and he learns the duty of correcting such bad habit by the manful or virtuous —and in such cases painful—exercise of his will, and of keeping his eye on the circumstances of his position: —on the circumstances, not on himself, otherwise his cure is not complete. The conscience is to the mind what the physical nerves are to the body; and men who are perpetually referring to it, ostentatiously at every step putting forth their reasons, and parading their sense of duty, are in a morbid condition: they are either formal pedants or precise and self-conceited prigs, being mentally, what persons troubled with nerves are physically, afflicted with the malady of self-consciousness in one or other of its forms. But the right mental habit once gained insures freedom and ease. The eye moves, and the muscles follow its indications instinctively, without any conscious effort of the will.

Let it not be supposed that by anything contained in the above it is intended to justify insubordination to *legitimate* authority. No authority is legitimate which does not profess to be based on

reason and permit criticism. All tyrannies practically rest on force, and by force alone can they be overthrown; but in societies in which every class is free, the only legitimate weapon against existing wrong is reason, and to resort to force is a crime.

§ XLV. The rule of reason, then, consists not in getting rid of habit, but in training it rightly; and its operation is the same with reference to passion. Reason does not destroy passion, but it directs it. Passion is the subjection of the mind to some conception of good which occupies it to the exclusion of every other object,—the domination of some ideal object over the heart. Just as stimulants excite the physical heart, increasing its force and activity, and diffusing warmth and vigour throughout the whole physical organism, so does a stimulating idea act on the psychical heart and constitution. Nor is the psyche able by its will, the domination once established, to withdraw itself from its influence. As long as the thing is there, its influence is felt. The object may be removed to a distance by the force of circumstances, and then the idea, unless the impression is too deep, will be effaced by time. Or it may seem to alter: circumstances may occur causing it to change its aspect and present new features not in harmony with the conception previously existing, and then, where once we were allured we become indifferent, or even disgusted. Or another fascination, entertained at a moment of temporary disengagement—a lucid interval—may intervene and, by its novelty or more potent attraction, alienate the heart from the object which formerly held it. Or, lastly, passion may wear itself out, may be

terminated by satiety: repletion satisfies desire and leaves the psyche at liberty to attend to the importunities of other wants, and to accomplish this it must turn in other directions; for it is not in any one object to supply all the cravings of the heart. For mental as for bodily health, variety of pabulum is necessary.

In one of these four ways, and of these only—starvation, disagreement, alienation or substitution, and satiety—can passion terminate. But the psyche cannot free itself by its will. The psychical heart, like the physical, is an involuntary organ. "The heart is an anatomical necessity, but we cannot control its loves and its hatreds, any more than we can its beatings." (Note H.) Still less can it be freed from the thraldom of passion by the arbitrary interference of others. Force may remove the object, but it cannot tear away the idea: it only causes it to be clung to more passionately. "Absence makes the heart grow fonder" is a truth demonstrable then, perhaps only, when such absence is the result of forcible interference. And disparagement is usually as unsuccessful as force, for the motives of the detractor are suspected. To be successful in the treatment of psychical as well as physical heart affections, the laws of that organ must be respected. Intelligent sympathy is the only mode by which help can be administered with any prospect of success. In the fable of "The Wind and the Sun," a more true insight into the nature of the heart can be discerned, than in many a grave moral treatise. To correct it, it must be understood.

§ XLVI. Imagination, then, and passion go

together: the one is the cause of the other. A mind with a feeble conceiving faculty is incapable of strong passion. It may have sound intellect, clear perception of the real with its good and evil, its beauty and deformity: but its horizon is bounded by the actual, it has no cloud-land. Nor has it the power of conceiving from what it sees that which it does not see—from the near the distant, from the apparent the hidden—of penetrating into the invisible. Nor of conceiving things visible in a different combination or order from that in which they appear—of perceiving in the real the goodness and beauty which exist there potentially—of extracting the ideal from the actual. And this is equally true of such minds, whether with reference to things existing by the will of man, or to things which arise from causes outside and independent of his will. To them things established by authority—the enactments of human laws—are as ordinances of nature, and, in each case, they consider the thing that is, that which must be. And they are as incapable of entertaining original conceptions offered by other persons as of forming them themselves. They perceive that the thing proposed is unlike anything that exists—that it is something that no one has ever seen or heard of before—a new thing—an innovation:—that is enough. To realise it, alteration must be made; something must be displaced; trouble must be taken; difficulties encountered; risk—even danger—incurred; suffering undergone:—all this they see very clearly. But they are unable to see, wanting imagination to conceive, the greater good that will be substituted.

Until the new conception is so matured that not only the proposition itself, but the method also by which it is to be realised, is made so plain that nothing is left to the imagination, they are cold and usually hostile. Such persons individually may possess both intelligence and taste. Prudent they generally are, and may in addition be considerate, kind, self-denying, generous; but their sensibilities are feeble, and their affections correspond. Distinguishing clearly the good and evil that exist, they pursue the former without ardour, and consider the latter inevitable—something to be borne in the best way they can. They are liable, like other persons, to be led away by folly, or to fall into vice; but their crimes, like their virtues, are exercised within a narrow range and on petty objects. Their records present no instances of reckless lawlessness or brilliant aberration—"To point a moral or adorn a tale."

Patience is the great virtue that characterises them. Capable of neither strong attachments nor aversions, they go through life not deeply affected by its changes, and bear ills proceeding from outward things with equanimity: but they in their turn produce no changes on outward things. In their sterile soil, whatever feeble conceptions are engendered take no deep root, and bring forth no lasting fruit. They live, making no mark; and die, leaving no void. Collectively, the purposes they unconsciously fulfil in the Cosmos are perhaps not inconsiderable: they serve as ballast to society which would otherwise be agitated by perpetual change; they also, by the *vis inertiæ* they oppose, develop all the powers

of genius, forcing it to make its work more thorough; perhaps, too, they serve to temper its fires, which would otherwise glow with too fierce a heat.

Imagination, on the other hand, expands and enlarges the mental sphere in every direction—above, below, around—encompassing it with an aery region, extending far beyond the confines of the known. Into this region the psyche penetrates, supported by conjecture, probability, hypothesis—the "if," "suppose," "perhaps"—and discovers in the far distance truths not revealed to those who, too cautious for such adventurous speculation, keep within the narrow, but safe, limits of proved and certain fact. And in this boundless aerial country it forms, out of materials taken from reality, its ideal conceptions—of beauty more perfect, of grandeur more imposing, of events more exciting, of goodness and pleasure more abounding with joy or more full of promise than anything offered to its eye by actual fact. And it is a characteristic of a mind of the class which we are now describing, that, not content with its own conceptions, it invites and hospitably entertains those proceeding from other minds; hailing their advent and meeting them on their way, or even penetrating into the region in which they were engendered, and seizing them before fully formed.

And in proportion to the sensibility and vigour of the conceiving mind is the vividness and power of the conception. Fascinated and enthralled, the mind is consumed by a longing to bring the cherished object of desire down from the cloud-land and fix it in the substantial region of fact. And this desire

grows into an irresistible passion, ruling it and forcing it into action. And the result of the attempt to realise its object of desire depends on whether, before surrendering itself to its influence, attention has been paid to that reality on which it is supposed to be based, and from which its component parts have been taken. If, in the journey into the unknown, the landmarks and indications drawn from the known have been duly observed,—if, in forming the conjecture or framing the conception, due care has been taken that the notions and perceptions existing of ascertained fact be accurate and correct,—in short, if the laws of inductive reasoning have been obeyed,—then as events advance and facts flow in, the ideal conception is verified and established. The theory turns out to be correct; the conception sound. A new domain of truth has been rescued from darkness; a new beauty unfolded, immortal, imperishable, a "joy for ever"; a new spring of goodness and pleasure let loose. If, however, through undue haste in seeking consummation, the mind surrender itself prematurely to the object of its desire, such preliminaries not having been gone through;—if unsound grounds have been chosen for the conjecture, unsound elements introduced into the conception;—then the result is failure. The visions of truth and beauty turn out to be fallacious and illusory; the hopes of pleasure and prospects of good end in disappointment. The views and conceptions melt like castles in the air, and are re-dissolved into the element out of which they were formed, either through inherent defect in organisation or from the means by which

they were to be realised not having been thoroughly understood.

To the form of self-deception which is produced by the undue influence of feeling, the term *pathetic fallacy* has been applied by Mr Ruskin. It seems to consist in a want of balance between the sensibilities and conceiving faculty on the one hand, and the controlling power on the other. The mind, suffering from the tension caused by the exciting conception with which it is overcharged, and seeking a vent, is driven to any object which presents any features of affinity, and, without waiting to see whether the other features correspond, credits it with all the rest—or rather, invests it with them, and thus surrenders itself to an ideal of its own, which has no existence out of itself; and it is not until those other features—in a moment of clear perception—are disclosed and found to disagree, that it is undeceived. Such a mind lives in an unreal world of its own, in which everything is transfigured. To it life is one continuous succession of dreaming and awakening, of illusion and disenchantment; until it learns the necessity of making a right use of its perceptive faculties and being no longer the fool of circumstances.

Into these two kinds of natures, the sterile and the fertile, human beings generally may be practically divided; the distinguishing mark being the relative excess or deficiency of imagination and its accompaniment, passion. Relative, we say, not absolute; for perhaps in no one is the conceiving faculty altogether wanting. Practically, however, the classification holds good; all below the average in this respect ranking with the sterile, all above with the fertile. And it is to be remarked that the difference between the two is one of quantity rather than quality; this latter depending more on culture and training than on nature. Whatever the culture, the product of the sterile nature will be feeble and scanty, that of the fertile nature vigorous and abundant; and if, for want of proper training or culture, this one engenders more evil than the other, yet on the other hand, it holds forth more promise. Luxuriousness may be restrained, misdirection corrected, by art: but barrenness is a curse.

§ XLVII. The proper function of the will, then,

is to counteract inclination and the gravitating forces that tend to draw the psyche downwards; to restrain it from prematurely surrendering itself to the influence of surrounding attractions; and to teach it, by the habitual practice of uprightness, circumspection, and vigilance, to perceive always the best object within its reach, and so secure right aims. And, this right habit of self-government once formed, the habitual exercise of the will is no longer necessary. "Use is second nature," and the cerebral organs that regulate the mental attitude, once rightly adjusted to their work, maintain the right action unconsciously and automatically. Prostrated by no terror, darkened by no blinding obstacle interposed by authority between it and the light, the psyche advances on its course—its stature elevated to its full height, supported by and relying on its own powers—not with the rigid and constrained stiffness of the victim of drill and discipline, but with the freedom and manliness of the vigorous and well-trained athlete; and, with a faith and a confidence which the cowering slave of superstition never knows, seeks that light which the other shuns, fearing only lest, in the struggle with impending circumstances, a full measure of it should be wanting. Nor by controlling inclination and preventing passion is vigour lost. Enthusiasm is concentrated and intensified by restraint, and when the right object is discerned and the judgment satisfied, then the heart and head, inclination and understanding, passion and will, go together, and the whole man is committed to the course of action with a force unknown to those who

habitually waste their powers on every object that presents itself, with a secret misgiving, perhaps, proceeding from the conscience, acting all the time as a drag. Reason, therefore, does not destroy passion, but increases its force, while enlisting it on the side of right.

§ XLVIII. The law of the will, then, is this :—. Until the right conception of duty has been formed in the mind, the psyche either follows at random any attractive object that may present itself, and avoids any repulsive thing—each of such things having power to overcome its *vis inertiæ*, and to act as a motive—or else, under the influence of some preponderating feeling proceeding from some absorbing conception of good—of some ruling passion—seeks by any means, regardless of all considerations of right and wrong, to realise such conceptions in the objects around it. And if several influences, proceeding from either an object or a feeling, are in action at the same time, then they act with different degrees of force, each according to its nature and the intensity in which it exists; and the psyche throws its will into the scale of that which appeals to its highest faculty—into the scale of the noblest—and moves according to the law of the resolution of forces —as in physics. Where, however, the psyche has been taught to see that relations exist between itself and the objects that surround it, and amongst which it moves—both the persons and the things; and that on its preservation of these relations aright its dignity and security depend; and further, that to accomplish this end constant attention is required; then to

ascertain and maintain these right relations becomes its chief care, and with this object it puts forth its will-force, controls feeling, resists inclination to attracting objects, and practises habitually self-respect; taking care to enter on no course and commit itself to no object until it is certain that it has selected the best that the circumstances present:— in short, reversing the practice of the Epicurean, as enunciated by Horace (Note J), it endeavours to adapt itself to its circumstances, not to bend its circumstances into harmony with its own feelings.

The characteristic of this will-force is that it emanates from the psyche itself, not from any of the objects around it. Through its action on the material organs of the brain the psyche is enabled to engage itself actively in the elaboration of its own notions and conceptions, and in the adaptation of the phenomena of sense to such. It seems to be essentially a spiritual force, and not to be dependent on any physical condition for its strength or weakness. It may be weak in the strongest body; and in the very hour of death, when the brain is feeble, and the thinking and acting powers are failing, and dissolution is imminent, it may remain firm and constant to the last. By putting forth this will-force the psyche has the power, in healthy and normal conditions, to free itself from all influences which have their root in feeling, and viewing things by the clear light of reason, to judge of their respective values and to direct its conduct accordingly. The essence of the will-force is, that it should be free from all admixture of feeling. If any force proceeding from disturbed brain-centres

mingle with it, then the action does not proceed entirely from the psyche, but, so far as such admixture of feeling extends, from causes outside it.

This power of acting freely— of controlling thoughts and actions by his own *free-will*—is one that every man possesses to some extent by nature, but it can only be exercised in minds which have been preserved from all vicious habits and tendencies—from all tyrannies caused by the undue influence of things which act on the different parts of the psychical nature—the sensual and sensorious, the æsthetic, emotional, and theoretic—or in whom such have been corrected; and it can only be maintained by the habitual exercise of self-respect. When the conscience has been awakened and the discovery made that self-abasement is the greatest of all, or rather, the only real humiliation; and that self-reproach is the greatest of all miseries, so that no enjoyment is possible while its sting is felt; and that, on the other hand, self-approval based on the consciousness of acting right is the greatest of all happiness, so that every misery is bearable if such a condition exist; and that it is in the power of every man to secure this greatest good and to escape this worst misery, simply by habitually keeping his inclinations in check and consulting his circumstances; not allowing himself to be committed to the influence of any until the import of all has been weighed, and never abandoning himself to any so far as to lose the mental equilibrium, but always keeping the circumstances in view and preserving the power of withdrawal, should sufficient reason appear;—when such discovery has been made and the habit of thus regarding the circumstances acquired, then freedom of will is established. But until this lesson has been learnt, freedom is but an empty word. The only intelligible sense which this word "free-will" possesses is, freedom from the influence of feeling. And the only condition consistent with the maintenance of such freedom is obedience to the law of duty—to the word contained in the circumstance. Mere absence of restraint is not freedom, but only a loose lawlessness. Until the sovereignty of reason is recognised, licence is permitted to every feeling, and the psyche, passive and inert, drifts before every passing influence. Licentiousness, if indulged in, is the certain fore-runner of some form of tyranny. "*Only in law can the soul find freedom.*"

§ XLIX. For the psyche, then, to put forth its will-force, the presence of a motive is necessary. And such motive must belong to one of two classes:—it must either proceed from the desire to obtain from outside things the realisation of some conception of pleasure which it has formed in its mind, and which it believes they are calculated to afford him; or else it must be caused by anxiety to act rightly towards such outside things, and so to preserve self-respect. Now the motives present to consciousness at any given time depend on the position in which such person is placed at that time with relation to outside things; on his perceptive powers, and the notions and conceptions in his mind respecting such things; and on his attitude mental and bodily. Those notions and conceptions constitute his mental circumstances—his intellectual horizon—and among these the motives which move his will are to be found: the noblest present at any one time to his mental eye attracting him most. And if he has adopted the right mental attitude, then the noblest thing within the range of his perceptions will never escape him, and he will act always under the best motive that his mental circumstances permit. The result of his conduct—the amount of influence he will exert—will depend on the natural capacity of his mind and the fulness and correctness of his information; but his rectitude depends on his mental habit, his moral training. And of these three conditions—capacity, instruction, and training—the last is by far the most important. Great natural capacity and copious information only

serve, in the absence of rectitude, to furnish a wider field and more abundant methods for going wrong; but right moral training—obedience to the light of reason—will, even when that light is feeble, owing to narrowness or poverty of intellect, keep a man in his right path. He may travel but a little way, but he will be right as far as he goes. Nor let it be objected by educators of the young that such training of the will, such right moral attitude, is difficult or impossible to secure. It has never been tried: at least not systematically. All natural processes are pleasant if performed under right conditions, and it is as natural and as pleasant to a child to perceive with its intellect and understand, as it is to digest its food, or see and walk. If suitable food be given, it agrees: digestion is pleasant, and the body grows and is strengthened; and if attractive objects are placed within its reach, it raises itself to them; higher and higher, in proportion to the height of the object. So with the mind: if suitable instruction is administered, it is received with pleasure, and the intellect is fed and strengthened; if elevating objects are presented, the stature is raised, and the mind ennobled. But if the natural laws are neglected—if the digestion is injured by unfit food; if the stature is dwarfed by want of nourishment; if the light is shut out from the eye, and the freedom of the limbs restrained by bandages or swaddling clothes—then neither strength nor uprightness is obtained for either body or mind, and correct vision is impossible. But in such cases the trainer is in fault, not nature. Throw away all

blinds and bandages, permit perfect freedom, and present proper objects, and the natural instincts will direct right. The nobler things will, by the power of natural selection, displace the baser, and the vision will be drawn upwards, commanding, as it rises, a more expanded view, and perceiving more numerous objects—the distant as well as the near, the things above as well as those below—until the psyche has gained its full height.

> "'Tis an assured good
> To seek the noblest! 'tis your only good
> Now you have seen it, for your highest vision
> Poisons all meaner choice for evermore"—

So says George Eliot; and Tennyson:—

> "It was my duty to have loved the highest;
> It surely was my pleasure, had I known;
> It would have been my pleasure, had I seen:
> We needs must love the highest when we see it."

§ L. *Rectitude*, then, is the essential ingredient in progress, not intellect: freedom and uprightness, not great knowledge and far-extended views. Intellect and learning will carry a man further, but without rectitude it will only be on the wrong road. There is but one light, reason; and, unless this is followed, the faculties of the mind only take it into darkness. This opinion seems on the surface to be opposed to that of the late Mr Buckle, who has laid it down that intellect, not morality, is the prime mover in the advance of mankind. But any one who has studied the context and the whole drift of Mr Buckle's writings, must see that the opposition is apparent only, not real. It is quite clear that when he speaks of

intellect as the cause of progress, it is implied that it must be guided by reason; which is equivalent to saying what has just been stated, viz., that it must be made use of honestly and uprightly. When he speaks of morality, it is evident that he means the conventional morality of society, which teaches that authority, not reason, is the sovereign to which obedience is due. Taken in this sense, his proposition is plain enough and indeed self-evident. Progress is departure from what is fixed and established to something further on; the perception of that something is effected by the intellect; and the recognition by the psyche of the same and of the obligation which its perception entails, is, by the very act, a denial of the supremacy of authority. That Mr Buckle, when using the word "morality," had in his mind *conventional* morality, is clear from the instance which he adduced to prove his proposition. George the Third, whom he brings forward as an illustration of a moral but unintellectual man, was a person of very feeble intellect and narrow mental capacity, it is true; and what mind he had was probably very imperfectly furnished with ideas. He was also, perhaps, in the conventional sense of the word, a *moral man*, *i.e.*, a man who above all things respected authority and the established laws and usages of society, and rightly endeavoured to carry out in his practice what he believed to be right: but he most certainly could not be called a moral man in the sense which it has been attempted to show is the true one in which the word morality should be understood; viz., a man perfectly free and unprejudiced,

practising above all things intellectual rectitude, and endeavouring in every way by the use of his understanding and reason to comprehend the facts around him and extract from them their truth. On the contrary, he was infected with the worst vice of all—bigotry; a vice which, measured by its inveteracy and the evils which it engenders, far transcends every other. Other vices subjugate only a single sense, but this one, trampling down the reason and menacing the conscience, calling abjectness virtue, and servility duty, enslaves and domineers over the whole soul. This vice it is hopeless to remedy. In the case of other infirmities affecting lower faculties it is possible to bring reason to bear, if only the attention is gained; for the way to the understanding is open: but here the understanding itself is the faculty enslaved, and there is no channel by which liberating influences can be admitted. Persons so afflicted are at once blind and deaf: they can neither see with their own eyes nor listen to others who can. It is usual to call their stubbornness honest and conscientious, but none of the attributes of honesty and conscientiousness can be discovered in them. With the merit of consistency they may be credited, if it be a merit to stand still when the feet are fettered.

George the Third was a bigot. Prejudices, which were with great pains introduced into his narrow mind when young, remained and ruled him through life, and he never used freely the feeble powers he possessed. In his darkened mind intelligence was at last altogether extinguished; for both the mental and physical vision are in time quenched by the depriva-

tion of their natural stimulus, light; a lesson which it behoves all educators carefully to take to heart. The case of George the Third, then, though an admirable one for Mr Buckle's purpose, proves nothing against what has been advanced; and it is matter of congratulation to the present writer that it will not be possible to urge against him the authority of the acute and enlightened author of the "History of Civilization."

Honesty and uprightness, then, it may be repeated, are of more avail in advancing mankind on the path of progress than intellectual gifts: and it is fortunate that it is so. The former are in the power of all: the latter belong only to a favoured few.

But it will be argued:—If a man's conduct is determined by his mental circumstances—the notions and conceptions present in his mind—and these again by his natural capacity, instruction, and moral training, what becomes of freedom of will, choice, responsibility, accountability? for not one of the above conditions by which the will is said to be determined are produced by the man himself, but they are all the result of causes operating from without; and he, who is not responsible for the cause, is not responsible for the effect. If the action of the psyche is not spontaneous, but is determined by conditions which it does not create for itself, then everything is fated, predestined: Man is what he is of necessity, and, as it is of no use contending against the inevitable, every motive for right conduct ceases and the distinction between right and wrong is lost. Either, then, the words free-will, liberty of choice, responsibility, accountability, have no meaning at all, it will be argued if this doctrine is accepted, or they must be understood in a very different sense from that in which they are commonly received.

The reply is, that the doctrines of the text may be accepted while still retaining every one of these words: all that is requisite to reconcile the two being, that the original and correct meaning of such words be restored to them. That which is free is disengaged, unimpeded. Free-will is, as has been already said, a condition of the mind, which exists or not according to circumstances; not at the will of the individual himself: for no one would consciously choose to be enslaved. The mind does not, any more than the body, create its own conditions. If the psyche is free from vice, it is free. If it is a slave to vicious habits, it is not free. Free-will is an effect, a condition. Again: if the mind is held captive by any attraction, it has not liberty of choice; but in proportion to its disengagement from such, is its liberty. If there be no leaning or inclination at all, the psyche is perfectly free to choose any course open to it, but its choice will be determined by the nature of the things which are presented to it: by the relative force of the motives.

So also with regard to responsibility and accountability. That is responsible which is able, when appealed to, to give a response. That is accountable which is able to account for an occurrence. If a man's mind contain notions corresponding to outside things, he is *able* to respond to them if he *will*: he is responsible with respect to them. And he will respond to them, if he perceive them. And he will perceive them, if he adopt the right mental attitude and use his reason according to the law of duty already laid down. And he will use his reason, if he has learnt the necessity of so doing. But if he has not learnt this necessity, there is no security that he will perceive them; and should he not perceive them, their reason will not appear. Also, if he does not possess correct notions, or any at all, respecting them, their influence will not be felt. His state of knowledge and his mental habit or training account for his conduct.

And doubtless it is true that every man is what he is, and

does what he does, of *necessity*. Of necessity his mind is of a certain limited capacity; his intellectual, like his bodily, powers being fixed within bounds. Of necessity his ideas and notions of surrounding things are limited by the opportunities he has had of gaining information. Of necessity also,—until he has been taught by circumstances—either instructors or experience—to obey the law of duty to his reason, he is liable to err through carelessness or inattention; for man is not born by nature upright, circumspect, and vigilant, any more than with a mind stored with ideas, but only with faculties enabling him to become the former, if properly trained; and with a capacity to receive and retain the latter, if supplied to him. Of necessity also, if through his carelessness he has lapsed into some confirmed habit, he is a *wilful* offender: his will is not free, and his mind, engaged with the object which has enslaved it, is inaccessible to other considerations. And although the condition of such a man's mind is the proximate cause of his conduct, and is therefore faulty and to blame, yet not in a sense that will justify hostility, and, still less, hatred. What is due to him and he merits is, correction—rectification—the putting straight. Censure or blame, as it is usually administered, is the expression of animosity—the indignation which the mind feels at perceiving conduct, or hearing the expression of sentiment or opinion, not in accordance with its own notions. It is the indulgence of uncharitable feeling produced by narrowness and the absence of self-control. If proper care were taken to be just and fair, and to give due attention to all the history and circumstances which led to the bad habit and wrong conduct—if the offender were completely understood—such a feeling would be impossible; mankind would love, or at any rate wish well to each other, and charity would become an actual fact.

Nor can it be argued that the acceptance of the doctrine of law and necessity regulating the action of the mind and the

conduct of men, would involve immoral or mischievous consequences, unless it can be shown that the knowledge that wrong conduct necessarily results from wrong use of our faculties, and this again from wrong conditions of mind, would be a motive for continuing in such wrong use, instead of endeavouring to establish those right conditions on which the right use of our faculties and our happiness depends. But it is evident that such knowledge would operate as the strongest possible motive on the side of *right.*

A man who has fallen into a ditch does not reason that because he lies there as a necessary consequence of his careless habit of walking, and to get up it will be necessary to exert himself, therefore it is better to remain where he is; on the contrary, the necessity of exertion is a stimulus for action. It is the same with the mind. Awaken it to its fallen condition, and it will put forth its efforts and become upright.

He in whose mind the obligation of using his reason is absent, is of necessity a fool. He in whose mind the highest motive in action is a selfish one, is of necessity a knave. He in whose mind the obligation of habitually using his reason is always present, is of necessity a wise man.

And, if it is objected that from this view of the human will the doctrines of fate and predestination follow as logical consequences, such consequences may be accepted without dismay. Fate *(fatum)* is the *thing said*, the *word* (Note K), the *decree.* Predestination is fore-knowledge, fore-determination. All who believe that everything has a cause, and that there is a first cause which comprehends the elements of all things—matter, mind, and psyche alike;—to which, as a root, all things may be traced, and from which, as a spring, all things flow;—must, to be consistent, accept the doctrine of fate. For, if such cause comprehended the elements, it comprehends the combinations; if the premises, the conclusions. If anything exist, or any event take place, which

was not fated, it would follow, either that some one or more of the elements of creation were not comprehended by such first cause—did not proceed from it—or that, from defect of deductive faculty, some unexpected conclusions have been arrived at. In other words, it would be imputing to the Supreme Intelligence either defective capacity or imperfect conceiving power; it would be making the Great First Cause inferior in these respects to a human artist who thoroughly conceives his work before executing it. The contradictory to *fate* is *chance*. One or other of these two must exist: either inflexible fate, or blind chance. Chance implies elements that, not being comprehensible, cannot be calculated upon. It is a condition that has no absolute existence, but only has reference to the human mind, the limitation of which gives the appearance of *chance* to all phenomena of which it does not comprehend the *law*. If the human will be absolutely free—unconditioned by law, moving without a motive outside the psyche—then there is an element in the universe that cannot be calculated upon; a thing without a cause; and, instead of *one* First Cause, there are *several*.

Chance involves atheism. Fate is the only view consistent with a One perfect Intelligence.

And that the mind should be subject to the law of necessity —that the conduct of a man should depend on his mental condition intellectually and morally, and this condition be the result of things operating outside him and independent of his will—is a most fortunate thing, and one fraught with the utmost hope for the future. For it follows that, if the circumstances alter, or be altered, the mental condition and conduct will alter also; and therefore, by directing attention to, and studying the circumstances and mental condition and their mutual relations, they may be understood and rectified, if necessary, so as to secure favourable results; and so the human mind may be acted upon with certainty and put right, like any other thing: and thus there is a field for the moral

philosopher, the educator, and the statesman to enter upon and work, with certainty, in the end, of success. If the human mind contained any element which was self-originating, spontaneous, and not to be calculated upon, then all effort to benefit and advance mankind would be useless, and hope would indeed be blotted out of the page of human history. But if the doctrine of necessity, of cause and effect, and of phenomena depending on laws be admitted into psychical as well as into physical affairs, then it will follow that by the inductive method of reasoning such laws may be discovered: and psychology, this principle accepted, becomes one of the inductive sciences.

This doctrine of necessity, fate, predestination, seems on reflection so conclusive, so consistent—not only with the facts around us, but with the words in everyday use—that it might appear strange that it has never yet been generally accepted. But many causes have been in operation to produce this. In the first place, the generality of persons do not reflect on the subject at all, but are content with superficial impressions; and they say that the doctrine is opposed to common sense. And it must be admitted that it is so in fact, if by *common sense* is meant that which is obvious to the common vision—to the first impressions of every eye. The motives which cause the will to act, for the most part, operate unconsciously and out of sight, and conduct cannot be traced to them without much skill in analysis; and thus the psyche appears to the common observer to put forth its will spontaneously. In being opposed to first impressions, and therefore to the opinion of the great majority of mankind, who are led by first impressions, this doctrine is in the same position as all great scientific laws. They are all, at first sight, opposed to common sense. To the common eye—viewing the superficial phenomena only—the sun appears to go round the earth: vision of a less common order—discerning more profoundly and extensively—perceives that the earth goes round the sun.

The common eye sees in the whale a fish: the scientific one discovers the characteristic marks of a mammal. So in this psychological question :—the common mind perceives that a man's conduct is the result of his will, and that he has the power (Note L) of putting this will-force in action or not; but it does not look further and see what the motives are, and whence derived, which have induced him so to exert himself. Unless a man choose to investigate the subject, freely analysing the mental phenomena—just as he would, in the cases mentioned above, the astronomical and physiological—and divest himself of all preconceived ideas and prejudices, he clearly is no more entitled to pronounce an opinion on this question of the will, than he would be to pronounce from his first impressions on any of the problems of astronomy or physiology.

But the chief obstacle to the acceptance of this doctrine of the law of the will is *fear*. Men do not use their reason from one of three causes :—either they will not, from bigotry—the absence of freedom; or they cannot, from want of training—the absence of wisdom; or they dare not, from fear—the absence of faith: and this last is the one that operates most strongly in the case we are considering. They shrink form the subject, for fear of fancied consequences that might spring from it. Conscious that reason is against them in this matter, they endeavour to remove the whole subject of the nature of the will from its sphere; shrouding it in ambiguous words and calling it a mystery :—Mystery—convenient word! whether to excuse indolence, stifle inquiry, or stop progress. Now, although facts, once ascertained, must be accepted with all their consequences, yet it must be conceded that conclusions, which seem to involve evil consequences, justify suspicion and reconsideration of the road which led to them. Judged, however, by this test of consequences, the doctrine that the action of the will is conditional and determined by causes that it does not create for itself, will contrast most favourably in every respect with the creed that is its alternative. Some of

these consequenees have been already alluded to. We will recapitulate them.

1. This doctrine is in accordance with the great law of causation which obtains everywhere else in nature, and with the theory of a One Great First Cause. It represents the mind as one link, and that the most important, in the great chain of causes by which all existing things are bound and obliged. The theory of absolute freedom from all law, by making the mind an effect without a cause, a law unto itself, is at variance with faith in a supreme intelligence and will.

2. The doctrine that the will acts of necessity is the only one consistent with any rational hope of progress, whether individual or social. Without it, there can be no science of human nature; no educational art—for art implies possible science; no statesmanship. Moral philosophy becomes a dream, and the efforts of the educator—the trainer of the psyche—and of the legislator are futile: for the social edifice could no more be raised, if there were no psychical laws regulating and determining the conduct of the psychical units which constitute it, than could a physical edifice if physical forces did not act according to law, and the material constituents of the building—the bricks and stones—behaved in their relations to each other in a manner that could not be foreseen. For it is evident that, as long as any one element of a subject cannot be calculated upon, science, the very essence of which is calculation and certainty, is, with respect to it, impossible. Clearly, then, if the human will be not governed by laws, if the psychical forces or motives be not constant in their action and capable of being understood, no good results can be expected to be attained by efforts directed towards the improvement of mankind; and such efforts might with propriety be desisted from, and the whole matter abandoned to chance. If, on the other hand, there be a law governing human conduct, then we may rationally hope, nay, confidently expect, that by study rightly directed, knowledge of such

law may be gained, just as has been the case with the laws regulating other departments of nature; and so, knowing the conditions, we may be able to direct and control the results and mould them at will.

If human conduct were absolutely unconditioned and governed by no laws, then it must be to an observer as if it were the result of chance, and human nature would be absolutely unintelligible, unknowable—even to infinite intelligence. That is the alternative of not accepting the doctrine laid down in the text. If, on the other hand, it be governed by laws, it is intelligible—is able to be understood by a sufficient intelligence. Whether it will ever be reduced to an exact science, so that one man could thoroughly understand another man, is a question unnecessary to discuss. It is idle to inquire into the limits of possibility. As a fact, we know that men do to some extent understand each other; that some men possess this faculty in a greater degree—have more penetration—than others; also, that some men are more easy to be understood—more candid and transparent—than others; but that which is understood already partially, will, it is reasonable to believe, be understood better, if more pains and attention are bestowed on it. On the doctrine of the text, therefore, there is hope of human progress. On the doctrine of unconditioned freedom, there is none.

3. The doctrine of necessity favours the development in the heart of the sentiment of charity; while the opposite doctrine has the contrary tendency. For, whereas on the one doctrine it is irrational to hate any one —however hateful his conduct may be—when we perceive that the difference between him and us is only relative; that we ourselves should act like him if placed in his mental circumstances,—if in fact our respective selves were interchanged, and we saw with his eyes, heard with his ears, felt with his feelings, and were moved by his sentiments; and that, as neither of us have made ourselves, we have no more right to hold him

responsible to us for his nature than another being, more perfect than we are and of whose motives and sentiments we have no conception, would have to hold us responsible for not exhibiting *his* conduct—on the doctrine of absolute freedom it would be equally irrational to love, or not to hate a being, who, with conceptions of good and evil existing in his mind just as we ourselves possess—with the same sentiments, the same motives in action, and the same surroundings—should, being absolutely free and unimpeded, deliberately choose the bad. Such a being, were it possible to conceive such (which to the writer it is not, for the theory involves a contradiction, as all false theories do when attempted to be expressed at full), would be an incarnation of evil, an evil principle; and as such would be a proper object of hatred.

Also, as on the doctrine of freedom, for every wrong action the person himself is to be held primarily responsible, and as the conduct of every one is in some respects imperfect in the eyes of other persons possessed of superior conceptions of moral perfection, it would, if logically carried out, involve general hatred and antagonism. That such consequences do not universally follow is because the doctrine of freedom is not logically carried out in practice: for, in the first place, the majority of men go by the heart rather than the head, and the instincts of the heart are not logical, that organ not being under the rule of the will; and, in the second place, mankind do to some extent admit the doctrine of necessity; for, whenever they take the trouble to put themselves in the place of an offender so as to understand him, in proportion as this process is completely performed, in the same proportion do they *excuse* him (*ex*, out of, and *causa*, cause), they find the cause to be outside him, and if the exculpation be not always complete, it is because they carry into the situation their own perceptions, knowledge, and feelings, instead of completing the interchange of circumstances and taking his. Were this perfect interchange of self possible perfect sympathy would

exist. But the process is not possible, save to perfect intelligence, and therefore to such a being alone is universal love practically possible. But although the mischievous effects of this doctrine of the freedom of the will are to some extent mitigated by the unconscious logic of the heart, yet they prevail sufficiently to cause more unhappiness and misery than all the other ills of life put together. For although, as far as we understand the motives of offenders, we excuse them, yet, when we are unable to understand them, we hold them inexcusable: thus measuring their culpability by the standard of our intelligence. Hence it happens that we always find the most intelligent persons to be the most tolerant.

While, therefore, the doctrine of the freedom of the will leaves us no room for love, the doctrine of necessity leaves us no place for hate; and so is in perfect accordance in its practical influence with the tone of sentiment exhibited in the Christian ideal. Religious doctrines, however true, cannot produce their full effect unless the intellectual culture be adequate, any more than good seed can grow and produce its fruit if sown on a barren soil. If the doctrine of necessity were universally accepted it would, perhaps, be not altogether unreasonable to hope that the Christian ideal and Christian real might be brought more into accordance than after eighteen centuries of effort we find them. But it may be inquired: If every man be what he is of necessity, and everything is to be traced to the will of the First Cause—is willed to be what it is by that cause—what becomes of *merit* and *de-merit*—of *rewards* and *punishment?*—in such a system they have no place. True: they have no place. And this brings us to a *fourth* consequence of the doctrine of necessity—that it affords a logical basis for the great virtue, humility. *Humility*, not *abjectness*: the lowliness that aspires, not the self-abasement that grovels. For clearly, if men are what they are of necessity, the man who, placed in favourable circumstances, has, by the influence of intellectual light flowing to him on

every side freely and in full measure, been raised to his full mental stature and proportions, has no more reason to boast over his more lowly and less symmetrical fellow-man than a tree that, placed in a rich soil, has been raised by the free influx of the physical light to its full development, has to glory over the stunted and crooked growth of other vegetations placed in situations where the access of light has been difficult and partial only.

The analogy is great. The physical conceptions of the tree —its leaves and buds—are formed by the light out of matter derived from without, and by their influence the trunk of the tree is raised and its direction determined. But, however rich the soil, the leaf-conceptions will not be formed unless the light have access; and in whatever directions the light approaches it, in those directions it will grow. If the light descend from above, the tree is drawn upwards and becomes straight, erect, lofty. If the light only reach it from below, it spreads itself out on the ground. If the light be not full and free on all sides, but approach it from one side only, then the leaf-conceptions that it forms are one-sided and partial accordingly. It is the same with the mind and its conceptions. These latter determine its growth and attitude, but they will not be evolved unless the light be admitted to them. Every mind, like every tree, has its typical form; but to develop such perfectly there must be right culture as well as nourishment—education or evolution by the light of reason as well as intellectual food. "As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined" is a rule that holds good in both cases.

And it is worth remarking that of these three conditions— the nature, the food or soil, and the light—which determine the development of both the physical and the psychical thing, the first and last seem to be sufficient for their purpose, even when the supply of food, whether physical or mental, furnished by the circumstances, is reduced to the most scanty measure.

A noble nature, whether man or tree, freely exposed to the

light, will develop under the most adverse circumstances in respect of food—nay, will even thrive better than if too abundantly favoured by fortune. Vegetations of a hardy stock, that rich and luxurious soils only render rank and feeble, will become healthy and vigorous in the poorest, if only light be abundant; and minds noble by nature are roused, not overcome, by adversity, if only they possess freedom.

> "But from its nature will the tannen grow,
> Loftiest on lofty and least sheltered rocks,
> Rooted in barrenness, when nought below
> Of soil supports them 'gainst the Alpine shocks
> Of eddying storms; yet springs the trunk, and mocks
> The howling tempest, till its height and frame
> Are worthy of the mountains from whose blocks
> Of bleak, grey granite, into life it came
> And grew a giant tree;—*The mind may grow the same.*"

Also with regard to rewards and punishments. The goodness of virtue consists in the freedom, serenity, and self-control which it produces: the evil of vice in its deformity and degradation. While the mind is unconscious of this latter condition, its evil is unfelt. But when, by the process of self-respect or self-inspection, the vicious condition is perceived, then the conscience is awakened, and shame and remorse constitute the correcting influences. These are the only true chasteners—the proper and sufficient chastisement for vice: while as for rewards for virtue—"Virtue is its own reward." Rewards and punishments are low motives, proffered by minds capable of conceiving nothing higher, and operating only on slavish natures. They appeal to base passions only—to selfish hopes and fears. To attempt to make a vicious person upright by such means, is, as has been said already, futile. A man must be raised to rectitude by his own powers—*his own free-will;* and the motives which, acting through that will, elevate him, must come from on high. Moreover, on the doctrine of necessity, the notion of rewards and punishment is altogether misplaced; for, accord-

ing to it, virtuous and vicious conditions of mind are no more proper subjects for reward and punishment than are healthy and faulty bodily conditions. Congratulation and pity are the more appropriate sentiments for the occasion, and correctives and discipline—mental therapeutics and hygiene —the proper measures to be adopted towards the vicious. Merit and demerit are terms that on this doctrine of necessity are altogether inappropriate to virtuous and vicious conditions, however greatly the conditions themselves attract our regard or excite our aversion. The condition of every man, whether virtuous or vicious, is determined, like that of every tree, by the light it receives. And that light comes from the source of all light. Without it, both man and tree wither alike.

"Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill,
That thorough grace hath gained victory,
If any strength we have, it is to ill;
But all the good is God's, both grace and eke will."

It seems then that this "glorious doctrine of necessity," as Priestley calls it, not only fits in with the facts of life, but also is a principle from which the most beneficial consequences would flow. By teaching that the light of reason—a light reflected from the facts of the cosmos, and fully perceptible only to the upright (Note M)—is the true and only influence capable of developing and elevating the psyche and of guiding it in darkness and perplexity, it places all who accept it under the obligation, not only of maintaining rectitude themselves, but also of developing, educating, and elevating, by the same influence, others as well. By getting rid of notions of merit and demerit, it represses individual arrogance and promotes intelligent sympathy, the source and essence of true charity. By introducing certainty into our calculations respecting human affairs, it furnishes good ground for hope in social progress. By pointing to a Great First Cause—an unseen source of light, directing and controlling all things—it gives a reasonable foundation for faith. In teaching us

that reason is the true light to light us on our way; that rites and ceremonies, except so far as they are related to it, are useless and vain; that obedience to it is the only real moral obligation—an obligation better than sacrifice or the blood of rams—it supplies at once a standard and a measure of duty. While strengthening the obligation of doing right by referring it to its true principle, it at the same time recognises the claim of every man to have the conditions requisite for the operation of this principle furnished him; and thus by enlarging men's ideas of justice, it multiplies the bonds of sympathy which unite them. It also, while fully recognising the imperfection of human nature, vindicates it from the aspersions that have been so freely cast upon it. It offers the highest motives to exertion. It tells us that man is a problem to be solved by the intellect, just as other problems are: that on the solution or not of this problem depends psychical happiness and misery—just as on the right solution of physical problems, physical happiness depends: that there is therefore a science called psychology, and that by the mastering and right application of the laws of this science moral happiness can be ensured—just as, by the right understanding of the laws of physiology and the practical applications of the deductions therefrom, physical well-being is to be obtained: and that we have no more reason to despair of success on account of failure hitherto in the one science than in the other. Old as the world is, physiology is but a science of yesterday: it is still imperfect, yet men see now that a knowledge of its laws lie within their reach, and seeing this, their intellects and energies are put forth in the right direction. Let them be once awakened universally to the fact that mind as well as body is governed by laws comprehensible by the understanding, they will advance in this highest department of knowledge as certainly as in the other; with practical results more important still.

The importance of rightly understanding this question of the will, and the vast issues which depend upon it, will, it is hoped, excuse, and perhaps justify, this long digression. In the next chapter the subject of inquiry will be resumed, and man, viewed hitherto as an individual, will be considered in his social aspects.

CHAPTER IV.

SOCIAL.

§ LI. OUR conception of self is now complete. Through the agency of the physical world, man is revealed to himself as a being endowed with perception, understanding, sensation, sentiment, imagination, desire, judgment, will, and power; and thus, in the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, a considerable advance has been made. It has been shown how, through the instrumentality of the several structures of the brain, into that mysterious sphere of consciousness which constitutes the only datum on which we can found a notion of mind, and which exists originally dark and void, there are introduced, either simultaneously or in connected sequence, phenomena relating, on the one hand, to the physical world, and, on the other hand, to the psyche itself: the former represented either in the form of sensorial perceptions and intellectual notions which, more or less imperfect, constitute our revelation of physical reality, or as ideal conceptions of beauty, goodness, and truth, based on such imperfect notions; the latter presented to us as a being sensuous, æsthetic, emotional, contemplative; also as subjected to the action of forces, attractive and repulsive, occasioned by conceptions present to its

consciousness; and, lastly, endowed with a power of self-inspection and a conscience, or sense of duty. It is now time to turn our attention to another and more important class of phenomena—to the great psychical Cosmos which is inseparably connected with the physical Cosmos, by the phenomena of which it is hidden, and, as it were, masqued—a Cosmos of which our individual psyche is a unit—and to consider its facts and laws, how they are to be comprehended, and what their import and relations are to us. Unless these can be learnt, a knowledge of the physical Cosmos, however complete, even with a knowledge of self combined, would be to each individual psyche of little avail. For man is a social animal. Pre-eminently is he dependent on his kind. Whether to obtain the necessaries of existence, or to ward off danger, co-operation is requisite: for his unassisted powers are inadequate for either purpose; and in proportion to the degree of his civilisation and development do his necessities multiply, and the disproportion between his requirements and his capabilities increase.

During a large part of his life—in youth, in sickness, and in old age—he is altogether dependent on the good offices of his fellow-man, both for the food that strengthens and develops his bodily powers, and for the mental food that enables him to use and direct them rightly. And even in his maturity and vigour the same rule holds good: for his food, clothing, and habitation have severally to be elaborated out of materials supplied by nature in the crude state only; and to provide for himself completely

either of these necessaries, the powers and knowledge of the most ably-endowed man—in his civilised condition at any rate—would by themselves be altogether inadequate. Nor, were it otherwise, would the case be altered much. Man resembles the plant of the field so far that, like it, his existence is incomplete unless his life be crowned with some result. Just as the plant extracts from the crude realities around it materials which it elaborates within itself, and expresses, in the forms of flowers and fruit, physical conceptions of beauty and goodness; so does the mind of man extract from his surrounding realities elements which it forms within self into mental conceptions of beauty and goodness, and seeks to give utterance to in language or some other form of expression, pleasing, or useful and instructive to, other minds. But they differ in that, while the plant or flower seems to be content "to blush unseen," man requires some other mind or minds to receive and entertain his thoughts, and share his sentiments. Of necessity, therefore, man must have intercourse with his fellows: their co-operation is essential to the supply of his wants and the completion of his happiness; and to establish this co-operation, mutual understanding is requisite. Until this is effected, and effected thoroughly, there must be misunderstanding and moral disorder, and the moral disorder will be in proportion to the misunderstanding.

§ LII. Now this class of the mental phenomena is one of which we have no direct perception. One man cannot penetrate directly into the sphere of

another man's consciousness, nor can he admit another man into his own. No one psyche can disclose itself by direct revelation to another. Neither the mind of another, nor any of its contents, whether intellectual or sensory, can be directly perceived by any one. That both of these classes of phenomena, the intellectual and the sensory, are contained in and peculiar to each kind, has been proved already, when it was shown that the latter have the same relation to the sensory ganglia of the brain that the former have to its intellectual ganglia: both being alike the expression of organic physical action. But it may be shown, not only that these two classes of phenomena, the sensory and the intellectual, are not identical in different minds, but that they necessarily vary in each case. With respect to our sensory perceptions, these can never precisely resemble each other in two different persons at the same moment of time, for no two persons can at the same moment of time be occupying the same stand-point; and even were it otherwise, both the sensory ganglia in which the final physical change in the organ concerned in perception occurs, and the avenues of sense in which it is initiated, would have to be exactly similar in every respect in the two persons in question for the phenomena to resemble exactly—outward conditions remaining the same. And if this be true of sensory perceptions, still more is it true of intellectual. For these to resemble—for the ideas hived up in two minds to correspond in every respect—not only must the cerebral ganglia be the counterparts of each other, but their whole past history must have

been identical in every particular: which of course could never have occurred. Our perceptions, therefore, necessarily vary, and as we possess no faculty by which we can obtain direct insight into other men's minds, we can only obtain cognisance of such by a reasoning process, from facts within our own consciousness. Our knowledge on this subject, therefore, belongs to the third kind spoken of in § V., and the criteria therein given by which such knowledge is to be tested apply to it.

The key then to another person's mind lies in our own—in the facts of our consciousness—our notions of self and surrounding things. Among this latter class of facts are the physical bodies by which other conscious beings are personified or masqued (*persona*, a mask), and the phenomena exhibited by these physical bodies are the only media of expression which they possess. We perceive the phenomena which each person presents—his physical appearance, expression, gestures, articulations, and all his actions, voluntary and involuntary, and seek by the aid of the other facts of our consciousness to explain them; to trace them to their root and discover what they indicate. And if the utterance of such person's mind be candid, its meaning clear, unequivocal, and lying within our reach, then the sentiment which corresponds thereto, and which is the spring from which such utterance flows is perceived, and, to the extent of such utterance, we comprehend the mind of the person in question. If, on the other hand, we do not perceive its signification, either from the mode of expression being ambiguous—dark and

confused; or equivocal—open to more than one interpretation; or, lastly, from our minds not containing the key thereto—either through want of capacity or want of instruction;—then such utterance throws no light on the mind from which it proceeds, or else a false one: it either remains a mystery and enigma, or we form a wrong conception of it and misunderstand it. Our intellect, then, frequently fails us in attempting to comprehend other persons, and, did we rely on it alone, we should seldom, if ever, form complete conceptions of them. But in forming our conceptions of other persons, both intellect and imagination take a part,—the latter usually the larger; for it is its office to complete by conjecture what is deficient in fact. And as it is easier to conjecture than to observe, this faculty is brought into play to eke out deficiency of diligence as well as of materials for observations; and so, what our conceptions gain in completeness they lose in accuracy.

§ LIII. But the causes of the failure of comprehension may lie not in the person perceiving, but in the one perceived. Such person may not wish to be understood. He may purposely try to baffle scrutiny, may dissemble—conceal what he is, or simulate—feign what he is not; or he may be simply reticent, and expose to the questioner nothing on which an opinion can be founded. And such behaviour may arise from various causes. Shame—consciousness that his reality would not bear inspection or meet with approbation; pride—contempt for the person scrutinising him; distrust and apprehension

of misconstruction; vanity—the pleasure of being a mystery;—any or all of these causes combined may present obstacles to a proper understanding. It results, then, that there exist two classes of character: one open, clear, transparent;—it may be shallow, light, weak;—but genial, bright, sparkling; or it may be also profound, rich, capacious; reflecting from its generous depths all the wealth it has received from without;—the other self-contained, dark, impenetrable; presenting no indications, save to the adept, of its interior; whether dull, irresponsive clod throughout, or pregnant with concentrated wealth capable of enriching all capable of exploring its depths. Each character has its advantages and drawbacks. The open and confiding one is constantly misconstrued and betrayed. It is the sport of fools and the dupe of knaves: but, on the other hand, it is by far the most generally popular. Confidence begets confidence; distrust, distrust. The man who —to use the ordinary phraseology—admits other persons freely into his mind is, in turn, admitted freely into the minds of others; while the close and reserved character must of necessity enjoy intercourse with but a few, and is equally, perhaps more than equally, liable to misapprehension. Excess on either side amounts, perhaps, to a fault. Every mind, conscious of good intentions and free from pride or vanity, has a natural desire to be understood. It is its desire and also its interest. But to secure this object, a due regard must be had to the comprehending powers and worth of the persons with whom it has intercourse and to whom it opens itself.

§ LIV. Starting, then, from its own perceptions as premises, the mind can by a reasoning process deduce the nature and qualities of other minds, and form notions thereof. And the accuracy of such notions can be tested by repeated observations and by experiment, each observation correcting or confirming and enlarging the previous ones. From facts perceived by ourselves and from the testimony of others, we reason, and form a notion of the person whose character we are considering, out of materials suggested by our own direct perceptions, visual and auditory, and furnished by the phenomena of our own self-consciousness. And these notions are correct in proportion to the accuracy with which the facts have been observed, the testimony verified, and the inferences drawn. And, as with our notions of physical things so with our psychical notions, when facts are insufficient we supply their place with conjecture; and often allow such conjectural notions to mislead our understanding and influence our conduct, to the exclusion of more true and just views. And if, in our psychical inquiry, difficulties are often met with through the illusory and evasive character of its objects, a parallel is presented in physical investigation, where similar difficulties are encountered: the phenomena being often equally specious, evasive, and hard to analyse. In both departments of knowledge, however, such difficulties are surmountable, and progress is made in proportion to the care and attention bestowed.

The processes by which we perceive and form notions of things and people, if analysed, agree in

this, that in each ideas directly formed from sensory objects are the starting point. They differ, however, in that, while in the case of physical perception such ideas go direct to form the notions of things which are the objects of thought, in the case of psychical perception, these ideas, so introduced into the mind of the perceiving psyche, act there by suggesting states of feeling or ideas of emotional conditions of the psyche itself (for the phenomena of feeling leave behind them ideas in the mind equally with the phenomena of sense), and these subjective ideas—these notions of the *ego* produced in the mind by the affections of the perceiving psyche—the psyche that is being perceived is credited with, and out of such the notion of it is formed. Although, therefore, we cannot admit the minds of other persons by direct perception through the senses into our consciousness, yet we are possessed of faculties by which we can, out of materials existing in our minds, form a notion of them and, inferentially, perceive them, and, to the extent of our means and opportunities, understand what they are. And having in this manner ascertained, with reference to them, their What? the observer, if he be a student of human nature, and has learnt that psychical phenomena, like physical, proceed from causes, seeks also to discover what causes have produced, and are responsible for the psychical things he is contemplating— to learn their Whence? and finally, he proceeds from these data to deduce the conduct which the persons under inspection will exhibit—to predict their Whither? He speculates upon them and calculates what they will

do. And so far as these queries respecting the What, the Whence, and the Whither are correctly replied to, so far is the psychical thing understood; as in the analogous case of the physical thing.

§ LV. The right way, then, to comprehend another person is this:—From the physical phenomena which he presents we must gather his view of his circumstances, and, by deducing thence his sentiments and motives, we arrive at his intellectual and moral condition. The process is the same both in the world of sense and in that of thought. We put ourselves in his place, and raise or lower ourselves and adjust our vision, until we obtain his view. The psyche we have thus mentally formed a conception of—our modified self—represents him in our consciousness—is the sort of person we conceive him to be; and if this process could be completely performed and the necessary *allowances*—whether of addition or subtraction—made, the conception would be correct, and the individual comprehended rightly. And the process is in the world of sense, for the most part, performed correctly. We understand that a man's sensible horizon is limited by his stature, his powers of vision, and the amount of light afforded him; and that of things hidden from him by either of these causes he is necessarily ignorant. Further, we see that of the things present to his senses and perceived by him he will prefer those most agreeable to him—that such will form his highest conception of present good; that such highest conception is regulated by *his* conceptive faculty, and not by the conceptive faculty of *another man;* and that such highest conception

of good is the only one possible to him—is the measure of his capability of action. We see also that even this highest possible he will not perceive, unless it meet his eye; and lastly, that he can only secure that such best possible always meet his eye under all circumstances, by obeying the law of rectitude in his movements. If he stoop habitually, or gaze upwards at the stars, or follow his fancies in the clouds, or limit his vision to the near, or neglect this for the far, or incline to either side; or be so engrossed with any object, high or low, near or far, as not to perceive the coming event;—we see plainly that he will be liable to miss this highest possible,—that he will be liable to come to some grief present in the circumstances which if he had been on his guard he would have avoided, and to fail in securing good which was within his reach.

But the principle is not admitted—at least not to the same extent—in the world of thought. True, we admit theoretically that men's capacities are unequal; that they vary in intellectual height and in range of vision; and that, other things being equal, there are varying degrees of enlightenment—that some have been more fully and accurately instructed than others. All these things are admitted in theory by every one who reflects, although not always allowed for in practice. But it is not so universally admitted that, even when the same view of the fact is present and taken, the power of the conceiving faculty varies in different minds, and that therefore differing conceptions of good are found. And it is so far from being admitted, that it scarcely ever seems to occur to any

one that, even if perceptive and conceptive faculties are equal, the conception of good that is formed depends entirely on the mental habit that exists, and that the right mental conception will not be present unless the right mental habit has been learnt: that with our ideas as with our sensory perceptions, wrong mental habit leads to partial, low, or one-sided views; and that such wrong habit results from want of proper moral training.

Where we misunderstand each other most, then, is with reference to the moral condition. And the reason why this happens is defective self-knowledge. We know that our intellectual condition is regulated and determined by natural capability and educational opportunity, but we fail to see, or at least always to bear in mind, that our moral elevation is also regulated by the same condition.

We see that when our will is under the influence of the higher conception the lower conception is overruled, but we do not see that the higher conception has been formed within us through the directing influence of circumstances, and not by our own will; and that, if it were not present, we should be led by lower motives, like persons of inferior moral height.

Misled by this fallacy, we measure other people by our own standard morally—and often intellectually as well—and judge them as if our notions of truth and right were in their minds. We measure their taste by our taste, their knowledge by our knowledge, their emotion by our emotion, their wisdom by our wisdom, their courage and resolution by our courage

and resolution; and, finding their conduct fall short of what ours would have been, misunderstand and form untrue notions and unjust conceptions of them, and visit them with that censure which we should consider that we ourselves deserved, had we, being free agents, voluntarily and deliberately violated our own clear conceptions of right;—a thing which never happens. Men wilfully offend against other men's conceptions of good, but never against their own convictions—against a higher conception present in their minds and clearly perceived. When therefore we see a man acting that which is foolish or wrong in our eyes, we may be quite certain that his view is not the same, and that the better conceptions which we possess and which would have preserved us in his situation from his mistakes, are not present to him. And from the same fallacy, want of self-knowledge, we are apt to be equally unjust to those whose moral standard is higher than our own. For the same reason that we are unable to understand that the considerations which cause us to act rightly are absent from the minds of those whom we censure as wrong-doers, we are unwilling to admit that the minds of persons above us morally contain motives which are absent from our own. When therefore we view conduct that springs from motives above our comprehension, we are apt either to resort to *detraction* and impute low motives, or failing in this, to sneer at them as foolish. Conduct springing from motives that lie beyond comprehension is always liable, owing to human pride, to be attributed to folly. When we have clearly learnt

that our moral differences, like our intellectual and physical, are relative only, not absolute; that there are moral excellencies to which even the best man cannot raise himself—the elevating influence being wanting; and moral degradation to which even the lowest man will not stoop—some higher motive restraining him; that what the low man is to the high, the high man is in turn to some higher,—the degree of rectitude of each being regulated by his own moral standard; and that the moral standard of men—natural endowments being the same—varies with variations of moral instruction and training, just as intellectual and physical excellencies vary with intellectual and physical instruction and training;—when we have clearly learnt this, then, and not till then, shall we properly understand and form just views of each other.

Our failure, therefore, in completely understanding other persons arises from our not completely understanding ourselves; and from the same cause arises our failure in understanding society. Our sociology has failed through defective psychology. For if we could understand the one, we could understand the many; if the facts separately, the facts collectively, and by induction arrive at the general laws, and so learn the great psychical cosmos—the world of humanity, of which each psyche is a component part; and, perceiving rightly both the facts which compose it and the forces that operate in and on it, comprehend both what it is and why it is so,—as in the case of the physical cosmos. But until we have clearly perceived these two things:—1. That the

human will is conditioned, like every other thing in nature; that it is dependent on the intellectual and moral conditions of the mind: and 2. That these intellectual and moral conditions constitute the mental circumstances of a man, and that these mental circumstances and his actual surroundings are two distinct things; the former varying in different men even when the latter are the same:—until these truths are recognised and acted upon, it will be impossible that we can make any important advance in either psychology or sociology. Suppose that we had made similar errors in our observations and reasonings on the facts of the physical world,—that we had held the inorganic atoms of the mineral to be responsible for the flaws and blemishes in the crystal; the organic material elements of the vegetable and animal for their blight and disease; instead of the surrounding conditions — defective culture and absence of chastening and refining processes; unsuitable food, soil or climate;—where would have been the arts of the horticulturist, the metallurgist, the physician? and where the sciences of chemistry, physiology and pathology? Doubtless the time will come—or, rather we may say, is coming—when it will be universally admitted that moral and social disorder depend on causes and are conditioned by circumstances as much as physical disorder is, and that the social organism is as amenable to refining and re-forming processes, based on scientific principles, as the aggregation of atoms that compose the physical cosmos. For the analogy is very close. The physical atom's behaviour is deter-

mined by the light, heat, and molecular forces which, proceeding from surrounding things, act upon it; and upon the right arrangement and harmonious conduct of such atoms depend the clearness and brilliancy of the crystal, the goodness and integrity of the metal, &c. The functions of the organic elements of the vital structures depend on the physical light and other forces acting upon them from without, and on the substances brought into contact with them in the form of nutriment; and on their proper discharge of these functions—on their conduct and behaviour—the health and soundness of the physical organism depends. And the conduct of the psychical *atom* or *individual* (the words mean the same thing) depends on the light that has entered his mind from his surroundings; and on the conduct of the several individual atoms that compose it the soundness and harmony of the social organism depends.

§ LVI. We have it in our power, then, to understand rightly another person. By observing the phenomena he presents we obtain his point of view, and, by adjusting ourselves to his point of view, our notion of him, intellectually and morally, results. When this process has been performed, we are in possession of his *what*, and his antecedents and history will supply us his *whence*. And having it in our power to understand men separately, we have it in our power to understand them collectively. Having the key to the mind of the individual psyche, we have the key to the mind—so to speak—of the society to which he belongs. A society is an aggregate of individuals. Its conduct is the resultant

of the wills of all its members: for such wills are the forces which determine the phenomena it presents. The propositions already stated as necessary for the foundation of psychical knowledge, once admitted, sociology will no longer be considered, as at present, a chimæra of the fancy, but will become one of the inductive sciences; and politics, no longer a blind, empirical game, an arena for fraud and force, will become a scientific field for investigation, affording the widest scope for the highest intellectual powers, observation and experiment, and inductive and deductive reasoning. The phenomena being clearly perceived and the forces in operation discerned and understood, the psychical cosmos, like the physical, will become intelligible. The moral philosopher will be able to explain its laws, and the statesman to perceive whither it is tending and to predict its future, not empirically, as at present, but with confidence, and to shape his measures accordingly, so as to secure the best results.

§ LVII. In the manner described, then, notions more or less complete of the psychical cosmos, the world of conscious beings in which we move and to which we belong, are formed in consciousness—notions of the individual and of the aggregation of individuals; the whole constituting our *psychical revelation.* And this revelation acts on the perceiving psyche in the same manner as the physical one does. As the physical revelation acts on our sensuous, æsthetic, emotional, and theoretic faculties, exciting in us sensuous pleasure, and the feelings which views of physical beauty, goodness, and truth inspire; so

does the psychical revelation act on the same faculties, awakening feelings and developing sentiments analogous to, but higher in kind and more intense in degree than, any that can be produced by the aspects and contact of mere physical things.

As in the physical revelation the starting point is consciousness of the existence of our physical body and of the physical things with which it is in immediate contact, so in the psychical revelation the starting point is consciousness of the existence of our psychical self and of the psychical things—the psyches—with which it has direct relations. The earliest and simplest of the affections produced in us by other persons arises from the relations which exist between them and us with respect to our physical wants and necessities—the satisfying our bodily requirements and the gratification of the senses. Necessarily dependent on our fellows for material support and assistance—at first altogether, and during the whole of our lives in some measure—feelings and sentiments spring up within us from this basis; some persons appearing grateful in our eyes as ministering to our self-interests, while others who compete with us for the goods of life are looked upon as rivals and antagonists. Our material interests, then, constitute the first uniting tie, or severing partition, between us. But other persons affect us equally, or even more strongly, in other ways than through our interests. Their notions and conceptions of surrounding things either agree with or differ from our own: if the former, our opinions are confirmed and strengthened by such support; if the latter, they are

disturbed and weakened; and we are pleasurably or disagreeably affected accordingly.

Again, the sentiments and feelings they express—their likes and dislikes—coincide with, or differ from, ours. They either feel joy and sorrow in the same circumstances that we do, or they do not. If the former, our emotions coinciding, there is agreement and mutual sympathy: if the latter, there is disagreement—antipathy. And when there is disagreement, the disagreeable feeling is heightened by the fallacy already alluded to (§ LIV.). Believing that their minds contain the same conceptions as our own, and feeling that we should be inexcusable if, with our conceptions, we exhibited their conduct or expressed the sentiments we condemn in them, we hold them also inexcusable: and bitterness is added to the disagreement. According, then, to the likeness or unlikeness between our views is our intercourse with each other agreeable or disagreeable—apart from considerations of material interests. When *likeness* exists we *like* each other, and give and receive from each other sympathy. When there is *unlikeness* we *dislike* each other, and there is mutual antipathy. Emotion is the outcome of excited feelings—the vent by which it relieves itself. All feeling, whether pleasurable or painful, seeks this relief. Sympathy, by reinforcing emotion, augments it, and therefore assists its efforts to express itself by increasing its force. Antipathy, on the other hand, opposes and weakens it. Sympathy is, therefore, usually agreeable: antipathy disagreeable. Sometimes, however, the reverse proposition appears to hold good. There are

cases in which we seek to repress emotion, but in such, sympathy, to be genuine, should be with the desire for repression, not with the feeling sought to be repressed.

Psychical things, then, with which we have personal relation, affect us agreeably and disagreeably by the ideas and sentiments which the phenomena they exhibit, conveyed through our senses and brain into our minds, there suggest; just as physical things with which our bodies are in direct contact affect our senses: and they awaken in our psyche sensuous and selfish feelings analogous to our physical sensuous and selfish ones; the whole constituting a class of affections to which the term *psychico-sensuous* may perhaps not unappropriately be applied.

§ LVIII. Now this psychical sensuousness has the same effect on the psyche with reference to the objects which excite it that physical sensuousness has. It deadens the æsthetic faculty. In the psychical world, as in the physical, feeling dims perception. *Touchiness* proverbially leads to misunderstanding. A mind unduly occupied with the personal feelings that contact with its neighbours excites, will never rightly understand such neighbours: it will be exclusively occupied with its own feelings. And not understanding them, it will never perceive any goodness or moral beauty that they may exhibit, for the eye must be withdrawn from self to discover such. Absorption in selfish sentiment renders all psychical knowledge, and moral growth and elevation, impossible. Were then our views of society limited to our immediate personal surroundings, our psychical

history would be made up entirely of the affections which have their root in self and of the emotions and passions they give rise to—of loves and hatreds; joys and sorrows; exultation and disappointments; envies, jealousies, and emulations; and of all the amenities and animosities that spring from excited personal feeling. We should be reduced to the level of the brute, whose life, being so limited, is one perpetual wrangle and discord.

But fortunately this is not the case. The great bulk of the transactions going on around us no more affect us personally than do the great bulk of the physical things around us our bodily structure. We are either not at all concerned therewith, or so slightly that our feelings are readily under control, so that we are free to perceive fairly and give sympathy only where it is due. In this manner, as in the analogous case of physical perception, a large number of ideas are constantly entering our minds respecting our psychical surroundings, uncoloured by any feeling produced by disturbance of the perceiving organ (the process being precisely the same as that of physical æsthetic perception, § XXXI.); and thus notions and conceptions more or less correct are formed of the events passing around us and of the persons by whom they are transacted. And these notions and conceptions form a constantly increasing stock of knowledge, by means of which the psyche is enabled to judge of the quality and excellence of the things presented to it—each entering perception giving satisfaction or the reverse, and exciting pleasurable or disagreeable emotion, according as it is perceived to be

superior or inferior in quality to the notions already present—and out of this stock of knowledge our notions of psychical beauty and goodness are derived, our psychical æsthetic faculty developed, and our moral standard raised. By the exercise of this faculty we learn to form just views of the character and conduct of our neighbours, to give due consideration to their rights and feelings, and to correct and control that tendency to attach undue weight to its own interests and inclinations, which even the strongest mind cannot prevent itself from doing without this sort of discipline.

§ LIX. By the exercise of this psychico-æsthetic faculty, then, our moral standard of measurement is being constantly raised and improved, and we pronounce the sentiments and conduct of other persons good or bad, and form high or low conceptions of them, according as we have had to rise above or lower ourselves below the level of this standard in order to obtain their views. This faculty constitutes our *moral sense.* The condition on which its development depends is that the mind shall not be unduly occupied by, or the psyche absorbed in, selfish, or what have been called psychico-sensuous, considerations. When the psyche is disengaged from these and free to move, its attention is readily directed to what is passing in the world around it, and thus the materials upon which its action depends are collected. Morality is, in fact, neither more nor less than good taste applied to the relations which human beings have with each other—right perception and discrimination; and it may be cultivated and

developed, like good taste in physical matters; like this also being conditioned by the delicacy and powers of the perceiving and conceiving faculties.

To obtain a clear knowledge of other persons it is therefore necessary to start with a right notion of self. This notion is obtained from the feelings which are awakened in us by our physical perceptions, as has already been described, and forms a standard of measurement. And to form a just estimate of ourselves it is necessary to know others: we thus obtain a standard of comparison.

"Wouldst thou know thyself? Observe what thy neighbours are doing.

"Wouldst thou thy neighbours know? Look through the depths of thy heart."

§ LX. And in the same way that our perceptions of psychical beauty and goodness affect our æsthetic and emotional faculties, do perceptions of psychical and moral truth affect our theoretic faculty. All that has been said on this subject in § XXXIII., when treating of the effect of the perception of physical truth, applies equally to psychical truth. In our survey of the psychical world, as of the physical, light, which is the revealer of truth, is the one thing needful. It is also agreeable above all other things. As more light enters the mind, the horizon expands in proportion, and larger and clearer views of society are taken—of the persons who compose it, and of their relations to each other. And not only are mental light and truth, which is its consequence, agreeable for their own sake, but they add to our happiness by enlightening our moral

sense and enabling us to form nobler and more correct conceptions of beauty and goodness. Through them the mind becomes more serene; and the aim of the psyche is rendered more clear, its method more correct, and its materials more abundant. Darkness and obscurity, on the other hand, are disagreeable. The mental horizon is contracted; the psyche is oppressed with doubt and perplexity; the conceptions it forms are poor and feeble, and liable to error. These propositions, as far as physical truth is concerned, are freely admitted. If they are not so generally received with regard to psychical truth, it is because —for the reasons given in § LI. and § LII.—such truth has as yet to only a very limited extent entered our minds. But the light has already dawned in this region also, and doubtless with the advancing day the whole region will be illuminated, and its objects clearly seen; with results even more important than those which have followed the acquisition of physical truth.

§ LXI. Through the same gates of knowledge, then, by which our physical revelation is admitted, and brought in, as it were, by the phenomena which compose that revelation, there enters consciousness, and is revealed to us our psychical world of reality, with its agreeables and disagreeables, its graces and deformities, its good and evil, its lights and shadows. And as in the case of the physical, so with the psychical revelation, the notions, as they enter the mind, germinate there, and stimulating, by the feelings which they excite, the imagination, engender new conceptions — ideals, more satisfying than reality—of psychical beauty and excellence, and of

social goodness and order, and theories of moral and social philosophy. How these ideals are formed out of our notions of the real, and what relations they bear to them, have been already fully discussed, § XXXV., and all that has been said of the influence physical ideals exercise on the heart and will applies equally, or still more, here. As with physical things, these psychical ideals form objects of desire which act through the heart as motives and set in action the will. Thus each man tries to realise the conception of good which attracts his heart most; the diplomatist and man of business to form connections and confederations that he conceives will promote and strengthen his material interests; the sentimentalist to form social relations gratifying to the affections; the poet, artist, and hero to express in fiction or to exhibit in action their ideals of nobleness; the philanthropist and statesman to realise and mould society to their notions of goodness and order; the philosopher to verify and establish his views of moral and social truth.

§ LXII. And these several motives, like those engendered by physical things, act on the heart with different degrees of force; the law seeming to be that those which present the greatest number of objects attract most. Thus physical gratification of the senses and the narrow interests that relate thereto, in the absence of other motives, absorb a person exclusively; but when he has experienced the pleasures derived from social intercourse and the indulgence of the sympathetic feelings, he is more moved by these. And as acquaintance with the

feelings of others is made and the sphere of sympathy enlarges, the importance of his own feelings lessens; in the wider sphere the lesser is lost, and he forgets his own at sight of other's woe. And if he abstract his vision altogether from his immediate surroundings and elevate himself so as to perceive what is above and beyond the sphere of the personal affections, it is found that, as the range of vision widens and the objects multiply, the heart is proportionately acted upon. As our knowledge increases, our conceptions become more perfect and our standard of excellence rises, and the psyche in the contemplation of nobleness forgets self altogether, and derives a higher gratification than in the indulgence of the sympathies and affections. And the contemplation of human beings collectively and in large masses—when the attention has been called thereto, and conceptions of social good and evil have been formed—moves more than that of individuals only; and the ambition of the patriot and the philanthropist is felt to be a nobler passion, by minds within which such conceptions have entered, than the desire for mere personal glory. Lastly, the aim of the philosopher who, not content with merely surveying the phenomena which men and women present and forming out of them ideal conceptions of goodness and nobleness, seeks also to comprehend the causes that have produced such phenomena—the forces that have been in action and their laws—and so to get at the Whence? and the Whither?—is wider in scope and more extensive in practical outcome than all; it presents larger views and

more fertile in promise than either of the former, and its influence on the heart is greater accordingly.

§ LXIII. The highest conception, then, present at any time in the mind, rules and holds in thrall the heart, in psychical things as in physical. And, in both cases, what sort of conception this will be depends altogether, not on the individual himself in the first instance, but on the directing influence of circumstances. Until the attention has been directed to higher objects every mind is occupied with the low ones with which its history commenced, and unless the psyche has been rightly trained from the first, or has been induced to enlarge its views under the influence of some force—privation, satiety, or some startling event—its heart continues bent on such low object. But the elevating motives being applied, the stature rises; and, as it rises, the view enlarges and the greater conceptions are formed. The degree of force requisite to raise the psyche and expand the mind depends on the strength of the existing habit and on the natural docility and susceptibility. A mind free to move and quick of apprehension readily responds when appealed to; but, unless an inveterately vicious condition exists, every one can be raised to his utmost height by proper influences rightly applied.

§ LXIV. The desire of the heart, then, whether with reference to physical things or to persons, is to obtain the noblest and most elevating kind of good of which the psyche has formed a conception. Also in physical and psychical matters equally, the desire of the heart is not the right rule of the will.

Man is connected with both of the worlds into which the cosmos is divided—the physical and the psychical; his body forming a part of the one, his mind of the other. With each of them he has relations, and towards each he has duties. The parts of each with which he is connected constitute his circumstances, and on right relations between them and him being established and maintained, and on their right relations with each other, both his and their well being, and that of the cosmos as a whole, depends. In the psychical world, as in the physical, changes are constantly going on, and the relations of the parts to each other are perpetually altering, and therefore constant attention is due from every man to his circumstances to understand and adapt himself to such changes and to fulfil the duty of the hour. The mental attitude which it is necessary to assume in order to discharge this duty has been fully described when treating of the relations of the mind to its physical circumstances, and need not therefore be dwelt upon again. It is enough to say that the same attitude in every particular is requisite towards the psychical surroundings. In the circumstances which the cosmos presents, and not in the imaginations of the heart, is contained the rule of duty. It is a man's duty to confront his surroundings, to give to each the attention which is their due, and, applying to them his intellectual and conceptual faculties, to gather their import and choose by the light of reason the best course to pursue. Such course constitutes his path of right, and he may not follow any object on which his heart is set

unless such object lie in this path. And of these circumstances, paramount above all other considerations are his fellow-men. It is his first duty to see that all that is due from him to them is fulfilled: what is due to their feelings, as well as what is due to their interests; what is due to their weaknesses, as well as what is due to their strength and superiority; what is due to their sorrows and misfortunes, as well as what is due to their prosperity and joy; what is due to their ignorance and error, as well as what is due to their learning and wisdom. Lastly, what is due to their faults, their follies, vices and crimes. The great law of social duty, "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you," holds good in respect of all these particulars.

Now what each man desires that others should do to him is *good;* that therefore it is his duty to do to them. But to accomplish this it is necessary that men should understand each other. As impossible is it for one man to do another mental good without understanding his mental condition, as it would be to do him bodily good without understanding his bodily condition. And for one man to understand another, it is necessary that he should adopt the right process. When he has put himself mentally in such person's place and ascertained his views, seen with his eyes, heard with his ears, felt with his feelings, understood with his understanding, and desired with his heart, then he is able to do such person good, to do for him what he perceives would be good for himself were he like such person, and therefore for him.

To understand other persons, then, is the primary duty of every man in order to act rightly towards them; and, this process having been performed, he is in a position to give to all with whom he has relations their due:—to the strong, justice; to the weak, help; to the prosperous, congratulation; to the unhappy, sympathy; to the ignorant, light; to the wise and learned, respect and deference; to the impure and vicious, chastisement; to the low and base, elevation; to the foolish, stubborn, and wilful, correction;—not until he has, as far as may lie in his power, performed all these good and just offices for all who are within his reach and with whom he has relations, has a man fulfilled all his active duties towards his fellow-men. And having in this manner provided against sins of omission, it is his next care to guard against those of commission; and therefore, before engaging in any enterprise, he must see that it involve no wrong. These points being secured, every duty performed and no right violated, he is free to choose an object of pursuit; and then, if he take due care that the object he selects be both practicable—attainable under the circumstances—and the best that they contain, he has, as far as his power of choice is concerned, fulfilled the law of wisdom.

But it is not enough for a man to be wise and noble in choice, he must also be brave and enduring; for the noblest path is often the most difficult and dangerous. And he must be brave and enduring in sufferance also as well as in action; for often, when he has done his part well both in thought and in per-

formance, and nothing in him has been wanting,—through want of power or some unavoidable circumstance, defeat and disappointment will ensue. And he will further require patience and fortitude to sustain evils that, springing from causes which he could neither foresee nor control, are inevitable—the evils that flow from defective and disorderly conditions of physical things—from privation, accident, disease; the evils that flow from the ignorance and error, the thoughtlessness and wilfulness, the malevolence and uncharitableness of his fellow-man; also those from his own errors and ignorance. And as no one is ever completely and at all times and on every occasion wise, he will have to bear—more bitter than all the rest—the evils that flow from his own negligence and wilfulness—shame for his own shortcomings and, for his blindness and stubbornness, remorse, that always comes too late. And last of all, he will have to encounter death, that happens to every one alike—to the happy as well as to the wretched.

§ LXV. The duty of a man therefore consists in interpreting by the light of reason his physical and psychical surrroundings; in taking care lest, through want of vigilance or energy on his part, some possible good be missed or some avoidable evil incurred; and in accepting the inevitable. In the fulfilment of these conditions consists both wisdom and virtue. He who applies his reason to his circumstances is, so far as in him lies, a wise man; and he who, with all the powers at his command resisting every inclination, seeks to act as his reason prompts, is a virtuous man. And the result

of this application of reason to his circumstances, whether with regard to men or to things, depends on his intellectual acquirements and the perfection of his standard of morality. Whatever obligation contained in the circumstances he sees, he recognises. If he has formed a right conception of justice with reference to material interests, he takes care, in all his relations with his fellow-men respecting such, to be *just.* If his conception of justice include also what is due to the feelings, he is *courteous.* If it extend so far as to include the duty of helping the weak and incapable, he is *kind* and *benevolent.* If his sympathies are so fine that he feels more for others than for himself, he is *generous* and *magnanimous*—both in giving and in forgiving. And if his sense of justice be perfect, so as to include thought and feeling as well as word and act, he is *charitable;*—he makes due allowances for the shortcomings and failings of all, and forbears from injury even in thought. And the same rule applies to the manner in which he carries out his obligations, as well as to the view he takes of them—to performance as well as to intention. He must not only aim at the right thing, but he must take care that he fail not through want of *courage* and *energy*, of *vigilance* and *resolution.* And this obligation also he will discharge, if he perceive it. And finally, if he has formed a right conception of true dignity and self-respect; if he see the weakness and the impropriety of permitting himself to be unduly affected by events which it is customary to call "the accidents of Fortune"—events which no wisdom or valour can either produce or ward off—the meanness of undue

exultation in prosperity, the degradation of undue depression in adversity—he will exhibit *moderation* and *modesty* in the one case, *patience* and *fortitude* in the other; and try to preserve under all circumstances *composure* and *equanimity.*

§ LXVI. To use the reason then—that is wisdom. To obey its indications and subdue inclination—that is virtue. And the faculties which enable us to accomplish these two ends belong to, and are at the command of, every one. They are possessed by the man of narrowest intellect as well as by him of the most capacious; by him who is actuated by the meanest sentiments, as well as by him who is animated by the noblest. Every one has it in his power—as far as faculty goes—to be both wise and virtuous: that which is wanting so often is the motive. And further, the unenlightened and mean man, who is guided by his reason and applies his understanding to his circumstances, is worth more, and is a more valuable member of the cosmos of humanity, than the man of great intellect and lofty sentiments who does not use his reason and conform to circumstances, but takes inclination for his guide. The outcome of the work of the former may be poor and small, but it is sterling as far as it goes: while that of the latter is for the most part both foolish and mischievous, and the mischief and folly are in proportion to the nobleness of the faculties which have been wrongly used.

§ LXVII. And what has been said of the influence of habit and passion on the will applies to the mind in its relations to psychical as well as to

physical things. A person who has acquired—whether by right training or by the discipline of events—the habit of using his reason, sees things habitually in their true light, and as the superiority of the higher good is then manifest it is at once preferred. There is therefore no temptation and no struggle with inclination, and virtue is to him easy. On the other hand, if this right habit do not exist, wrong ones are sure, sooner or later, to be formed, difficult to overcome, and necessarily leading to partial and incomplete views of things and consequent wrong estimates of value.

Stubbornness of heart, the result of inveterate bad habit, is the source of every personal vice and of every social crime. The psyche, engrossed with its own objects, refuses to respond to invitation and to give access to more elevating conceptions. Just as in its relations to physical things, if possessed entirely by its sensuous desires and appetites, it is blind to the beauty and goodness of the physical world and sets at naught all the physical laws; so in its relations to psychical things, if occupied unduly with its own feelings and self-consciousness, it is unable to see the beauty and goodness of moral nobleness and of social order, and the principles and laws on which they depend. On whatever occupies it, it sets undue value. If it be its own notions and conceptions with which it is unduly engaged, it over-estimates them and falls into the vice of *conceit.* If it be the opinions of others respecting itself, then, over-estimating such, it falls into the vice of *vanity.* And if it has acquired a habit of contemplating its idea of

self exclusively or unduly, it becomes infected with an overweening feeling of its own importance and superiority, arrogates to itself undue deference, and exhibits towards other persons that sense of their comparative inferiority and insignificance which constitutes the vice of *pride*. And even when the psyche has emerged from the narrow sphere of self, and learnt to look on nobler objects, the influence of bad habits is equally felt. A habit of carelessness and negligence in directing the thoughts either leads to the formation of false conceptions—false ideals of nobleness, false views and visionary schemes of social good, false theories of truth—or, what is just as mischievous, to the exhibition and application of true ones at unseasonable times and in unsuitable circumstances. He, who, when attention is due to low and humble matters, neglects these for the sake of loftier and more fascinating conceptions, is equally wrong and to blame with him who, placed in circumstances requiring attention to these higher matters and imposing obligations thereto, basely gives undue attention to the lower and more selfish considerations to the neglect of the higher good.

§ LXVIII. Also with regard to the passions. The presence or absence of strong passion is no criterion of right or wrong. It is not the intensity of the fire that is burning in the heart that determines the criminality of a passion, but whether it has been kindled by a right object. The psychical is *par excellence* the theatre of the passions, but here, as when physical objects are concerned, it is the office of the reason and the will not to extinguish but to

direct. Passion is to the mind what tension is to a bow, and the more intense the strain—provided no faculty give way—the more certain and speedy the result. It is enough if reason has directed the aim and preserved control of the instrument. The filial love of Cordelia was comprised within the limits of duty: yet it cost her her life. It is true there is "a charm in the forbidden," and that it gives to passion a zest; but this is when the forbidding power is authority, not reason. If reason forbid, there is antagonism, indecision, and the influence of the object exciting passion is weakened. But when head and heart go together, the energies of the whole soul are put forth, and the results are proportionate.

Love is the desire of the soul for sympathy at every point—that every chord of the scale of being should meet with the fullest harmonious response, from the highest to the lowest. There must be the closest contact throughout, and such can only be supplied by another soul, and that one of the opposite sex. "Happiness is a twin." Each of the pair must be occupied exclusively by and comprehend the other, and each must feel that in like manner it occupies and is comprehended. To be perfect, there must be the most perfect reciprocity—the fullest satisfaction on both sides of the receiving faculties, and the fullest vent for the free and unimpeded energies of the producing faculties;—each giving what the other wants and receiving what the other gives, and repaying with interest. When this harmony—this complete affinity of mind and soul—exists in its most perfect form, every thought of each of the two

minds, admitted freely and congenially entertained by the other, germinates under the cherishing influences. Each mind is then the exact complement of the other, and nothing is wanting.

> "All then is full, possessing and possest,
> No craving void left aching in the breast,
> Ev'n thought meets thought, ere from the lips it part,
> And each warm wish springs mutual from the heart."

Rapt in their own happy conceptions they only for each other breathe, and all the world besides is as non-existent.

> "For love is a celestial harmonie
> Of likely harts composed of starres concent,
> Which joyne together in sweet sympathie,
> To work each other's joy and true content,
> Which they have harboured since their first descent
> Out of their heavenly bowers, where they did see
> And know each other here belov'd to bee."

Love in this its ideal form, could it be realised, would be complete happiness; but in this its ideal form it perhaps never exists,—or only for a few brief moments. Theoretically perfect affinities are conceivable, but, granting their existence, for them to find each other out—for individuals intellectually, morally, and physically harmonising to discover and recognise each other—could only be the result of happy accident. For not only co-existence, but mutual recognition, is requisite. For two persons to comprehend and estimate each other justly it would be necessary that the character of each should be perfectly discernible, and that nothing should be taken on trust; for that which is taken on trust might turn out to be—

"The little rift within the lover's lute,
That by and by may make the music mute."

The reason therefore must be used, and nothing trusted to hypothesis. But to use the reason with effect requires not only calmness and imperturbability—qualities which in lovers are not usually pre-eminent—but also opportunity, and discernment proof against imposition. There must be perfect candour on both sides. Were these conditions always complied with—was the obligation of consulting the reason before abandoning one's self to passion deemed imperative—perhaps here and there a perfect concord might be established. But it could scarcely be asserted, even by the most credulous, that they would be numerous. Love would be a passion practically in abeyance, and nature would be baulked of her object.

But nature will not be baulked of her objects, and her object in endowing man with this passion was not, primarily, his happiness. Love is proverbially blind. He is also a cheat. In those over whom he holds sway, imagination, not reason, has the ascendancy. The passionate lover, seeing, or thinking he sees, one part of his ideal in an object, credits it with all the rest. His

"Fancy forms it of angelic kind,
Some emanation of th' all-beauteous Mind."

The object so transfigured to him, flattered by the adoration ostensibly directed to itself, in its turn becomes infected with a similar delusion. Both are

self-deceived, the future is pledged as a guarantee of sincerity, and an eternity of happiness is supposed to have commenced. Then "the little rift" is discovered and the disenchanting process begins. And the result depends on circumstances. If there be *any* real concord and the higher and noble nature be also the stronger, then, by such union, the lower and weaker nature may be supported and raised to the higher level. But it may be otherwise. The too tight embrace of the lower nature may strangle the vitality of the higher, and deaden the more lofty conceptions. Or by its weight and luxuriance it may exhaust and overcome the too feeble elevating powers, and so both will grovel in the dust together. Or lastly, a fond and trusting, but feeble, nature, with capabilities of rising high under kinder fortunes, may heedlessly trust and cling to and be held down by a strong but low and coarse one. All of these cases suppose a real, though incomplete, affinity to exist. But if there be no real concord on any point, if the whole was a delusion from the first, then no commingling of soul can ever occur. Yet, even here, if the law of rectitude be recognised on both sides, union, though not of hearts, may be preserved. Every pledge that depends on the will, when rights are observed, is redeemed; the obligations of honour and justice are maintained inviolate; new bonds, which the union has given birth to, form further connecting links; and thus, without affection, the connection is maintained by mutual respect and regard, until the companionship is severed by death. If, however, there be neither affection nor rectitude,

then the heart will obey inclination. Aversion follows disagreement, and the separation is hastened by the influence of other attractions.

Such are the conditions by which the passion of love would be regulated if left to itself. But society will not leave the passion of love to itself, and at this stage it steps in. By a conventional fiction it is supposed that "human love is the growth of human will;" that what is framed unstable and conditional by nature may be rendered constant and absolute by authority; and that a vow can pledge the heart: and, acting on this fallacious hypothesis, the attempt is made to compel nature to obedience and to hold together that which its laws are dissevering, by a form and by a ring. But it is only dead matter that admits of this mechanical treatment. Organisms, whether vital or psychical, rebel against legal covenants and resent coercion. "Love will not be confined by maisterie."

> "Love, free as air, at sight of human ties,
> Spreads his light wings, and in a moment flies."

Love is nothing, if not spontaneous. It cannot be exacted. But some effect is produced. The timid and weak are restrained, and under a show of union, drag on a cold and colourless existence. But the more impatient spirits revolt—many who, if their sense of right had been appealed to, would have responded—for those who would have been most amenable to the law of honour, resent coercion most—and, either secretly or openly, violate the letter of that compact of which they had already violated the spirit. Thus

one more crime is added to the calendar, and the misery of disappointment is augmented by the burden of guilt. The subject is a wide one and beset with difficulties, yet it may be freely questioned whether social law, in ignoring the facts of nature and seeking to dictate and to control the affections, does not create more evils than it prevents. Perhaps, if the will were left more free and human law limited its endeavours to the enforcing obligations which were within its power to exact, better results might be obtained than any that have yet been arrived at.

From what has been said it would appear that to realise the passion of love in the form that the mind desires is impossible, and the situation therefore hopeless. Nature has implanted wants that she is inadequate to satisfy; reason is powerless; imagination treacherous; and we are abandoned in a matter which concerns our happiness most intimately to a malignant destiny. Such a conclusion, however, does not contain the whole truth—in fact, is altogether wide of the truth. In this, as in all other matters with which we are concerned, reason is our only safe guide; and in proportion to our fidelity to her guidance is the reward we obtain. Though at the birth of love she is not permitted to preside, she can direct the life, and determine the issue. The torrent which cannot be controlled in its rushing, passionate youth, becomes manageable in its more tranquil maturity, when its turbulence has subsided and its force been broken by successive falls. So it is with love. The causes of the failure of this—as of every other passion—are two: baseness and folly. Base

love is attracted by selfish considerations only. The base man forms alliances for the sake of wealth and personal gratification, whether mental or bodily. He seeks in a companion some one who will promote his bodily comforts, do homage to and applaud his sentiments and abilities, flatter his vanity, and concur in his views,—a slave, in mind and body. But wants that have their spring in self are soon sated, and the passion expires with the appetite to which it ministered. And even the objects which attract nobler minds are not more durable, unless reason lend its aid. Physical beauty fades; ideals of nobleness and goodness, and views of truth alter or weary; and, unless both minds are open to progress and mutual improvement, the harmony cannot be sustained. If, however, reason guide, then both walk in the same path and the companionship is preserved to the last. The mathematical proposition that two straight lines which coincide in position and direction at their commencement will coincide throughout their length, though prolonged indefinitely, is no more certain than the analogous psychological one that two lives coinciding in thought and sentiment at a given period will, if both possess rectitude, coincide and lie together throughout all their course. The intellect of the one may be more limited, the sentiments less lofty; but by the force of the larger nature expansion and elevation will take place, and the progress be harmonious. And something perhaps may be gained by the very inequality. As when two streams of unequal force and swiftness commingle in one channel, what the more rapid loses

in speed is made up by the increased volume which retardation produces,—so when two minds of unequal power coalesce, though the rate of progress of the stronger may be lessened, yet the nature may be rendered more full; and if to do good to and make happy the loved object be the true aim of love, then, by such inequality a happier and more perfect result may be attained and a more exquisite harmony reached, than when two chords higher and nearer to each other in the scale had vibrated in concert. By the aid of reason, then, if right and reason were permitted to rule, the object of nature would be carried out in the end; the desire implanted by her in the heart of man would ultimately be satisfied by a reality better far than the illusory ideal; and what was sighed for in the commencement would be attained in the termination. And these results, which do in fact even now take place perhaps not unfrequently, would be far more common if the course of nature were not interfered with by laws and customs of society not based on nature. The conditions on which happiness depends, nobleness and rectitude, are the very ones which society does its best to exclude altogether from the matter. Perceiving that sentiment, however noble, is not a safe guide to be relied on, it strengthens the motives which spring from self; rewarding with its approbation alliances which feed interest and vanity, and extinguishing as far as it can hopes of realising ideals in which it cynically disbelieves. With equal cynicism, placing no trust in heroism and the moral sense, it seeks to obtain rectitude by authority and

coercion—influences to which only ignoble minds respond. Not until law confine its operations to its own province, natural feelings be more believed in, and support be given by public opinion to the nobler aims, will better results be obtained.

The passion of love, then, to be realised in its perfect form requires two things;—nobleness of heart and rectitude of vision. No tie that has its root in self can be lasting. If love—the gratification of the passion itself, of the personal sympathies—be the highest object existing in the heart of the lover—his ultimate aim—then such love cannot be of the highest and most perfect kind. "I could not love thee, dear, so much, loved I not honour more," is not only a fine sentiment, but the expression of a strict psychological truth. Also there must be rectitude on both sides. Each must be under the law of right. When these conditions exist, as there is in all circumstances but one path of right belonging to such circumstances, the journey will be performed together, when once there has been coincidence. The higher may see further, but as far as the vision of the lower extends, there will be agreement. On the other hand, the paths of error are manifold, and inclinations vary so much that no two persons will always agree. There may be contact at a single point, but the paths soon cross and diverge. But these two conditions, nobleness and rectitude, are so rarely met with together, that perfect love in its ideal form can scarcely, or not even scarcely, be said to exist. Successful unions, enduring through life, are not uncommon, but they are for the most part either

compromises in which the union is preserved by moral and social considerations — duty, justice, interest, prudence, honour, pride, &c.—in which love has no part—or else they belong to that rare class in which the reason has been made use of throughout, and from the first there has been no passion and no illusion. The loves of impassioned natures are proverbially seldom prosperous. Many a union has been successful, supported by social considerations alone, in which passion has been absent; but scarcely one based on passion alone, with social considerations absent or adverse. In some happier state of society ideal love may one day be realised, but at present it must exist but as a dream, haunting and disquieting the soul of visionary enthusiasts.

"O love! no habitant of earth thou art—
An unseen seraph, we believe in thee,
A faith whose martyrs are the broken heart,
But never yet hath seen, nor e'er shall see
The naked eye, thy form, as it should be;
The mind hath made thee, as it peoples heaven,
E'en with its own desiring phantasy,
And to a thought such shape and image given,
As haunts the unquenched soul—parch'd, wearied, wrung
and riven."

Thus far of love—the passion: and did love exist only as a passion, he would be an unmixed evil, and his name suggestive of calamity only. But he exists in another form, or rather, from a common parent, sensibility, a half-brother of his has been born, the child of intelligence, as he, the passionate one, is of imagination. And this further difference attaches to

their history, that while his birth took place in the night—or twilight at best—this latter was brought forth in the full light of day. Hence it has happened that while the love that has been described is blind and guided by feeling only, this latter can see clearly and understand. And this difference in their origin and in the circumstances of their birth has caused such a difference in their character that, in every particular, they present to each other a marked contrast. Love, the passion, seeing nothing outside himself, and absorbed in his own dreams, is, whether the objects presented in such dreams be noble or not, essentially self-regarding and selfish. His object is his own gratification; and though to attain this he will sacrifice himself even to death, yet it is only that such sacrifice may be appreciated, and that he may enjoy in imagination the thought that an adequate impression has been made. If he desire good for the loved one, it must proceed entirely from himself: he will not endure rivalry. Even sorrow and disappointment befalling the object of his passion is not disagreeable, so that he may enjoy the gratification of administering consolation. But he requires response. He soon wearies of conferring benefits which are unappreciated, and is quite capable of becoming malevolent; for he is readily transformed into his opposite—hate. In short, the passion, love, like every other passion, will make any sacrifice and use any means to attain its end—self-gratification; but it will not sacrifice that end. It is true that instances occur every day of persons passionately in love resigning themselves to circum-

stances and abandoning their pursuit; but never voluntarily. To abandon voluntarily an object, the mind must be under the influence of higher motives, and the love that is capable of this is not passionate love, though it may be every whit as deep and as ardent: for that love is not passion which leaves the will at liberty for other motives to act. Finally, passionate love is liable to change; for, as has been said, its objects are dreams, and dreams are soon dispelled when they come into contact with realities. Passionate love, then, is blind, imperious, selfish, fickle, and treacherous; in every one of which particulars passionless love, the child of intelligence, is its opposite. Gifted with clear insight, this one perceives nothing but the fact; and perceiving, it understands; and understanding, it forgives. *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner:* it comprehends *all* —both the error and its causes—and finds excuse for and pardons the trespass. And divining and sharing the thoughts of other persons, it also by intuition divines and shares their feelings; and loves —wishing their good, not its own. Love, the passionless, then, loves, because it *knows.* "You would like the Smiths, if you knew them," said a friend to Charles Lamb. "If I knew them, my dear fellow, *of course* I should like them," was the reply. The heart of the genial humourist had divined a truth which many a learned writer on moral philosophy has failed to discover. Knowledge, then, is the condition upon which this kind of love depends, and, that being so, where opportunities of fulfilling this condition best exist, there this sentiment is most to

be found. Thus it exists in no purer form than between members of the same family, and especially between parent and child. It also forms the material of which genuine friendship consists, and, even in the marriage state, forms the only tie that lasts; for mutual understanding is the only sure basis both of friendship and of wedded love. It also inspires philanthropy, when philanthropy is not charlatanism. Lastly, under the name of charity, it is held up by Christianity as the greatest virtue of all, and was enjoined by the early Church as a religious and moral obligation due from each man to every other. How it has happened that this gracious virtue has been permitted to be confounded with alms-giving, and so to become the appanage of the rich—a luxurious outlet for refined sympathies or for vanity—let the Church explain—the Church, to whose keeping it was entrusted, and from whose teaching and practice it has been so conspicuously absent! The fact remains; and it also remains that this duty of charity is obligatory equally on all: on the poor, as well as on the rich;—the poor, whose special heritage it is, needing it as they do so much, to enable them to support the insult and wrong to which they are so often subjected.

While, then, love, the passion, like the burning-glass, scorches and consumes the objects on which its fires are concentrated; passionless love, or enlightened sympathy, like the blessed sunshine, warms and invigorates. A product of the light, like the bow of heaven, it shines on high amidst the tumult of the passions, the symbol of hope, cheering and

inspiriting. In the moral atmosphere, as in the physical, calm and unmoved in the storm—

> "An Iris sits amidst the infernal surge
> Like Hope upon a death-bed ; and, unworn
> Its steady dyes, while all around is torn
> By the distracted waters, bears serene
> Its brilliant hues with all their beams unshorn :
> Resembling, 'mid the torture of the scene,
> Love watching madness with unalterable mien."

In the game of the passions, it is not always the winner who gains most. Foiled in its object, the soul forsakes the arena of strife, and raises itself into a higher sphere and wider range: just as the tree whose lower shoots are curtailed, puts forth more abundant vigour in the upper ones. That sympathy which has failed it in the one it seeks in the many, and hopes to subdue the minds and win the hearts of the multitude by its strength and nobleness. Whatever conceptions of psychical excellence it has formed it tries to realise in itself—to be its own ideal, and thereby not only gratify its own self-consciousness but live a larger life in the thoughts of other minds, and within such merit and obtain approbation and homage. Could such a conception be realised the resulting happiness would be great indeed! Though the sympathy might not be so close and complete as that which successful love would elicit, yet this defect would be more than compensated by its greater grandeur and power. But the passions of glory and ambition are in relation to reality as utterly visionary as that of love. The passion of fame or glory resembles that of love in

this: like love it exists in two forms, a base kind and a noble. The base form of glory aims only at *acquiring* applause: the noble form seeks to *deserve* it as well. Under favouring circumstances the first form can usually be gratified, but only by abandoning all claim to the latter. The noble form also can always succeed in one of its objects—the meriting approbation, but seldom in gaining it; and the higher the merit, the less likelihood is there of its general recognition. The man who seeks the applause of the multitude must of necessity stoop; for the heart of the majority is generally set on low objects, and if a really noble man win it, it is seldom through his nobleness. But he who seeks to *deserve* the applause of his fellow-man must aspire, not stoop; for his ideal is above him, and all he can hope for is the sympathy of the noble few. In this respect the passion for glory is even a more hopeless one than that of love. Nobleness and rectitude may here and there find a response in a single heart; but never in the hearts of the many;—at least not in the present condition of mankind. But in neither of its forms can the passion for glory be gratified without the aid of circumstances which a man cannot procure for himself—of position, ability, opportunity. When these are present, the spurious form can be certainly secured by stooping. But genuine glory can never be completely gratified; for to a right thinking man there must always be a long interval between his conception of perfect conduct and his attainment. He can neither satisfy his own ideal, nor, unless exceptional circumstances favour him, obtain even

the applause of the select few, however fully he may have earned it. All he can be certain of obtaining is the consciousness of having done his best; and this is in the power of all alike.

And what is true of these two passions, love and glory, is true of ambition also. This, too, is subject to the same conditions and regulated by the same laws.

Ambition is the love of power—of exercising the same influence over the wills and actions of other men that fame does over their thoughts and feelings. And like love and glory, it also has two forms, a vulgar and a noble. Also, as with the passion glory, the vulgar form may succeed—circumstances permitting—by *stooping*.

The noble form of ambition is seldom realised in its full extent, and the higher and larger the aim, the less likely the fulfilment. True and noble efforts are perhaps never altogether wasted; but the seed does not ripen in the life-time of the sower, and the harvest is reaped by another hand.

Passion, then, is the result of sensibility, imagination, and force of will combined; and passion is bad. But it does not follow that sensibility, imagination, and will are bad; on the contrary, a character without these elements would be worthless. Man has to act; and to act, he must conceive and feel. Absolute *insouciance* belongs to what is either above or below humanity. A character incapable of passion from feebleness or coldness, approaches the inanimate; a character incapable of passion because reason is supreme, approaches the divine. It is the low-bred horse that has no fire or spirit. The

more of these there are present, the higher is the value—provided there be also response to the restraining power. The quivering of his fibre indicates high nervous tension and latent vigour—

> "His high mettle, under good control,
> Gives him Olympian speed, and shoots him to the goal."

But passion must not rule. Not imagination and feeling, but the light of reason, is man's true guide, and this light lies in and is reflected from his surroundings. "It is not given to man that walketh to direct his steps," or choose his arena. His field of action and the part he has to play are marked out for him by circumstances. If he be true to his part, he will do well; and the more of the elements of passion he has in him, the better. If he be untrue, he will fail; and the stronger his passions, the more disastrous will be the failure. The path of right, then, to which the guide is reason, is the proper path for a man,—the one in which lies his real good. Its excellence is visible to the upright, though even from their sight it is sometimes hidden by temporary clouds and intervening obstacles; but vision of it is impossible to those who stoop.

> "Straight is the path of duty,
> Curved is the line of beauty;
> Walk by the first, and you shall see
> The other always follow thee."

§ LXIX. To do right, then, it is necessary that the heart should be under subjection to the head, the desires be controlled by the will, and the mind obey

reason. But the order of nature seems to be against this arrangement, for obedience to reason is the result of experience, and the passions come before experience. Reason is the product of age, and passion is the characteristic of youth. It seems part of the order of nature that nothing perfect should come at once. First appears the imperfect—the incomplete; then from it is developed the better. And this imperfection seems by its antagonism to stimulate the growth of the more perfect. So it is with the passions. They come early in life, that by their discipline they may develop the reason. The grown man walks erect, free and well-balanced; the child's progress is unsteady — *non vi, sed sæpe cadendo*, but by his frequent falls he in time learns to take heed to his steps. The action of the passions produces a similar result. In their school and under their fiery ordeal the soul is chastened and purified, and without the experience thus obtained could never have acquired uprightness, self-control, manliness,— in a word *virtue*.

A thoughtful and earnest divine (Rev. F. W. Robertson) has attempted to illustrate the part which illusion plays in life by a comparison which, as far as it goes, is suggestive. A child sets out on a long journey, the end and object of which is unknown to it, under the guidance of a wise guide. On the road various objects of interest attract it—a butterfly, a flower, a pebble —and, in the pursuit of such, the journey is beguiled and the sense of fatigue lost. Each object in turn wearies it and it pursues a fresh one, and thus imperceptibly the journey is

accomplished, and it arrives at the end with an accession of health and spirits from an exercise which would, without the aid of these diverting objects, have been irksome and insipid. The comparison does not meet all the facts of the case. The guide is there, it is true; but he will not speak unless appealed to, and the child does not always recognise him and appeal to him; or only when too late. And the child does not merely pursue butterflies and *harmless* objects on the road, but strays often off the road after will-of-the-wisps and into bogs and quagmires, and causes injuries both to itself and others. And usually it is not until the walk has come almost to an end and all its happiness is marred, that it learns to consult the guide. Moreover it suffers injuries in its walk, when on the right path, from other children, against whom its guide cannot protect it.

A man of science (Professor Huxley), recognising this rude method of nature in her capacity of moral educator, has suggested that perhaps in this, as in other matters, its harshness might be mitigated and its evil removed by art. It is true the lesson of life must be learnt by experience only: no other school can teach what life is. Yet there is no reason why the elements of natural moral law might not be taught as those of physical science. The child might be taught to have recourse to his guide habitually before, instead of after, committing himself to his object, or, dropping the metaphor, might be trained to attend habitually to the things and persons around him; to inquire before doing a thing

whether he should inflict as well as suffer any injury; to be as careful, at least, over the rights of others as over his own;—in short, habitually to respect other people, and by such habit always secure under all circumstances the best path open to him, and save himself from the suffering and reproach that always follows inadvertence and wilfulness. By such education, Professor Huxley thinks life would become merely the application of such rules and principles to practice; and, were all so educated, then not only would each be saved from injuries resulting from his own fault, but from those caused by others also. Nay more, the principle of morality is not *self-help*, but *help to others;* and he would learn from such training to give as well as to receive assistance.

§ LXX. From what has been said, it appears that man has faculties, perceptive and imaginative—a power of perceiving and of conceiving—which inform and guide him on every subject to which they are directed; and that these constitute his intellect. That his moral nature depends on the subjects to which these have been directed. If they have been habitually turned to low objects, he is a low man; if to high objects, he is a noble man: the height of the objects determining his moral height. That this moral height constitutes a standard by which he can measure his conduct, and when it comes up to such standard his moral sense and conscience are satisfied: otherwise, he suffers regret or remorse. And further, that this moral sense is the only authority which the mind recognises

as its criterion of right and wrong. The duty of a man, therefore, is to make use habitually of this moral standard and to regulate his conduct by it. And the goodness of a man's conduct depends on the perfection of this moral sense and on his obedience to its dictates. This being the case, and the happiness of every person being dependent on the harmonious relations that exist between himself and the persons and things around him, and especially on his social relations, it might be supposed that the chief object in education would be to elevate the moral standard in the pupil, and to train him to habitual reference to it. Yet such object is entirely or almost entirely overlooked. It is true that the necessity of harmonious physical conditions is recognised, and it is beginning to be perceived that such conditions depend on laws, and that, by studying and acting in conformity with such laws, they may be secured. But here education stops. Its aim is to obtain physical happiness, and it is altogether overlooked that moral and social happiness is far more important; for without it not only are the higher wants of our nature unsatisfied, but even the lower good, the physical, cannot be secured. The error arises from our not perceiving that moral harmonious conditions, as well as physical, depend on natural laws, and may be secured by obedience to such laws. What morality is taught at all, is taught only incidentally, and as a part of theological dogma. Authority is the ground on which the obligation of obedience is made to depend, not the reason and conscience. By-and-by, when the law of the will and its relations to the conscience are

perceived, morality will be taught as a science, and then, perhaps, Professor Huxley's desire will be realised, and men will be passed from training schools into the world, equipped with principles and habits of which their subsequent career will be the application, and man will be, not the slave and the victim of his passions, but their master.

§ LXXI. The general conclusion then to which this view of the physical and psychical phenomena revealed to us in consciousness leads, amounts to this:—That in these phenomena are contained the elements or germs of beauty, goodness, and truth, and that, as the phenomena enter the mind and notions are formed of them, these elements germinate therein into corresponding conceptions, illuminating, gladdening, and captivating the psyche;—that the condition upon which the growth of such conceptions depends is freedom of the psyche from selfish and sensuous considerations;—that all in whose minds such conceptions have been formed are actuated by them and seek to realise them;—that such conceptions can only be realised when in themselves inherently sound, and where circumstances are opportune;—that the soundness of the conceptions depends on the accuracy of the notions that have been formed of the phenomena;—that, therefore, the duty of every man, both in order to secure sound conceptions and to avail himself of his opportunities, is—attention to the circumstances;—and, lastly, that to accomplish these two objects the habit of rectitude is necessary,—intellectual rectitude in forming his notions out of the phenomena around

him, and moral rectitude in applying his conceptions to such phenomena.

§ LXXII. And the relations which these three classes of conceptions have towards each other, and the conditions which regulate them, are precisely the same, whether in the world of things or of persons. Psychical beauty consists in this:—noble faculty nobly exercised; just as beauty in a physical organism may be defined—perfect organisation in perfect action. To both physical and psychical beauty grace, the perfection of motion, is necessary to render it complete. For beauty to be conspicuous, circumstances must conspire—the thing possessing it must be highly placed—but it may manifest itself in even the humblest position. Psychical beauty then, like physical, is a gift of nature. It may be developed or disturbed by good or bad training, but it cannot be produced by art alone.

Further, neither physical nor psychical nor moral beauty exist in nature without alloy. The elements are there, but they have to be discovered by the mind, separated from the dross, and worked into ideal conceptions. And this process is performed more or less completely by different minds, the results varying with the degrees of perfection of the faculties employed, and with the opportunities presented and culture bestowed. Hence the various standards of taste and morality. And the mental process by which we judge of physical and moral beauty is precisely the same. In each case we fix our attention on the object in question, adjust our mental sigh tto it—bringing it into focus as it were—

and compare it with our mental ideal, and, according as it surpasses or falls short of such ideal, praise or condemn it. And as with our physical perceptions, so with our psychical; the mind, by fixing its attention on the object, detects in it subtler and more excellent qualities which, by improving its conceptions, give it pleasure and elevate its standard of perfection; and *vice versâ*, the detection of imperfections causes pain, by producing disagreement with the existing ideal.

And as in physical beauty there has been found to be a principle running through it, that none of its parts should be in excess or deficiency, but that a certain proportion or balancing must exist between them all—every part being in subordination to the general plan; so in psychical or moral beauty it may be noticed that a similar balancing of the virtues that compose it is necessary, so that none be either wanting or redundant—any one, unless balanced by some other becoming a vice. Thus prudence without honesty becomes knavery; honesty without courtesy becomes rudeness; courtesy without truth becomes hollowness; truth without kindness becomes inhumanity; kindness without judgment becomes foolishness; judgment without courage becomes cowardice; courage without caution becomes rashness,—without perseverance, unstableness; whilst perseverance without discretion becomes stubbornness. Again, in prosperity, exaltation without modesty becomes insolence; without humility, arrogance. And in adversity—intrepidity without patience becomes intemperance; patience with-

out self-respect becomes abjectness; and so on. With every virtue, for its proper and graceful action, the antagonism of some other seems requisite. Just as, in the human body, the muscles by which physical uprightness and self-control are preserved must each be antagonised by its opposite, and for the perfection of grace and symmetry it is necessary that they should harmonise in their action, and that no unsightly protuberances or vacuities should be observable, but that, although present and always ready on occasion, when not wanted they should not obtrude themselves too much on the attention; so is it with the virtues—the moral muscles of the psyche:—for complete integrity and perfect *moral* grace it is necessary that these also should all be present in harmonious proportion, never obtruding themselves unnecessarily on the attention, but each and all free and ready to manifest themselves whenever their action is required.

§ LXXIII. And the same relationship exists between physical and psychical goodness. Beauty and goodness differ in this,—that while the excellence of the one lies in itself, that of the other is seen in the results that it gives rise to—in the consequences that flow from it. Beauty pleases us by perfectly satisfying our æsthetic faculty. We perceive in the object our highest ideal of excellence realised or surpassed, and the exalted function produced thereby of that part of the brain which is brought into play gives—through the organic sense probably—the psyche pleasure. In the pleasure that the contemplation of goodness gives, the æsthetic faculty does not participate,—at least as

far as the object of which the goodness is predicated is concerned. What we admire is the effects produced by it on other objects. We perceive that through it some benefit or excellence is supplied or imparted to something else, and that thereby it contributes towards maintaining and producing that order and beauty of the Cosmos generally which we love and desire to see existing. A flower or fruit may be beautiful to the senses of sight and taste, through realising in itself the highest conceptions of direct enjoyment which those senses are capable of producing; but the fruit to *the eye* is *good*, because it promises enjoyment as a result. So also grain is good to the sight, because we anticipate in thought its capabilities. Circumstances determine the goodness of a thing: rain after a drought, rivers of water in a thirsty land, sunshine after a storm, are all good; but rain and sunshine, if unseasonable, are both of them evil. So with the psychical. A man of no special intellectual or moral excellence, and placed in the humblest situation, does good, if he fulfil all his duties rightly to the persons and things around him; he tends to maintain—to the extent of his limited capabilities—the order of the Cosmos: while the noblest faculties, if not directed in accordance with the circumstances in which they exist, are not good; they cause disorder. Further, although moral goodness is not necessarily moral beauty, it is, as it were, a step on the road thereto. A man thoroughly unselfish and with a mind open and free, is progressing towards nobleness, both intellectually and morally, if he has learnt rectitude; while noble faculties, used foolishly

or basely, degrade, and produce deformity. Beauty, then, is a gift of nature, with conditions attached thereto; and may be preserved and augmented—whether it be moral or physical beauty—by observing those conditions. Goodness is in the power of all, and only requires training; and further, it, in all probability, is the right road to beauty.

§ LXXIV. Psychical truth, like physical, is a revelation which is presented to us in a language the characters of which are unknown, and the words and sentences disjointed and obscure; and it is our business to learn the alphabet of this language, to spell and understand the meaning of the separate words, and to connect them together in a form which is intelligible and consistent. The language is the world of human beings—the psychical cosmos; the key to it is in ourselves; and by the right use of this key, the separate words are learnt, the several sentences framed and connected together, and the import of the whole gathered. And in proportion as the principles and laws which this revelation contains are known, are the persons around us comprehended. Psychical knowledge is divided into two parts, psychology and sociology—the former treating of the individual, the latter of the agglomeration of individuals. The law which regulates the conduct of the individual psyche—how the will is determined by motives and these by conceptions—how the relative force of these conceptions may be estimated—in short, all the conditions on which such conduct depends—has already been given. The same law holds good with respect to those compound psyches—societies. A society is a

collection of individuals, and its will is the expression of the resultant of the wills of its constituents. In the savage or hunting state of society, the members are actuated mainly by the desire of the immediate gratification of the bodily appetites, like the animals, from whom they have scarcely emerged: physical strength therefore rules, and the opinions and sentiments of the strongest govern. In such a society, sensual and sensuous things are the main objects of pursuit, and no sentiments or opinions are tolerated but what flatter the feelings or stimulate the passions of the rulers. As society advances and knowledge of facts increases, pastoral, agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing communities gradually make their appearance; the conception of providing for the future is formed; and property gives adventitious power and displaces brute force. But property brings leisure, and leisure gives opportunity for culture; and so taste improves, and cultivated classes with higher ideals and nobler desires are produced. And these more enlightened and cultivated classes, in proportion as they perceive social wrong and disorder existing, in the same proportion perceive the obligation of attempting to remove such, and lend their sympathies and aid to those who are weak and oppressed. But this condition is necessary to progress:—That the influence of no one class preponderate so greatly as to outbalance that of all the other classes and members of the society combined. In such a case, progress would be impossible; for it may be taken as a law that no class in a society will ever voluntarily open itself to motives, or permit principles

to be discussed, which are destructive to the very considerations on which it is based, and which have actuated it, and hold it together. In every society, then, in which any one class dominates entirely—whether such class be a priesthood held together by dogma; or a nobility, by class-privileges; or a plutocracy, by identity of commercial interests; or, worst of all, "that worst of tyrants, a usurping crowd," mobocracy, by low instincts and appetites, or by caprice—progress is impossible: the will of the nation is enslaved and its liberty taken away. For such a nation, as in the analogous case of a man enslaved by a dominant vice, there is no hope, unless by some sharp calamity, produced either by violence inflicted from without, or by its own rottenness, such tyranny be prostrated and liberty restored. In all cases, then, in which progress is stopped and civilisation thwarted—whether it be in the savage state, in which it can scarcely be said to have commenced, but brute force prevails; or in those effete and worn-out communities in which all life is paralysed and ruined, and forms of civilisation show that progress had made perhaps considerable advance but was arrested; or in those states in which no balance of classes exists, but all equilibrium is lost, and there is no steady rule or order, but one class after another in turn come uppermost, and there is no healthy life, but only convulsion and constant succession of excitement and prostration, tyranny and anarchy—in all such cases the evil may be traced to the undue influence of class and faction, unchecked by any combination representing the public. So long, however, as by combination of the

rest, each separate class and interest may be defeated, so long is it in the power of the society to preserve its freedom, and progress is possible. For each class is able to perceive injustice and is open to conviction, as long as its own special interests are not involved in the maintenance of such injustice; and so the balance is preserved, and all classes are kept within their due bounds, though at the cost of political strife and contention. States in which this balance of classes is preserved, and which are free to progress if they will, are called—whatever the form of government—constitutional states: the social organisation is rightly constituted for the purposes of progress. In such a state every wrong can be righted, and every iniquity removed, provided that the members suffering from such wrong and iniquity possess power and influence enough by agitating to attract attention, and so gain the ear of the public, and that the power of those interested in the continuance of the injustice be not too strong for the united forces of the disinterested and impartial. But even in constitutional states, where these conditions do not exist, those who are oppressed by wrong must be resigned to suffer; for not yet in any society may those who have only right on their side hope for redress, as in no society are those who love right for its own sake, and better than anything else, sufficiently strong to rule. No doubt individual members may be found, amongst all classes, open to conviction—to reason from without; but such are the exception. In proportion as culture and enlightenment spread, the number of persons freed from narrow and class interest, and from the influence

of base and selfish motives—from sensuousness, luxury, pride, vanity, conceit, prejudice, bigotry, superstition, and all the fetters by which authority and conventionality enslave the intellect and degrade the soul—will increase; but such persons belong to no class: *ipso facto*, on gaining their freedom they leave their class and join the community. And the day may, or rather will, come when such persons will become the majority, and then all will be governed by the law of right, and by that alone; and all *classes* will have disappeared or been merged into one—the *Demos*. And when this ideal rule of right has been realised, then the good of all will become the care of each, and, the society unduly influenced by none of its members, but giving attention to all, every member will receive his just rights, and the *democracy* —in the only true sense of that word—will be established.

The fundamental condition then for the progress of a nation in civilisation is *freedom*. The rule must not be monopolised by a class, but all the members must participate therein, so that they may have it in their power to gain the ear of the legislature, and exert their due influence. So far as this condition exists, so far is the state free, and at liberty to progress. And when this condition exists, in the state as in the individual, if a good be perceived, it is secured; and if a wrong be recognised, it is redressed. And the order in which a state advances from barbarism to civilisation, and right laws are framed, and justice distributed, is analogous to that in which moral virtue is developed in the individual. As long as the conceptions of an indi-

vidual are limited to himself, selfish considerations exclusively rule in his mind: his own interests, opinions, and sentiments occupy him; he feels only for himself; and to self the rights of all other persons are sacrificed. But if his mind be free to expand, by-and-by his view enlarges, and more liberal conceptions are formed; the space in his mind which was occupied by himself is shared by others, and they and their belongings exercise their due influence on his conduct. It is the same with a state. In a state, as long as the tyranny of a class exists, an undue share of every good in the power of a government to obtain is appropriated by such class; laws are passed and monopolies formed for the purpose of securing to its members wealth and influence, honour and dignity; and institutions are created for the purpose of establishing and imposing on others views and opinions in conformity with those entertained by them. But if the nation be permitted to develop, other classes spring up, and liberating influences begin to act. The new classes thrust themselves into notice, and obtain a share of the attention and consideration of the state—freedom of thought and of action, and participation in the government, and in the honours, dignities, and profit accruing thence; and thus, one by one, monopolies are abolished—trade is made free; liberty of thought and of speech is permitted, and institutions favouring any particular class of opinions at the expense of the rest are got rid of; power and influence are opened to all; honour is paid to personal merit alone, and patents of nobility fail to secure respect where real worth is

wanting; and, after a time, and by degrees, all inequalities created artificially by the regulations of society are removed. And, also by degrees, it is perceived that not only inequalities which are artificial, and the creation of society, but those instituted by nature, are susceptible of amelioration and of remedy. If nature has given strength, she has also given sympathy; and, under liberating and refining influences, this feeling comes into play, and the duty of using such strength for the benefit of the weak is admitted—first by individuals, and afterwards, as the influence of these increases, by the whole society; and justice is extended at last to the weak and unfortunate.

And it happens, also, that men get to perceive that not only may the inequalities of nature be removed, but also her shortcomings may be made up—that, by *co-operation*, evils which no man, however strong, individually could contend against, may be overcome; and good, which no man by himself could procure, be acquired; and that, as science advances and enlightenment spreads, there is scarcely an evil—whether springing from disorder in physical things or from the injustice of man—that may not be remedied, and scarcely a good conceivable by his mind, that may not, by co-operation and the use of reason, be realised. And in proportion as this is perceived, will men learn to lay aside private and selfish aims, and to work together for the common good; and as this faith gains ground, will all tyrannies, monopolies, and class and private interests and prejudices disappear, and one object come into view, and be

paramount to every other consideration—the Common wealth.

With the many then, as with the one, with communities as with individuals, progress consists in liberation from the bondage of selfish influences, and in the substitution of broad views for narrow; of conceptions of right for conceptions of personal good; of nobleness for baseness. Also, with communities as with individuals, it is not enough that nobleness should prevail and the love of right be the ruling passion. To secure the establishment of such right the law on which its perception depends must have been learnt, and the duty of using and obeying the reason be perceived.

There must exist in the society persons who habitually obey the law of right in sufficient force to influence the will of the nation and determine its conduct. But there is no existing community as yet in which such is the case. In every nation the individuals who take reason as their law are the small minority. Over most minds custom and conventional opinion exercise some influence; in the majority they reign supreme, and notions imposed in their infancy—before the age of reason had commenced—must not be questioned. It follows then, that even in the most advanced nations the prevalent opinions are those which were imposed upon them in their infancy—the traditions of their fathers—the tales and superstitions of their nursery. The various societies which exist on the earth differ as much in their characteristics as individuals do. In all of them, probably even in the lowest, some noble

motives exist contending with the base, but as yet in none, it is to be feared, have these succeeded in liberating the nation entirely: no nation has so completely emerged from barbarism as to be entirely free from base motives; no nation has progressed so far in civilisation as to be wholly noble.

And still more remote seems to be the time when perfect rectitude will be obtained. Yet, until the law of reason be universally acknowledged, no nation can have peace. In the heart of the nation, as in that of the individual, no matter how noble the aim, dissension and conflict between rival motives will exist, and the community will be distracted by strife, and exposed to calamity, until all class interests have been done away with; not until all the members have been merged in one class alone—those who take reason for their guide and consult it as a duty—will the objects of civilisation be secured and the reign of right established. And, if this be true of social organisms severally, still more is it true of that greater organisation that is going on of which these organisms form the units—the great world of Humanity:—an organism still in a state of utter barbarism; in which physical force is the rule, and the reign of might is supreme. Yet here also there is hope: for the same rules apply to it, and the same laws are in operation, that develop individuals and nations separately. Nations are forced into contact with each other, like individuals, of necessity, and at first their intercourse is regulated by agreements and disagreements of interests and sentiments. But by-and-by they also, as their notions enlarge,

view each other more correctly, and begin to understand each other. And in proportion as such understanding increases will grounds for misunderstanding diminish, and they will perceive and fulfil their duties to each other—each doing to every other all the good it can—and so form a real brotherhood of nations. The growth of the mind of a man and of that of a nation are therefore strictly analogous, and are developed on the same principles.

Mr Herbert Spencer has discovered a resemblance between psychical organisation and physical, and has traced the analogy to a surprising extent. Comparing the physical cell with the psychical individual, he has shown that the principles on which these cells are arranged in the various physical organisms, from the lowest to the highest, agree closely with those on which human societies are constructed; the lower organisms corresponding to the more primitive and barbarous communities, the higher to the more civilised. It is evident, from the facts he has produced, that the analogy is too close to be accidental only, and the inference is that the laws of life resemble those of mind—the psychical forces acting in the one department of nature in the same manner that the physical forces act in the other—and that, when the sciences of biology and psychology are thoroughly known, common principles will be found to pervade them. Such conclusions will not startle those who reflect that not only does the kingdom of mind spring out of that of life, but that every *mental* change has its corresponding *vital* one; that each is to the other alternately as an effect and as a cause,

their intercourse consisting in mutual action and reaction. The subject is intensely interesting; but one of which in our present position we can only obtain glimpses and form guesses.

A great and gallant nation, in a moment of exaltation, saw—revealed as by a lightning-flash—a bright vision of the future, and heard, as if proclaimed from above, the words *liberty*, *equality*, *fraternity*. The brightness of that vision dazzled its sight and inflamed its brain; and, in its blindness and delirium, with the words ringing in its ears and ever on its lips, it violated every principle which such words expressed or represented. With it, *liberty* meant the right of every man to impose by force his thoughts, sentiments, and will on every other man; *equality*—the right of the low to degrade the high; *fraternity*—the guillotine! And ever since, the memory of that debauch of the imagination—that travesty of reason—has haunted its mind, with desire of renewal; the intoxication has become habitual, and it has gone on, like the drunkard, in alternate states of excitement and depression. Like the persons in the legend who have seen "the blue flower," reality has for it no charms any longer, and it has wandered on, further and further from the path of right and of reason, using the name of the latter, but neglecting every landmark of fact which its light would have indicated, and following every will-of-the-wisp glitter, in the hope that it might lead it to its ideal—to the vision that it has lost.

Nor has the evil effect of this epidemic of unreason been limited to the nation in which it first

broke out. The neighbouring nations have been affected also, and their progress interfered with, although the disturbing forces have operated in a different manner. Less advanced and elevated, these did not see the Vision, though they saw its effect. They heard the words proclaimed, and in their minds they were associated with all that is most hateful. And because those who committed the excesses styled themselves followers of reason, these bystanders have, by a confusion of thought, held this divine faculty responsible for such, and their chief object ever since has been to shield themselves from its light, as from something baneful. Mantling themselves within the dense folds of custom and opinion, they have limited their perceptions to the grosser impressions derived through the less noble perceptive faculties. And the result has been that they have remained stagnant in all but material things. Thus while the imaginative, undisciplined Celt has been wildly pursuing every dream of fancy, neglecting reality altogether, the more solid, matter-of-fact Teuton has been sedulously binding down his mind to conceptions of material and sensuous good: the one has been almost stationary in all the higher regions of thought, while the other has been rushing to destruction. And were the above description true absolutely and without qualification, the consequences would be equally fatal to the life of both races. But fortunately this is not the case. In each case men have been produced with minds enslaved neither by passion nor by habit. On the one hand, among

Teutons free thought is not wanting, and elevating and liberating conceptions are in formation which in time will break the chains of custom and prejudice; on the other hand, there are Celts who have learnt from experience the necessity of applying the analytic intellect to the facts of reality. Such influences will increase and such minds multiply, and by-and-by they will rule. Both satiety and privation help progress.

> "Winter's cold blasts and icy winds serve good
> As much as summer suns, Man yet shall reap
> The harvest of his deeds and sufferings.
> Then *Liberty* shall birthright be of all,
> *Equality* mean equal right to claim
> A share of God's best gifts, a share of life,
> And scope to use it for all wisest ends;
> *Fraternity* shall then be mighty bond,
> Binding all men in glorious brotherhood."

And so the time will come at last when all mên will march and progress under the banner of a common Humanity. And when that time has arrived, perhaps on that banner will be found inscribed the words Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,—words which, however desecrated by contaminating associations, yet contain within them the only true principles by which men can be rightly held together; their meaning in fact being precisely the same as the hallowed and time-honoured Anglo-Saxon ones, associated with the noblest chapters of our English History—

FREEDOM, FAIR-PLAY, BROTHERHOOD.

CHAPTER V.

SPIRITUAL.

§ LXXV. If the physical and the psychical comprised all the phenomena of consciousness, man's case would be desperate indeed; for the former, on which he immediately depends for existence, presents to him nothing but a mixture of good and evil so intermingled, that his individual perceptive faculties are unable to discern the method by which the one is to be separated from the other, and his unassisted powers are unable to effect the separation; while in the latter, to which he looks for aid and co-operation, there is the same mixture of good and evil, but in still worse and more perplexing forms: so that it depends far more on what is called *chance* or *fortune* than on his own powers how he shall fare. Had he then nothing to look to but the persons and things around him, his short existence would be hopelessly embittered either by the actual presence, or the perpetual apprehension of evil in every form, without any quarter whatever to which he might turn for security. Led into error by his own ignorance and blindness, his own thoughtlessness and stubbornness, his own slavish fears and prejudices; misled by his head; betrayed by his heart; oppressed even when

doing right by the ignorance and stupidity, the tyranny and brutality, the folly, meanness, and wilfulness of his fellow-men; his reason—the divine gift which, if used by all, would suffice for all—put under a ban, or, even if used by some bold individual, inadequate because unsupported by that of his fellows; alone, or almost alone; well might he retire in despair from the unequal combat; well might he exclaim with the great poet whose words have been so often quoted already—

> "What from this barren being do we reap?
> Our senses narrow, and our reason frail,
> Life short, and truth a gem which loves the deep,
> And all things weighed in custom's falsest scale;
> Opinion an omnipotence,—whose veil
> Mantles the earth with darkness, until right
> And wrong are Accidents, and men grow pale
> Lest their own judgments should become too bright,
> And their free thought be crimes, and earth have too much light."

But this is not the case. Man is not abandoned to the caprice and uncertainties of the physical elements, nor to the still more uncertain and to be dreaded caprice of his fellow-men. There exists for him yet another region which his consciousness reveals to him, and to which he is driven for refuge by the very evils which he encounters elsewhere—the *spiritual.* And the objects which occupy this region, although less palpable and definite, are—so far as they are correctly perceived—no less real and certain than the nearer and more obvious ones contained in the two regions of consciousness which have been already treated of. To the objects of this spiri-

tual region the mind is directed by the unsatisfactory nature of those of the physical and the psychical: it, like these two, appeals to the three great psychical faculties, the æsthetic, emotional, and theoretic: and it is through it, and it alone, that these faculties and what we perceive in the physical and psychical are harmonised;—that our notions of what is are reconciled with our conceptions of what should be. It is by hypothesis supplied from this quarter that our imperfect conceptions of truth are supplemented so as to be presented in a complete form to the theoretic faculty, and that our perceptions of moral and psychical evil are reconciled with our conceptions of moral and physical beauty and goodness.

§ LXXVI. Now this last of the regions of thought which are revealed through consciousness is a revelation entirely conceptual, and, like all conceptions, is deduced from pre-existing and pre-conceived notions. It is a conception which the unsatisfied requirements of the psyche *force* it to make, and, being deduced from our notions of the physical and psychical Cosmos, is only so far true as these notions are. Thus, if our notion of the Cosmos were complete and true to fact in every part, and nothing left to surmise and hypothesis, then our spiritual conception would continue always unshaken and immutable. But this is not the case: our notion of the Cosmos is incomplete, and is constantly altering. The facts near us are perceived tolerably clearly; those further off are more dimly seen, and doubt and confusion begin; and they grow less and less distinct as the distance increases, until at last they merge in the absolutely

unknown, and are lost even to conjecture. And the same proportion of uncertainty that exists with regard to these three classes of facts exists with regard to reasoning based on them—conceptions of the mind based on the facts distinctly seen are tolerably correct; those based on the dimly seen are liable to error; while those which have no support but conjecture are altogether imaginary — unsubstantial forms whose truth can neither be disproved nor verified. As knowledge advances, the circle of the known enlarges; what is erroneous in our suppositions is corrected, and as our false notions of the Cosmos disappear, the visionary and fallacious spiritual conceptions which were grounded on them perish also. Thus it happens that while our conceptions of spiritual truth must necessarily be modified with every step of progress, all that is based on fact will remain unaltered; and more will be added to the certain portion with every change. And it is the same thing with our conceptions of spiritual goodness and beauty. As we are driven by the exigencies of our theoretic faculty to seek in the spiritual region the supplement of the physical and the psychical, so are we compelled by the requirements of our emotional and æsthetic faculties to conceive such spiritual invention in a form in accord with our existing moral and æsthetic notions. Our conceptions of cosmical goodness and beauty are, like those of truth, formed out of our perceptions of such, and are only accurate as far as these extend; and as our conceptions of spiritual goodness or beauty are based on our cosmical conceptions, they also are accurate in the same pro-

portion. Were our cosmical knowledge then stationary, our spiritual conception would stagnate also. But our knowledge of the beauty, goodness, and truth of the Cosmos is constantly advancing, and our spiritual knowledge must therefore also advance. The spiritual revelation, then, like the cosmical, is imperfect, and in great part conjectural—based on uncertain hypothesis. Like the cosmical, also, the certain gains on the conjectural, and the gain of the one is in exact proportion to the gain of the other.

The spiritual revelation, then, belongs to the third kind of knowledge spoken of in § V. It is altogether inferential—a deduction of the reason. It is deduced either from directly perceived cosmical facts, or from statements respecting such; and its truth or falsehood depends on the soundness of the premises, and on the correctness of the reasoning process by which it has been reached.

§ LXXVII. But although the spiritual revelation is altogether an inference of the reason, it must be borne in mind that it is quite as much a fact of consciousness as the other two revelations which have been already treated of. An idea, or object of thought, is quite as much a fact of consciousness as an object of sense. Both are caused by excited brain-structure, and the only distinction between them is that the one is always preceded by the other, either immediately, or through the medium of connecting things; its cerebral seat being further from the exciting outside impression. Ideas, whether deduced direct from objects of sense, or from other

ideas already formed, are equally facts of consciousness. Intellectual things, connected with each other by the laws of thought, are as real as visible things, connected with each other by the laws of sight. There may be error in each case. There are optical illusions and hallucinations, as well as intellectual delusions. It is the province of the reason to correct them both; for all truth—physical, psychical, or spiritual—depends on the reason.

§ LXXVIII. The spiritual revelation, then, is a genuine thing, a real fact of consciousness. And the manner in which it is made is this:—Experience teaches that whenever an event occurs it is preceded by some other event, and this again by some other; the different events being connected together by the association of sequence in time. To the thing which precedes we give the name *cause*, and the thing which succeeds it we call its *effect;* and things which are associated together by this sequence, we say are connected as cause and effect. And with the notion of cause we always associate the further notion of *force.* When we produce a change on the things around us, we are conscious that we put forth force. Also, when we are acted upon by surrounding things, whether we are passive or antagonistic to such action, we feel the effects of force proceeding from them. This notion of force, then, we associate with that of cause by the law of our minds, which compels us to connect with an idea every other idea with which it has relations. We are unable then to conceive of change taking place without force being exerted; and further, as our experi-

ence leads us to associate force with *will*—that being the only source of force that our mental experience furnishes us with—whenever we see evidence of force put forth, we conceive the existence of some *will* from which it primarily emanated. From these principles it follows that all the natural events which cannot be traced either to our own action, or to that of any other psychical being embodied in a person, are attributed by us to some unembodied psyche, or, as we are in the habit of saying, some spiritual being. Further still: as we associate with will and power, desire, thought, feeling, and all the other attributes of the human psyche, we invest these spiritual conceptions of our mind with all these attributes as well, and conceive the spiritual psyche in our own image. The beings of our spiritual world are, therefore, of necessity *anthropomorphic*, or human-like. They are made after our pattern, only endowed with mightier wills and powers, and with larger intelligences. And it is important to insist upon the fact, that the evidence upon which our belief in such spiritual existence rests, is quite as strong and indisputable as that for our belief in what has been called psychical existence—as far at least as that of other persons is concerned; the only difference being that this latter is presented to us personated in bodily forms, while spiritual existence is, as far as we know, altogether unembodied, and, in this sense, impersonal. The evidence for the existence of other persons rests ultimately, as has been shown, on our consciousness of our own personal

existence; and the evidence for spiritual existence rests also on the same foundation.

§ LXXIX. Our belief in spiritual existence, then, is deduced from our notions of the Cosmos. Every event which cannot be traced either to our own actions, or to the action of some other being embodied in a bodily form, is referred ultimately to it. And the form which such conception takes in our minds is dependent on, and varies with, our notions of the Cosmos. Thus the uninformed savage, whose knowledge is limited to a few isolated facts, when he sees an object of an unusual and mysterious character, or possessing remarkable qualities, conceives such to be animated or possessed by a distinct spiritual being. Hence *Fetish-worship*. As knowledge advanced, and things became grouped together in men's minds in classes, to each of these classes or groups of things a distinct deity or ruler was assigned; and so arose that higher conception of the spiritual which is called *polytheism*. And this system of deities became more elaborate and highly organised with the growth of knowledge, and the increasing complexity of notions about things. The older deities were those of the physical world—of the air, earth, water, fire, light, and the heavenly bodies. Then the attributes of the human mind became spiritualised. The god of the sun became also the god of knowledge or mental light; the pleasures and appetites, the passions, wisdom, purity or chastity—all had their divinities. There were Furies, Graces, Muses, and thus the system grew, expanding and refining with the growth and culture of the human mind—a beautiful system,

truly and honestly supplying the wants of its day, and fulfilling its purpose; elevating the soul, and furnishing the highest and widest scope to the imagination of the artist; "lending a soul to the objects of sense, and a body to the abstractions of philosophy." And this *polytheistic* system passed—or rather is passing, for the process is not yet complete—by slow degrees and imperceptibly into *monotheism.* In proportion as unity and subordination were perceptible in physical nature, in the same proportion were rule and order introduced into the spiritual conception. The notion of a Ruler in heaven was formed, to whom the other deities were subordinate; and, in time, this process of subordination has been carried so far, that these last, losing altogether their independence, have become mere ministers and functionaries, carrying out the will of the Supreme One.

§ LXXX. But in its moral nature, the advance of the spiritual conception from polytheism to monotheism has been yet slower. The discord between evil and good is so great, that it at first seems impossible to trace them to a single cause. Hence the spiritualistic conception of the two principles, with equal powers, contending with each other through every part of the Cosmos in eternal conflict. Then, the superiority of good in the long-run being perceived, the evil principle is degraded to a lower rank. The conception of rebellious subordinates is introduced, with power to influence physical things and the heart of man; and to lead him also into rebellion: and this notion of a devil or author of evil,

and of fallen angels, still maintains its ground in the popular theology. Finally, the Necessitarian, seeing that all will is conditioned by motives, and that psychical motives, equally with physical, are traceable to one root or cause, refers everything alike—both what we call *good* and what we call *evil*—to the one Great First Cause, the Divine Will by which everything is fated or decreed.

§ LXXXI. By another path—by speculations connected with the distinction between matter and mind—we arrive also at the region of the spiritual. The rudest savage makes a distinction between matter and mind. With the former he classes his corporeal existence, objective and subjective—his body and its sensations. To the latter he refers his ideas and feelings; and thus he conceives himself as composed of two natures. His bodily nature, he perceives, perishes and is resolved into its elements: but where goes his mental nature? His sense of individuality, of indestructibility, of immortality—his incapacity of conceiving himself nonexistent—negative the supposition of mental dissolution. Further, to the uninformed mind the phenomena of dreams and apparitions, in which the phantom forms of the departed return, seem to prove the existence of some shadowy land of disembodied spirits. Hence the conception of such a place belongs to all rude mythologies. Advancing knowledge seems to destroy much of the foundation on which such speculation is based, by tracing all phenomena, intellectual as well as sensorial, to the brain as its cause, and by accounting for dreams and sensorial hallucinations by bodily

causes. It leaves, however, the intuitive sense of individuality; and, as moral knowledge advances, reasons, which have their root in such knowledge, spring up to reinforce the belief in immortality. Lastly, still more advanced knowledge, by showing that all phenomena, both intellectual and sensorial, sensuous and emotional, though produced by outside cerebral change, are strictly mental, reveals to us the mind as a sphere, mysteriously connected with the brain it is true, but conceivably independent of it; and thus the distinction between matter and mind is revived; ground is furnished for further speculations; and the argument for immortality strengthened.

§ LXXXII. The mind, then, is driven by the requirements of the intellect to conceive of spiritual existence, holding the same relation to the Cosmos that a cause does to an effect. And it is further compelled by the requirements of the heart to endow such conception with attributes satisfactory to the moral and emotional feelings. And just as the spiritual conception varies, in the manner we have seen, with our varying intellectual notions of the Cosmos, so does it vary in the same manner with our varying notions of moral goodness and nobleness existing in the Cosmos. As in our intercourse with our fellow-men we form our conceptions of their character from the notions we have of their conduct, and put such construction thereon as is most in accord with our sentiments; so in our communion with the spiritual world we form our conception of its goodness and nobleness from the goodness and

nobleness of the Cosmos which is the expression thereof, and put such structure or construction thereon as is most in accordance with our ideas of what is good and right.

§ LXXXIII. We form then our views, intellectual and moral, of the character of the unseen from the expression of such revealed to us in the seen, just as we form our views of the intellectual and moral character of a person from his words and acts. And if the Cosmos were completely presented to us, and its significance, morally and intellectually, thoroughly understood, then the character of the spiritual existence of which it is the expression would also be thoroughly understood, and there would be no room for hypothesis, but the mind would have to accept what was presented to it without addition and with all its consequences. But the incompleteness of our knowledge of the Cosmos leaves a vast space void, and this vacancy the mind fills with conjecture, and builds thereon its ideals, framing them so as to satisfy the emotional and æsthetic faculties and win the heart. Thus in the spiritual, as in the physical and psychical revelations, there is scope for the imagination to work, "to adapt the shows of things to the desires of the mind." And these ideals we take on credit; they form our *creeds;* and so *faith* ekes out what is wanting in knowledge, and, like artificial illumination in the absence of the sun, guides and satisfies us when the light of reason is lacking. And the same law holds good with regard to these spiritual ideal conceptions, as with the ideals we form of cosmical goodness and beauty and theories

of cosmical truth. As long as they seem rooted in reality, they fix and attract the heart and satisfy the understanding; but when they are uprooted, they decay; nothing can save them: faith dies. And this further truth also holds good. As their decay is caused by advancing knowledge sapping and destroying the foundations on which they were based, so, from the addition to the known thus derived, there spring up new conceptions, with larger roots, deeper and more firmly planted in reality, that with a further growth replenish the void. As then science advances, and the sphere of the intellect enlarges, all conceptions of the spiritual, all theories or theologies based on erroneous conjecture, necessarily disappear. And with such vanishing conceptions vanish also all ideals of goodness and beauty—all the captivating mythological fancy-work with which the imagination had invested them.

§ LXXXIV. As science advances, therefore, wrong theological notions are necessarily dissipated. But moral progress, as well as intellectual, dissipates illusions. The moral progress of a nation, as of an individual, is, as has been shown, from lower to higher conceptions of what it is right or good to pursue; and as it elevates its aim, its standard of morality rises in proportion, and it ceases to tolerate the mythological conceptions which once it cherished. Thus the Fetish worshipper and the early polytheist were brutal and sensuous, and their mythology was in conformity with the minds in which it was conceived. But as civilisation advanced, and finer and nobler moral conceptions were formed, the polytheistic

mythology grew continually to be more pure and refined in form, and more humane and genial in spirit, up to the time that advancing philosophy had so sapped its foundations that it yielded at once to the assault of Christianity. And the history of monotheism exhibits equally the effect of advancing morality on mythological conception. In the earlier Hebrew records the Deity is represented as breathing vengeance against his enemies, visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, and making use, as a means to induce right conduct, of gross, material motives, addressed to the lower and more animal part of man's nature;—a conception, evidently, of a people having no notion of justice, and conceiving of sensuous and sensual prosperity as the chief good. Afterwards, as enlarged observations showed that the good often suffered in this world and the wicked prospered, the conception altered. The notion of reward and punishment, and of vengeance, was retained; the appeal was still made to low feelings —to fear and self-love; but the period of retribution was postponed until after death, and places of endless suffering and enjoyment were imagined, the former to be eternally the region of punishment for rebellious souls, the latter to be for ever the abode and reward of the obedient. With Christianity a new moral epoch commenced. At a period of spiritual darkness, when there was scarcely any faith in anything, and no creed existed presenting anything satisfactory either to the intellect or to the feelings, a new moral revelation was made to man. A doctrine involving the highest and purest psychi-

cal excellence was taught; the true law underlying all right social conduct laid down; and the teaching, illustrated by a noble life, was sealed by a noble death. And the effect of such teaching was instantaneous moral regeneration. At one spring Humanity rose to a conception of moral beauty and excellence that nothing since has surpassed, and that seems to leave nothing to be added. But the regeneration effected by Christianity was moral, not intellectual; of the heart, not of the head. The teaching appealed most obviously to the morally-æsthetic and emotional feelings; and although truth was recognised as the sole aim, and the right attitude—rectitude or *righteousness*, and the right method—fidelity to the light, were pointed out, yet no positive addition to knowledge was made, no real advance in science. The conceptions of right held up for guidance by the Great Master were based on views to his clear eye and elevated stature discernible enough, but hidden from the narrow horizon and feeble vision of his followers. And the result has been that the old views of the heart and will as innately corrupt and rebellious, of a fall, sin, a curse, and a punishing Deity have been retained, almost to the present hour; and the Christian conceptions have remained suspended in the air, resting on no visible support in fact,—like beautiful visions, deemed incapable of being reduced to practice. Prominently conspicuous in this Christian ideal was the virtue charity. The practice of retaliation—of returning like for like—was pronounced abrogated, and the "new commandment" that men should love one another—should do

good to those from whom they had received injury —was proclaimed. Yet eighteen centuries have passed away, and the obligation remains unrecognised, except in name. The word charity has lost its original noble signification; and men, nominally Christians, go on hating each other, as if Christ had never taught and never died.

Nor could the result under the circumstances have been otherwise. Conduct results from motives; motives depend on notions and conceptions. All evil, when perceived and understood, is hateful. As long as our psychological notions are so incomplete that we can conceive a being, with will free from coercion, and with just perceptions of good and evil, deliberately choosing the evil, we must view such a being as hateful. If such a being could exist (which is impossible) he would be consciously an author of evil—an evil principle. To love that which is hateful is a contradiction in terms; the very least we could desire for such a being would be annihilation. The new moral law, then, which Christianity proclaimed has never yet been carried out, because the grounds on which it rested have never yet been distinctly and generally perceived. The law of the heart is to follow the highest good in sight, and to feel hatred and aversion for the bad. As long therefore as, through ignorance of psychology, the existence of beings is considered possible who, being altogether free and independent of circumstances, could deliberately prefer the bad, such beings must excite in the human heart the sentiment of hatred. This erroneous view of the action of the human will

was left by Christianity untouched. It was no scientific revelation. It gave the world no new intellectual truths, physical or psychical. Nor did it destroy intellectual error which it found. It left the old psychological notions of the natural depravity of the heart, of the innate stubbornness and lawlessness of the will, of evil in the very nature of the soul itself, original and congenital—as it found them; together with the spiritual conceptions of sin, rebellion, a fall, a curse, an avenging God, and eternal punishment, which such notions had given birth to. But it added to the old spiritual conception, conspicuously emblazoned thereon, this one statement: "God is love." On the old garment it placed this new cloth; into the old bottles it poured this new wine. And the issue foreshadowed in the parable has been illustrated by the event. The old bottles have burst. The rent has been made worse. While the moral teaching has produced, on the conduct of the world generally, comparatively small practical results, this one solitary addition to the old spiritual doctrine has—though containing a germ which, like a leaven, is destined by-and-by to leaven and purify the whole lump—in the meantime excited a fermentation which is still going on. The whole history of theological science has been a record of the controversies excited by the presence therein of the discord thus engendered;—controversies so fierce and conducted with such weapons as to amply justify the melancholy prediction of the Great Teacher, that He "came not to send peace on earth, but a sword."

For the conception of the First Cause, as a God of *love*, is manifestly inconsistent with that of a God of *vengeance*. He who taught men the duty of doing good, could He do evil? He who taught the duty of forgiveness, could He not forgive? By no logic are the two conceptions reconcilable. If He, knowing that the soul He was creating would choose evil, yet gave the liberty of choice, where was His goodness? If, on the other hand, He did not know, where was His omniscience? Whichever horn of the dilemma is abandoned necessitates impalement on the other. There is no escape.

Such a dilemma would in any other science than theology cause no difficulty. It would constitute a *reductio ad absurdum*, and would necessitate abandonment of the premises which lead to such absurd conclusion—or, at least, reconsideration of the grounds on which they rest. But this rectification of error which in every other science is the practice, and which is the condition of all true progress, is in theology not permissible. Free inquiry (and inquiry is of little use if it be not free) into the grounds on which any tradition or article of faith which has received the sanction of authority rests, is not permitted to the follower of a creed, and, lest notwithstanding such inquiry should be instituted, and the weakness of the grounds on which some dogma laid down in less enlightened ages rests, should be perceived, it has been the custom with all theological authorities to shroud such questionable dogmas with a veil, and to inscribe thereon the word *mystery*. And not content with this, reason itself—the one

attribute of man which enables him to penetrate into all mysteries, and so to elevate himself from the condition of the brute, and to rise into communion with the Divine—has been placed, by these authorities, under a ban, and Christianity—a light sent from on high to free man's mind from error—has been perverted by their ingenuity into an actual obstacle to progress.

And in order to quiet the demands of the heart which will not put up with negations, and to divert the thoughts from more dangerous contemplations, there has been invented a plentiful supply of forms and ceremonies, of dead symbols and empty formulas; and this sham spiritual nutriment, from which everything capable of giving to the soul either warmth or vigour has been carefully excluded,—these "stones" have been distributed plentifully for food; impossibilities have been required from the heart, and laws imposed upon it contrary to its nature; and the intellect has been trained to see things in false lights and through distorted media. And the result of such interposition of shams between the spiritual region, and the intellect and heart, has been twofold: first, moral depravity; and secondly, spiritual inanition. On the one hand, a race of sceptics and infidels—too acute to be imposed upon—either venting their disgust at the imposition by covert scoffs and sneers at the whole thing, or, worse, concealing their want of faith under the mask of hypocrisy; on the other hand, starved and frigid devotees, with hearts unfired by any kindling conceptions, and intellects warped and perverted by the

noxious processes to which they have been subjected. And when any minds, more noble and less slavish than the rest, have refused to accept such innutritious food and pronounced against such imposition, declaring that such ceremonies were no better in their eyes than the incantations of the Fetish worshipper, and that such conditions could not be complied with by the heart, being at variance with its laws, and therefore, with the will of Him who made that organ and imposed those laws,—then such offending minds have been, for venturing to use their faculties, branded with the words sceptic and atheist, and freely doomed to the

> "ready hell
> Which answers to all doubts so eloquently well."

Christianity, then, has failed to reform mankind, both morally and intellectually, only because the mind has not been free. The elevation of stature to the highest moral conception possible which it indicated would, had the psyche been free to rise, have reformed theology by bringing into view the intellectual grounds on which such moral conception rested; and the old doctrine, its erroneous base once perceived, would have disappeared. But such mental elevation has been prevented by prejudice. The intellectual vision has been bound down to the narrower view and more superficial impression, and the stature has been limited by such bondage. In the early days of the Christian Church—when it was plastic and its creed undefined—progress went on; but as soon as Christianity stiffened into a creed its

vitality was suspended, and from that hour the spiritual revelation has ceased. And though the strife of the contending sects has been fierce and bitter, yet the battle has been fought with fettered links and in a *vicious circle.* But that liberation of the human mind which Christianity has, for the reasons given, failed to effect, has been—or rather, is being—brought about gradually in another way. While these profitless theological controversies have been raging in the dark and obstructed region of the spiritual, a thing destined before long to dispel the darkness and to rectify the confusion which prevails therein, *science*, has been slowly but surely advancing. Science is, as has been already said, perceived truth, revealed to us by reason, the mental light which, reflected from the facts of consciousness to the mental or intellectual eye, enables it to perceive their true nature and relations towards each other, and to form correct notions respecting them. In the absence of the mental light, the intellectual eye is as impotent as the corporeal one would be in the absence of the sensible light. In mental as in physical darkness, we go by feeling and conjecture; we dream and imagine, are frightened by spectres, and mistake fancies for realities. But as the light advances, both in the sensible and in the intellectual region, objects are seen more clearly, and all atmospheric illusions bred of fog and mist—all hobgoblins—are dispelled: we are reassured and walk with confidence. And this further resemblance exists between physical and mental light. As with the former we have it in our power, if we will, to gain a

knowledge of its laws, and, rightly applying such knowledge, to collect and convey it by means of apparatus—borrowed lights and other contrivances—into regions which are hidden from superficial vision—into the interior of the earth, the minute structure of things, the human physical heart and brain—and so penetrate into the depths of the physical Cosmos, and bring to view its secret facts; so we have it equally in our power, if we will, to collect and convey the mental light by logical processes—analogy, hypothesis, inductive and deductive reasoning—and so penetrate to the truths which lie hidden deep in such facts, and bring before our mental view the psychical heart and human mind, and, pursuing the inquiry yet further in the directions to which these point, obtain glimpses of truths deeper still; and thus, extracting truth from its well, transcend from the world of sense to that of thought, and arrive at regions which are directly revealed to no sense. And this mental light further agrees with the physical in that its progress is gradual. At first it is distributed in scant measure, and things are perceived superficially only and confusedly; but, as it advances, they become more distinct, the light seems to penetrate, and we perceive the things thoroughly; and not only the things themselves, but their relations to other things and the grounds on which they rest. They are understood, and *science* begins.

And it follows from this gradual progress of the light, that the most simple things are first understood, and afterwards the more complex, of which these form a part. For when the common element has been

understood, then, by subtracting mentally this, the special can be studied. But until things have been obtained and learnt in their simple forms, they cannot be comprehended in their combinations, as this mental, abstracting, isolating process cannot be performed. Thus in the mineral, matter is presented to us in the inorganic form, and its properties can be studied undisturbed by the organic or vital forces; and, this knowledge having been gained, we are enabled, by abstracting from the phenomena which the vegetable presents the properties which it has in common with the mineral, to obtain in the residue those peculiar to vegetable life. And in the same way with the animal, which, besides presenting phenomena which it has in common with the mineral and the vegetable, has properties peculiar to itself—the phenomena of consciousness;—we are enabled, by a previous acquaintance with the phenomena of mineral and vegetable existence, to abstract these mentally, and isolate and study separately, its phenomena.

The light of science, therefore, necessarily advances from the superficial to the deep; from the simple and general to the complex and special. Of necessity the more simple mineral or inorganic kingdom, the basis of all, must be known before the organic and more complex kingdom of life can be learnt; and this latter again, before the yet more special and complex kingdom of mind. Of necessity, therefore, the march of science is slow, and the rectification of erroneous conceptions based on superficial impressions must be slow in proportion. But, as it advances, this rectification surely, although slowly, takes place;

for mental conceptions based on illusion vanish at once when the real fact appears, as dreams are dissipated by the touch of reality. Hitherto such rectification has been limited to conceptions based on the physical, for the light of science has not yet advanced beyond its limits; but within those limits the rule holds good. From the days of Galileo to those of Lyell and Darwin almost every step of advance in physical science has been attended with corresponding modification of the spiritual conception. With the discovery of the motion of the earth, of its true relations to the other bodies of space, and of the laws which regulate those relations, all spiritual conceptions based on the erroneous notion that the earth was immovable, that the sun moved round and the stars existed for it, have vanished. With the discovery of the gradual formation of the earth by slow change, and of the gradual formation of all species by transitional development, all spiritual conceptions based on the erroneous notion that species are immutable, and that the earth has been made recently and by one act of creation, have disappeared or been modified. And if our spiritual conceptions based on moral notions have not yet been affected, it is because the light of science has not as yet penetrated into the region of the human mind and revealed the psyche that dwells therein, and its relations to the things around it, its laws and springs of action. But the light is now fast entering this psychical region also, brought in by the road of cerebral physiology—and when once the law of the will is recognised—as, if true, recognised it will be—then

will the power of dogmatic authority fail here also. Then will this deadlock in theology, arising from the collision of incompatible doctrines, cease. When once it is perceived that the human mind, like every other natural production, is conditioned and dependent on other things, not absolute and unconditioned—that it is itself an effect, not a first cause—that it moves by law—that its notions and conceptions are its motives—that these are formed by the mental light, and are regulated by the amount of this light which gains access to it—that this light flows from the Giver and Source of all light—and that for its amount the giver and not the recipient is responsible; then from the spiritual conception the dogma of a punishing and avenging Deity will vanish at once; for with what justice can He punish that which He has created and caused to be? Then will theology again satisfy both the theoretic and emotional faculties of man. It will satisfy the former by removing from the spiritual conception every portion incompatible with the divine omniscience; it will satisfy the latter by removing every portion inconsistent with the divine goodness; and head and heart thus at last reconciled, its influence will be re-established.

The scientific necessitarian who has formed a conception of the plan and forces of nature, and of the laws by which such forces act, and according to which such plan is formed; and has further—perceiving unity in the plan and tracing all the forces to one common root—deduced thence the existence of an all-comprehending Intelligence, by which such plan

has been conceived; and of an all-potent creating Will, from which such forces flow; sees that man himself—a part of such plan and a product of such force—has been created and is what he is in accordance with the will of such supreme Intelligence. He perceives that his will and conduct are regulated by the notions of truth and conceptions of good that have been formed in his mind; these again, by his position and opportunities—by the light that has reached him from the persons and things around him; and that all his knowledge, whether much or little, has been provided for him by the universal Providence, the Source of all light and of every motive or motor-force. Such a Being must, *ex-hypothesi*, know everything and conceive everything "that was, that is, and that is to be." He also must be *primarily* responsible and accountable for everything; for whatever man does, "it is God that worketh in him both to *will* and *to do* of His good pleasure;" and to suppose such a Being condemning His own creation would be equivalent to supposing Him casting a reflection on Himself. As everything then proceeds from one Being, and that Being possesses all perfect knowledge and omnipotent will, everything must be what it is in accordance with His will. Further, as every conception of goodness and nobleness that exists in the mind of man is placed there by the will of God, they must exist also in the mind of God. But He has put into the mind of man, as his highest conception of moral good, the duty of doing good to his fellow-men, and He has given him the faculty of sympathy, and has imparted to the exercise of this

faculty the highest pleasure as an incitement to its exercise. He has also given the power of understanding, so that, by the use of such power, the exercise of sympathy may be possible; and has made the heart and will capable and under the necessity of acknowledging and responding to the obligation when imposed upon them. It is evident therefore that He also must possess perfectly this faculty which man possesses imperfectly; and that He must be a God of understanding and of sympathy; and—what follows from sympathy—of love; and that He must be under the obligation—an obligation belonging to Him by the laws of His own nature—of doing good. Also, as He has imposed on man the duty of attending to the things around him, and of avoiding sins either of omission or commission—of manifesting rectitude—He, too, must manifest this quality, and be a God of righteousness. And of a Being with such attributes, the work must be perfect also: perfect both in conception and in execution. Either, then, existing things are, in every respect, right—either good in themselves or leading to good—or there has been *failure*, either in conception or in execution. But this last hypothesis involves a contradiction in the theory. Therefore the mind of the necessitarian who admits all the foregoing premises, must also admit the conclusion, *that whatever is is right; that in creation there is no evil.* The scientific psychologist, then, discerning that mind itself is, like the forms of matter, a product of antecedents, an effect proceeding from causes and conditioned by circumstances, perceives that everything is what it

is of necessity. To his mind creation presents itself as one great plan, divided into three portions, the past, the present, and the future. (Note N.) The past is rolled up; the present is being rolled up, and becoming a portion of the past; the future is rolled up, but is being unrolled and becoming the present. The present is the result of the past; it proceeds from it as a spring flows from its source, or a tree from its root. And it itself contains within it the future; as a bud contains the undeveloped flower, and this the fruit and seed. All the elements and forces which compose and produce the future lie in it, just as those which produce it were contained in the past. The past then, having existed and gone, is unalterable; and, the present being an existing fact and also unalterable, it follows that the future is already ordained and unalterable; and that if a mind could comprehend thoroughly and contain all the past and present, it would also be able to comprehend perfectly and predict the future: the forces in action being known, with their laws and the existing conditions, the future would be deducible. In the present, then, are all the materials out of which the future is to be formed; and in it exist, either stored up potentially or in actual operation, all the forces which constitute the formative power. Pre-eminent among these constituents of the present is the human mind, with its capabilities and forces—its perceiving and conceiving powers, and its will-force—its power of setting in action its will, and of expressing and producing its conceptions, and so giving birth to the future. This will-force which, existing in every human being,

affects and influences so largely his individual future, and to some extent that of the whole human race collectively, is itself set in action by other forces existing in the present and arising from the past. Man himself is a product of the past. His body is the result of physiological laws, and its type is determined by the stock from which it has sprung. And his mind is determined by a bodily organ, his brain. On the qualities and powers of this organ depend his mental capabilities—his intellectual range and capacity, his imaginative power, and the energy and force of his character. Thus endowed and equipped by nature, he is launched—by forces springing from the past—on his appointed course; and the direction in which he proceeds depends on the forces from his surroundings which are impelling him. Highest and most potent of all these forces is the mental light, reason. Descending from on high, this light is diffused on every side, on his physical and psychical surroundings—on the things of his sense and on his fellow-men—penetrating to their very thoughts and hearts, and revealing to him everywhere germs of beauty and goodness, together with their opposites; and so instructing him what to pursue and what to avoid. And if he has, through the training of the past, learnt to walk by that light, and to consult it always, then such a man is obeying the law of right; his will-force is tending in the direction of good, and if through ignorance (insufficient light) he err, he soon, by the use of reason, discovers his error and retraces his steps. Such a man may have to encounter misfortune and

to suffer calamity from the wrong disposition and the disorder existing in the things and persons around him, arising from causes which he cannot control; but his efforts have tended in the right direction and the outcome of his life is good. If, on the other hand, he has not been taught by the lessons of the past to consult his reason, then he is altogether at the mercy of circumstances, and the strongest that attract his attention rule him: he either follows the first attractive object that presents itself, or else being inclined by past habit unduly in some direction, is influenced only by some particular class of objects, and disregards altogether the claims of the rest on his attention. Such a man of necessity acts wrong. The wrong habit and training which he has derived from past influences preventing him from seeing things in their true light, he is guilty at every step of sins either of omission or commission. The outcome of his conduct is bad. From the different past moral experience and training, then, of men—their past history—arise the wrangling and discord that mankind at present exhibits. One set of men (the few) adopting one attitude, uprightness; and following one light, reason; and one object, right; the others pursuing various objects, according to their different inclinations, and so producing a number of conflicting forces;—disagreement and contention exist of necessity. For of necessity, men following partial inclinations and various objects must cross each other's paths, and run against and come into collision with each other. But when by the correction and rectification they have received in the

course of events, they have learnt the necessity of practising uprightness and exercising self-control, and, united by one harmonious bond of fellowship, walk straight and in the one right direction, then this contention and disorder will cease. Men will not, then, walk harmoniously and rightly until they have been trained. And the training itself comes of necessity. The trainers of a man are his circumstances. The man who walks without due consideration for the persons and things amongst which he moves, violates their nature constantly, and receives from them, sooner or later, correction and chastisement. The man, on the other hand, who pays due attention to his surroundings, acts—so far as he understands such—in accordance with their nature, and, so far as his own conduct is concerned, is at peace with them, and receives from them good. He may suffer from *their* wrong conduct, but this only tends to confirm him in his right course. If he has rightly understood them and given them their due, he sustains from them, in this respect, no injury. Thus there is in the very nature of things a correcting influence, acting on the side of right. And although it is true that this influence acts so slowly as to be almost imperceptible; that a large number of men seem never to have profited by it at all, and none thoroughly; and that those who have benefited by it die and depart, while those who arrive and take their place have to learn the lesson afresh; yet this correcting influence is making ground, and must of necessity ultimately triumph. The truths perceived by lofty intellects, who have made use of their reason,

are handed down by them to inferior men, and, diffused among the crowd, become common property.

The duty of making use of reason with regard to *things* is becoming generally recognised, and by degrees the true nature of such is being discerned; and when the same duty towards *persons* (the duty to our neighbour) is equally admitted and acted upon, then accurate knowledge will be arrived at respecting them also. Then will progress become more orderly and steady, and the march of humanity be like that of a disciplined army—not of a tumultuous, quarrelsome rabble. That which is due from the elevated and lofty to the lowly, from the strong to the weak—enlightenment and help—will be afforded, and misunderstandings and contention cease. The necessitarian, then, perceives a moral Cosmos evolving by natural laws and the action of psychical forces out of a moral Chaos, just as the physical Cosmos has evolved or rather is still evolving, by the action of physical laws and forces, from a physical Chaos; and he traces all the forces, both physical and psychical, to the will-force of the One Great First Cause, and sees that they are all acting of necessity and in the direction of right. "*Οἱ κύβοι Διὸς ἀεὶ εὐπίπτουσι*," says Plato—"the dice of God always fall propitiously,"—are always loaded on the side of right. There is no *chance* in the development of the universe. To the mind of the scientific necessitarian, every force and event is in its result right; it either corrects imperfection or furthers progress.

The scientific necessitarian, then, from the unity of plan which he perceives in the Cosmos, from the unity of force to which all events can be traced, and from the unity of purpose to which they all seem to be tending, is compelled by the mental law which renders him unable to form a notion of *plan* without the conception of a contriving Intelligence—of *force*, without the conception of a mental Source—or of *purpose*, without that of a maintaining Will,—to infer the existence of a universal Mind as the great First Cause of everything. Such a Mind, conceiving *all* things, must be all-comprehensive, *omniscient;* being the source of *all* force, it must be omnipotent; and the aim and purpose of all such forces being, *ex-hypothesi*, in the direction of perfect good, it must be *all-benevolent.* And his faith in these conclusions will be in exact proportion to his faith in their premises. If he is certain of these latter, he is certain also of the former, and rests securely on such support. And as such certain knowledge enters his mind, all preconceived notions inconsistent therewith are dissipated, and all false theory vanishes. The notion of a vengeful, cursing Creator, punishing a wretched helpless creature, disappears at once; together with all the unhealthy fancies it has engendered. And, with these unfounded beliefs, vanish also the difficulties which beset the theologian, who feels himself bound—by the bonds of authority—to such false theory. The necessitarian, whose mind science has rendered free, can therefore reconcile in his spiritual conception the doctrines of all-knowledge and all-goodness without doing violence to the laws of logic;

to him the claims of the head and the heart are satisfied, and theology, become a logical science, need no longer shrink from the light of criticism. But he who believes that the will is conditioned by laws and determined by motives, equally with him who holds that it acts absolutely and spontaneously, has need of faith to eke out his imperfect knowledge. Standing on a higher platform and commanding a larger view, he has, it is true, dispelled a host of unsubstantial phantoms, creatures of the imagination, but it is only to encounter other difficulties which at first sight seem substantial enough. It is easy for the free mind to get rid of any amount of fancies based on pure hypothesis, but how are deductions from very evident facts to be disposed of? The imaginary hell of the theologian may be banished from *thought*, but how is the actual evil of existence—the too often very real hell of life—to be removed from *fact?* For if God is the author of everything, then He is the author of existing evil as well as of existing good; and, if so, how reconcile this with benevolence? This difficulty, which the believer in absolute human responsibility does not so directly encounter, must be met by the Necessitarian. Either evil does not exist, or God, the author of everything, is its author, and is not therefore, according to this creed, good. Unless this difficulty is faced adequately, nothing has been gained by the Necessitarian: on the contrary, everything has been lost; even hope. For if evil exist, then a Being who had it in His power to do good, has done wrong, and has done it knowingly and wilfully; and is therefore, on the

principles which have been laid down, wilfully criminal.

But when we reflect on the broad facts of life—on its shortness and uncertainty—and on the certainty of death;—on the liability to bodily pain and privation;—on the necessity of toil, with care and anxiety, its attendants, dogging our steps;—our senses offended and disgusted by physical discords and dissonances — our feelings lacerated and understandings outraged by those whom we call our *kind*:—by their stupidities and follies; their falsehoods and dishonesties; their unkindness, meanness, brutalities, and baseness; their ingratitudes and perfidies; their thoughtlessness, frivolities, and fickleness;—on our own sorrows and disappointments; the failure of noble aspirations; the dispersion of illusions; the death, or worse, the alienation of friends; on the humiliation and mortification, the shame and remorse, caused by our own errors and shortcomings; the worthlessness of what we have pursued; the value of what we have neglected;—on the defeat of right and the triumph of wrong;—when we reflect on these facts, to maintain in the face of such the non-existence of evil would seem to be indeed a hopeless undertaking. Yet, unless this thesis can be maintained, the necessitarian has by his doctrine gained nothing: there is an inconsistency in creation: the Being who has impressed on us the duty of goodness and rectitude is Himself neither good nor righteous; for He who inflicts gratuitous injury cannot be good: and so the theological dilemma remains, or rather, the impalement has occurred. Nor can the con-

clusion be evaded by any theory of compensation. The doctrine of compensation, representing man and his Maker in the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant, will not avail; and still less that other doctrine which we sometimes hear of, that the amount of evil is pretty equally distributed. It is no compensation to a generous mind, but an aggravation of its misery, to be told that all suffer equally.

The doctrines, then, of necessity and of the existence of evil, present or future, are incompatible: they are propositions mutually destructive. Nothing has been gained by the removal from our creed of prospective evil, if evil exist as a fact, actual and present. Now this thesis of the non-existence of evil as a fact can be maintained. It will be found on examination that existing ideas about evil are as superficial and inaccurate as the popular notions about the will are. As inquiry once instituted establishes the doctrine of law and direction respecting the human will, so does it dissipate our wrong notions respecting evil, and prove that in matters relating to and concerning human welfare there is also law and right direction, and that the laws which regulate both are in accordance with the conception of the existence of an all-wise and all-good Ruler.

Before instituting an inquiry respecting the existence of a thing, it is manifestly very desirable to have a clear notion of what we are inquiring about. Let us therefore inquire what we mean by this word *evil*. Evil is the opposite of good; and good is that which, either directly as an immediate result of its

action, or indirectly through the medium of other things, benefits or tends to perfect something else. Now the best that could happen to anything is that it should attain perfection—be perfectly developed; whatever, therefore, promotes the perfection of a thing is, as far as that thing is concerned, a good. Further; the perception of goodness implies the existence of a perceiving mind—of a mind to whose perceptions the effects produced, or in course of being produced, are agreeable. Goodness, then, is a quality which has reference to the mind of the perceiver, and is necessarily a relative term only, its meaning varying with the varying conceptions of goodness that exist in different minds. Did a mind exist capable of understanding a thing completely, both in itself and in its consequences—its what and its whither—so as to perceive the whole of the results that flow from it to their extreme termination, and also with conceptions of goodness adequate to form judgments thereon, then such a mind could pronounce absolutely whether such thing were good or not; but such not being the case, we can only pronounce whether things appear good or otherwise with reference to our limited perceptions and conceptions. If the results a thing produces appear, as far as we can see, in accordance with our notions of goodness, we call it good; if we cannot see the goodness we withhold from it that epithet; and if they appear to be in opposition to our notions of good, then we are compelled to pronounce them evil.

Accepting, then, for our premiss this criterion of goodness, that what appears in its results—looking

as far as we can see—to be desirable must be, to the mind contemplating it, good; and that what appears to be bringing about undesirable results must be, relatively to the mind contemplating it, evil; let us see, whether, on the doctrine of necessity, there is anything in the aspect of creation which justifies us in concluding that evil exists. That the *disagreeable* exists is but too certain. Disagreeable sensations and perceptions, disagreeable ideas and emotions, discomfort—mental and bodily—are notorious facts. Also *wrong* exists. Physical and psychical things in a wrong order—in an order producing, directly or indirectly, results more or less in disagreement with our feelings and ideas—are so abundant that they may almost be said to be the rule rather than the exception. We call such things "wrong" and "disagreeable," because they produce in us suffering, either mental or bodily. Is *suffering* then evil? Does it in its remote and ultimate effects, as far as we can see, tend to bring about a desirable condition of things, both to Humanity collectively and to the individual, or does it not? that is the question. If the facts that appear permit us to answer this question affirmatively in both respects, then suffering is a good, and there is no ground for charging the Cosmos with evil. If, on the other hand, they fail in either, then suffering is an evil; for its immediate effects are unquestionably undesirable.

The proposition that suffering tends to bring about desirable results in Humanity collectively is easy to prove. It is easy to show, looking at Humanity as a whole, that the existence of wrong in

the Cosmos is the condition of all progress, whether physical or moral. If surrounding physical things had harmonised exactly from the first with our sensuous and sensual nature, we should have rested satisfied therewith; there would have been no unsatisfied desires stimulating to inquiry; and no advance in physical knowledge would have occurred, or notions and conceptions of physical beauty and goodness been formed. The intellect would not have been informed, nor the taste cultivated; and neither head nor heart been improved: our æsthetic, emotional, and theoretic faculties would not have been called into play—perhaps would not have been formed. We should have remained animal. So also, if moral wrong had never existed—if from the first we had been so constituted as either not to be dependent for our happiness on our fellow-men, or, being dependent on them, their ideas and sentiments had been entirely in accord with our own, then these would have stagnated; there would have been no necessity for studying our neighbours; and there would have been no advance, intellectually or morally. But disagreement provokes contest; judgments are formed, and, by the law of natural selection, the fittest—that which fits most and is most in accord with the facts of the Cosmos, and is therefore the best possible at the time—conquers and survives; and so moral progress is secured.

Wrong, then, whether physical or moral, is, with reference to man collectively, the condition of progress. The forces of nature are weighted on the side of right. Pain, privation, and disagreement are

chastening influences, compelling men to use their reason and to fulfil their duties to their physical and psychical surroundings; and it is by their influence, that conceptions of beauty and utility, of moral nobleness and social goodness, and of physical and psychical truth—in short, of all that ennobles man—are formed. By their means Humanity collectively emerges out of the Animal and learns to understand the Cosmos—its beauty, order, and goodness—and to form spiritual conceptions and learn moral duty and obedience to law.

But that which is the root and source of every good cannot be evil. Pain, want, sorrow, and physical and social disagreements, cannot therefore be, to Humanity at large, evils; as they are the conditions of the greatest goods. But to affirm that physical and moral wrong contribute to the progress of man individually, and are therefore for him good, is a different proposition, and one more difficult to maintain. In the face of the every-day facts of life—some lives cut short in infancy before any mental life can have commenced—others one long record of mental and bodily suffering—the body wounded and torn by accident, or worn and wasted by pain, disease, and want—the mind the subject of afflictions and calamities yet more exquisite and agonising—the intellect befooled by its own perceptions, its false notions, and erroneous conceptions—the soul lacerated by sorrow and disappointment, or convulsed by passion—the feelings outraged by brutality and insolence, or cut to the quick by unkindness; smarting from injustice, or consumed by shame and remorse—the

will enslaved by vice, paralysed by doubt, or distracted by contending emotions—the powers weakened—the creed failing—the heart broken—the understanding demented—in the face of these every-day facts to assert that suffering is a good to man individually is a strong proposition, and one the truth of which, in every case at any rate, it would be hardly safe to undertake to demonstrate.

Yet *this* may be asserted—that we know that *often* it is, while we can *never* say in any case that it is not. Whenever *all* the facts respecting a thing or an event are in our possession—its what and its whither—we see that it is good. In the cases that have been alluded to the consequences are for the most part hidden from our observation, and all we can say is that the evidence is negative, that the good is not manifest. The infant whose stream of life flashes on our consciousness like an electric spark, and then returns to the great reservoir; the self-destroyer who deserts his post and flies

"Anywhere, anywhere, out of the world;"

the maniac whose mental eye is blinded, and whose psyche is left imprisoned in the darkened chamber of the mind, a prey to dreams and phantoms;—of the future of such we know nothing. All that we know is that a brain has given way—that the physical instruments of the mind have been unequal to the struggle with the circumstances; that a heart has broken, a psyche been prostrated—that on which it leant for support having failed it; in the case of the infant, that a soul has touched at a port, bound possibly elsewhere. But from these cases,

and such as these, we learn also this: that there must be for all these cases a future, or God is not good. The lesson derived from our personal consciousness that we are individually and psychically indivisible, and therefore, in accordance with physical analogy, indestructible and immortal, is corroborated by our moral reason. Either there must be a future for every one, and what is hid from us is good, or else the Omnipotent Creator, in endowing such beings with life, has inflicted on them intolerable wrong. But the latter alternative must be rejected, being both abhorrent to our feelings and at variance with all the facts of our moral nature. We are therefore bound by the strongest law of our nature, our sense of right, to believe in immortality. There is no scientific truth more certain than this; since a deduction from moral facts is quite as certain as any deduction from physical facts can be. The existence, then, of wrong—of suffering acting without producing evident good fruit, as in the instances given above—requires for its justification, and compels our belief in, the existence of a future state. And if to such conclusion we are impelled by the facts given above, in which the suffering which is exhibited would be purposeless on any other view, still more strongly are we forced to it by that other class of facts where suffering in the form of correction or chastisement is withheld when due—when men die, steeped to saturation in every vice and blackened by every crime; with consciences callous, hearts untouched, and every desire apparently gratified,

"With all their imperfections on their heads."

Such cases must be referred—like those in which suffering has not been justified, as far as we can see, by the result—to the category of imperfectly comprehended facts. We infer, from analogy and from the major premiss arrived at by the reasoning already given, that *all* is good; that the subsequent history, could it be seen, would rectify the apparent inequality or *iniquity*. We believe that, in this latter class of cases, the discipline that is due and that has been withheld will be inflicted; and that, in the former class of cases, the fruit of that which has been administered will be manifested.

And thus faith is strengthened by the fact that whenever we *can* trace individual suffering to its fruit, such fruit *is* good to that individual. Adversity develops mankind individually as well as collectively. The struggle with surrounding things sharpens the intellect and stimulates the conceiving faculty. Conceptions are formed of a loftier kind, and the contemplation thereof elevates the psyche and withdraws it from the mean and ignoble things which immediately encircle it. And in the pursuit of such, the character is strengthened by the vigorous exercise of the will and courage, and resolution and fortitude imparted. Conceptions of manliness and virtue may be inculcated by education, but they can only be developed by actual life and its experiences. That physical and moral wrong teach circumspection, vigilance, and rectitude, and that these are liberating influences leading to nobleness, and to knowledge of beauty, goodness, and truth, and to correct conceptions of duty and of right, these are propositions

that have already been pointed out and may here be taken for granted. On such subjects, a man's direct knowledge is limited to his own personal experience, and to a few casual and imperfect observations on others. Probably most would admit, if they were candid, that disappointment in obtaining their objects has procured for them often greater good than success could; and we all admit plentifully that those around us are or would be benefited in various ways by chastisement or correction in some form—that the bad should be purified or punished (the meaning of the two words is identical)—although we fail to see the desirability of the application of such process to ourselves: but the difficulty is when the good suffer and the bad triumph; as is so commonly the case. When the psyche has already surrendered itself to the law of duty and the heart is set on right, that suffering or liability thereto should continue seems, at first sight, gratuitous and unjust: yet, that it does so and must in the nature of things, is plain. Nay, more: in proportion to the rectitude and elevation of the psyche, in the same proportion must be the liability to suffering—as long as evil exists. So Plato taught: and to the reality and intensity of such suffering the tremendous utterance on Calvary of Him who was perfectly just clearly testifies; yet even here, to those whose vision is elevated sufficiently high, goodness is dimly perceptible. That process by which the soul is a permanent gainer cannot be an evil one. Now there is ground for believing that affliction—the infliction of suffering (*affligo*, strike, afflict)—may be a good even to a man striving to do right. Every

blow which strikes that to which a person is attached appears to such person to be an evil; and, if his heart be altogether set upon it, it is to such person evil in the highest degree: it destroys what seems to him the chief object of existence. If, on the other hand, what is struck be not that on which his heart chiefly rests, he is not upset by such blow. His support remaining unshaken, he sustains the infliction with fortitude, and, although he may feel acutely, is not vitally injured. That which he considers good still remains to him, and life therefore is not evil. Now the blows of fate cannot strike the immortal spirit, but only the mortal crust of self with which it is begirt. Every woe that the human mind can conceive falls on the mortal side of man's nature—on his sensations, affections, and passions—his corporeal and mental attachments; and if his heart is set on such, he not only suffers but is overthrown by such blows, and calls them evil. But the man whose case we are considering, being good, has adopted the habit of rectitude. His heart is detached from personal and selfish surroundings and set on right, and therefore he cannot be upset, because his ground of support cannot be shaken, and, whatever befall, his object remains to him; for, under all circumstances, the way of right is open to a man. He suffers, it is true, for he cannot disconnect himself from attachments; but if his heart is firmly fixed on right, he remains unshaken. His faith in right and hope remains to him, and, perceiving that what is struck is transient and temporal, he rests on that which is permanent, and is unmoved. Even the

sorrow that sympathy awakens in him will shake him not; for the same grounds that support him in his own affliction enable him to bear that of others. If, however, he be not thoroughly upright, but is inclined in any direction, he is in danger of falling; and the more so in proportion to the inclination. The heart of the thoroughly good man is therefore safe from injury from the persons and things around him. He is not at the mercy of circumstances. "It is impossible," said Socrates, "that a bad man can hurt a good man"—injure vitally his heart. According to the view, therefore, that the object of life is the development and perfection of the soul, worldly calamity, while a benefit to the wrongly-inclined, is no injury to the rightly-disposed man, and it may be to him also a good. There is a passive virtue which endures that is even of a higher quality than the active one which achieves. Man is called upon not only to act, but to suffer in the cause of right,—to endure the inevitable; and to develop the power of such endurance, suffering, even to the rightly-disposed, may be requisite. Such suffering tests the *integrity* of the mind—the strength and sincerity of its convictions, and, by calling forth its passive powers of endurance—by developing the great virtue fortitude—may correct any lingering weakness, and further the development of the soul. Then, and then only, when man has learnt to bear the inevitable without repining and accusing fate, will patience—suffering—"have worked out her perfect work."

The process by which adversity frees the soul

from its attachments to its surroundings, and raises it to its proper height, may be likened to the work of a sculptor in freeing the statue, when in the rough, from *its* surroundings. The soul exists wrapt in its mortal envelope of selfish attachments, a conception of the Divine Artist potentially perfect, just as the statue potentially exists in its marble envelope, an immortal conception of the genius of *its* artist. And in both cases, force, applied by the artist, is necessary; and in the case of the soul, suffering accompanies each blow; for, as the soul develops by its own active will, such suffering is necessary as the moving influence or motive to rouse the will into action. Nor is the work ended when, by successive blows, each selfish attachment has been severed, and the immortal conception, separated from the earthy bonds which held and obscured it, and elevated by the hand of the Artificer, stands erect and free; for, in each case, there must be an adequate support to sustain it—in the case of the statue, a pedestal—in the case of the soul, a creed—and what is true of the soul is true also of its creed. It also, if it is to rightly perform its function and support the soul, must be upright and well-balanced; be freed from all one-sided attachments, and rest firm on solid ground, not on frail and uncertain supports deduced from and depending on untrustworthy premises. Further, as the soul is an organism, increasing in stature and development, and so resembling in this respect the tree rather than the statue, it is requisite for it that its creed, which is to it its root, should, like the root of the tree, have ample room and freedom, so that it

may expand in every direction, commensurately with the growth and expansion of the soul. For both psyche and statue, then—to revert to the original simile—it is necessary that, purified and freed from all external attachments, they should be firmly poised, each on well-grounded supports, the heart or centre gravitating to neither side, but lying in a right line with the great centre of attraction: in the case of the statue, the centre of the physical world; in the case of the psyche, the Great Universal Spirit to which all things, both physical and psychical, gravitate. As long as there is inclination, both psyche and statue must be unsteady, tottering, and liable to be shaken by every vibration propagated from without. Not until each is severed from its surroundings, and freed from all restrictions proceeding thence, will it be safe.

Adversity, then, is an elevating process, raising the soul from the grovelling, animal condition which seems to be its primitive form of existence, and fixing it in that position which it is destined to fill, and for which its faculties are fitted. Under the hand of the Afflictor, the soul, the lower ties being severed, rises to within the influence of the higher motives. And it is not until perfect rectitude has been obtained, and all inclination removed, that the proper function of adversity is completed. Then, and not till then, is the soul fit for the calm, serene atmosphere of prosperity. And it is noteworthy that this is true both of the statue and of the soul. Prosperity is the test of perfection. When the elevating hand of the artificer has been removed,

every prop taken away, and the work, psyche or statue, left to itself, then, if the heart be in its right place and the foundation adequate, it remains firm, supported by its own inherent powers—in the case of the psyche, its own free-will; but if there be deviation of the heart from the line of right, then it falls out of its place, and comes again under the afflicting hand of the Chastener.

Prosperity and adversity, then, are neither of them evils, but are rather conditions by which the perfection of the psyche is reached and secured. Not until, through suffering and affliction, the soul has been raised superior to fate, and been taught to exercise moderation and self-control, and so to maintain itself in the state of rectitude, is safety or "salvation" for it accomplished.

By adversity, then, both uprightness is produced and the growth of that spiritual conception which constitutes a man's creed promoted. In producing the former result it necessarily brings about the latter also. To stand upright, a support for the feet is requisite, and this support must be adequate. Now in the passage of the psyche from infancy to adolescence, the mental sphere or mind-cell which it occupies increases in capacity with the growth of experience, just as its corporeal frame enlarges by the introduction and assimilation of food from without; and it itself must expand and develop in proportion, to accommodate itself to its enlarged range of ideas, and adequately command and avail itself of them. And it is evident that, so developed, it must, when raised from its immediate surroundings

and elevated to its full height, require for its support a creed or spiritual conception broader and of larger dimensions than that which sufficed for the narrow and limited ideas of its infancy.

The creed, then, of its early infancy is necessarily unable to support the more mature psyche under adversity. In such creed it perceives at once that many things are based on erroneous notions, and that a large proportion had no basis whatever in fact; and that of the whole amount, only a comparatively few on investigation remain undisturbed and reliable. But for the soul to be safe it is necessary that what supports it should rest on the absolute and unchangeable. If it rest on anything but truth—on any conjecture or temporary prop based not on solid, immutable fact, but on fallacy—then such prop will sooner or later give way. As soon as the adverse facts appear, the fallacy will be dissipated. The creed, being unfounded in fact, will be no longer trustworthy. Under the pressure of adversity it will break down, and the psyche be prostrated and helpless.

That the soul may be perfectly safe under all circumstances, it is necessary then that a due proportion exist between its perceptions and its conceptions—that its conceptions of the spiritual and unknown correspond with its perceptions of the actual and known. And, to preserve this proportion, it must be vigilant to observe the facts as they come into view, and to supply the deficiencies in its creed by broader and more certain conceptions. If this attitude be maintained, it will be preserved from surprise, and overcome by no sudden blow.

For a man then to support adversity, he must himself be adequately supported by his creed; its conceptions must correspond to the facts of life. And it follows that the smallest and narrowest minds are supported by the narrowest creeds. As the mental sphere enlarges, and the psyche rises in proportion to command the whole intellectual horizon, the broader and more massive the support it requires. Advancing minds are therefore *necessarily* dissatisfied with existing creeds. These propositions are amply borne out by experience. Every creed can produce its martyrs—the lowest and most degraded the most numerous. The fanatic is usually narrow-minded. On the other hand, the despairing cry wrung forth by the death-agony on Calvary has been reiterated by many a soul prostrated by the break-down of its creed under the pressure of calamity.

In saying that a man's creed to be adequate must be true, what is meant is, that it must be truth *to him*. It must not be contradictory to his perceptions of fact. The creed of the best informed man is based in great measure on error—on false hypothesis—and necessarily must be so, while knowledge is incomplete. But as long as the falseness of the hypothesis is not perceived, the creed stands firm. As soon, however, as the true facts come into view—the fallacy on which it rests is detected: it supports him no longer; it is no longer a thing to be trusted—a *creed*. Further, it must be added, a creed in supporting a man under the blows of affliction does not operate by producing in him apathy.

Every man belongs to a community of other men, to each and all of whom he is bound by ties varying in strength and kind—by the strong and immutable natural ties of sympathy and affection, as by the artificial and conventional ones of social law. By these obligations the community is held together, each giving and receiving support; and in proportion to the degree in which the mutual support is accorded, life is made easier to every one, and the comfort of each is increased. Such ties constitute the happiness of life, and their want is felt by the upright man who rests on his creed as keenly as by him who relies entirely on them. Their severance cuts him to the quick, and the nearer and closer the tie, the deeper the laceration. He remains erect, it is true, but he stands isolated; and isolation is not happiness. Theoretic considerations cannot take away feeling, or make one mourner weep the less. In moments of agony, when the eye is suffused by emotion, such considerations may be altogether lost sight of, and the psyche be shaken to its centre, but with the dispersion of the mist the vision again becomes clear; they are again perceived; faith returns, and calm and equilibrium are restored. Neither does adversity, in cutting off from a man the support he receives from his surroundings and throwing him on his own resources, release him from his obligations to others; on the contrary, it increases their force. Uprightness multiplies the social bonds which bind a man, by bringing into view circumstances and considerations from which inclination had withdrawn him, and which, when

seen, operate on his mind as restraining and compelling forces. A creed is necessary to salvation it is true, but in this life, as much as in that which is to come, the salvation which it affords is required. And this salvation consists in the safe elevation it affords him on which, firmly planted, he may—not grovel abjectly, but stand erect and safe in the war with wrong, fulfil all his duties to his surroundings, and bear the inevitable. A creed, then, to serve a man in adversity, should elevate him above it, not lower him. It should be—not a pit of concealment but a tower of defence, elevated on which he is enabled to survey rightly his surroundings, and, perceiving his connections with his fellow-men—his *kin*—obey the law of kindred—*kindness*. Such a creed teaches a man, instead of selfishly seeking his own good in another world, to seek the good of others in this; to seek to realise here the true kingdom of heaven—the reign of right; to return good for evil; and to lose sense of his own in the sight of others' woe.

The ascetic who wrongs nature, the devotee who conceals and ignores her, hiding natural feeling under a veil and shutting out the world by artificial barriers—whether they be the physical ones of the conventual walls, or the moral ones of the forms and formulas of a factitious piety—these stoop to their creeds—creeds scarcely less lowering to the soul than the inanimate idols before which the fetish-worshipper grovels. In the hope to fit themselves for a nobler and better world they resort to methods which unfit them even for this; for the conventional forcing houses, in which it is attempted to rear souls, produce seldom

anything much better than self-conscious valetudinarians, or, yet more odious, self-complacent spiritual hypocrites. Cut off from the access of the food which is its nourishment—knowledge, the psyche, under such pernicious hygiene, languishes; its growth is arrested, and it becomes colourless, attenuated, feeble, puny, torpid; until, roused by adversity, it wakes up to a perception of the worthlessness of that to which it trusted, and seeks a firmer footing on some more solid foundation.

The right creed to sustain a man in this life and fit him for another is neither a platform for the display of fantastic antics, nor a covert to hide in, but a foundation to support him in his conflict with wrong. It saves him—not against suffering, but against evils that damage the soul worse—against wilful error or sin; against cowardice, meanness, falseness, hypocrisy, and every baseness;—not against physical tortures in another world, which only a perverted mind could imagine, and only a base one fear. The soul that has once learned to love right has ceased to hope or fear for itself. It has lost the narrower in the wider object, and exclaims, in the spirit of the great revolutionary leader, "Let me perish so that right be done!" Strengthened and disciplined in the battle of life—in the eternal struggle with wrong—it is developed and perfected, and fitted for immortality. "*Sic itur ad astra.*"

There is good ground then for believing, that both for the individual and for the race, suffering is good; that the blows of adversity, falling on and detaching the mortal parts of our nature, reveal thereby and

develop the immortal; and that thus humanity, individually and collectively, is severed from its low inclinations and elevated to its proper height. Thus the doctrine of necessity—that doctrine which teaches that immutable law and order reign everywhere—in the psychical Cosmos as well as in the physical—and traces everything and every event to the will of the First Cause, and makes it *ultimately* responsible for everything—for suffering as well as for happiness—involves no conclusions incompatible with the essential attributes of such First Cause. To the scientific psychologist, who sees that suffering and wrong are productive in the long-run of good results—that they are in fact the conditions by which the highest good is achieved—they cannot appear evil. Evil, to him, no more exists than chance, both being merely expressions of human ignorance and short-sightedness. He sees that what is called evil has produced and is producing good; that physical evil produces physical good by stimulating the understanding and opening the mind to the light of truth, and quickening in it conceptions of physical goodness;—that moral evil leads to moral good in the same manner;—and lastly, that our powerlessness to bring forth and realise in this world such conceptions produces spiritual good, by directing the eye to the spiritual region, and teaching us our relations to it, and the true goal and aim of life. The psychologist, then, who has recognised the true law of the will is able to accept without difficulty the moral revelation of Christianity; for he perceives the ground on which it is based. The advance of science has

brought him to a stand-point at which what was present to the capacious mind and noble nature of the Great Master is by him also perceived, and there is perceptible by him both the moral view and the intellectual grounds of which it is the corollary. The doubts and perplexities which the contradictions involved in the doctrine of spontaneous volition occasion have for him no existence. He perceives that "all things work together for good," and that the blows of fate always fall right.

But the wider the circle of knowledge, the larger is the circumference of haze; and if the necessitarian, standing on a higher eminence and seeing further, has got rid of some of the difficulties that belong to creeds based on the opposite view, yet other difficulties remain, and some peculiar to himself spring up. *His* view presents also phenomena which his reason is inadequate to explain. Their what, whence, and whither, not being clearly perceived, they are not understood; and the spiritual conception is necessarily incomplete, and must depend in some measure on conjecture. Admitting that intellectual and moral perception is arrived at by the road of suffering, the question remains unanswered, Why? Why should that road be selected when to Omnipotence it would seem that all others must be open? Why were affections given us to be wounded, senses to be offended, hopes to be disappointed, enthusiasm to be chilled, trust to be betrayed? Why were we not made perfect at once without the baptism of suffering? Was there no other way to such goal than over road like this? Either there

was not, or the Author of creation is not supreme, either in power or in goodness. To such questions there seems to the present writer but one answer:—It is a mystery—a mystery which will perhaps hereafter be solved, as other mysteries have been. Advancing knowledge may in the future solve this problem, as it has solved other problems in the past. We know that the essence of some perfections consists in the existence and experience of their opposites. None enjoy health like those who have been afflicted with sickness; none security, like those who have suffered from apprehension. To appreciate beauty properly, one must have made the acquaintance of ugliness; to value goodness, one must have felt unkindness. The joy of victory is in proportion to the agony of struggle. So the very reward of perfect moral rectitude may consist in the sense of self-command—in the consciousness of self-control which belongs to it, just as the pleasure of scaling difficult heights, and of gaining giddy elevations and traversing perilous passes, consists in the consciousness of the adequacy of our own powers to the emergency. Man could never have acquired the power over his physical frame and attained the physical perfection necessary for the accomplishment of such feats, unless he had learned by much discipline and the experience perhaps of many falls the necessity of relying on his own voluntary powers; of putting forth their strength to the utmost, and of always controlling the involuntary physical tendency to inclination or gravitation downwards. The moral man is also raised from the level of the beast to the upright con-

dition and maintained there by the exercise of his moral elevating powers, set in action by the agency of his own will. In this spontaneity of power all the virtue of moral rectitude consists. Now it may be that such rectitude could not have been gained and maintained unless, by the suffering of frequent falls, the peril of relying for support on the changeable and untrustworthy had been inculcated. If falls and suffering had been rendered impossible, then the evil of inclination, whether moral or physical, would not have been perceived; and perfect manliness and self-control, with the enjoyment of the sense of freedom and independence which they involve, never have been attained.

The free inquirer, then, has need of faith to support him, like him who trusts blindly to authority; but the conjecture of the former—the hypothesis on which his faith rests—must be at least probable: it must not be contradictory to known facts, and must have reason to support it as far as it goes. Moreover, this incompleteness of the spiritual revelation may have its good purpose. Just as physical imperfection leads to physical good, and psychical imperfection to psychical good; so may the appearance of imperfection in the spiritual view lead to spiritual good:—in each case, by stimulating the speculative faculty.

The creed of the necessitarian, then, suffices for all the purposes that a man requires from a creed; it supplies him with motives to do what is right and to support the inevitable. Under the pressure of wrong and misery he is sustained by perceiving that everything is tending to a good goal, and he believes

that when that goal is reached, the solution of every difficulty will be accomplished. Such a creed may satisfy the intellect, but scarcely the heart; for to win this latter organ the warm approbation of the feelings is requisite, as well as the cold assent of the understanding.

Reason, it is true, teaches us that towards a Being who is all-good, and in whom we can trust with confidence, love should be felt; and it is the custom of creeds based on the theory of spontaneous volition to exact this sentiment from the heart as a duty. But the heart, as has been already said, is an involuntary organ, and will not obey the will or surrender to authority on compulsion. It is amenable only to laws of its own, the leading one of which is that to win its love there must be presented to it a lovable object. It is true that there are some natures—women mostly, or else feminine men—who seem to love for the sake of loving. Weak in character, with dull perceptions and feeble wills, they are unable to stand alone, and throw themselves for support on any object that offers. For them one creed will answer as well as another, for they never bring the understanding to bear upon the subject, but submit to any authority that puts forth a claim, and are plastic in any hands that are firm enough to mould them. Such persons are the ready material for the spiritual charlatan; and it is on such he preys. But more masculine minds decline to be blinded, and to take on trust that which their own consciousness repudiates; and while they respond to goodness that is felt, they resent unkindness.

This desire of the heart the creed of Christendom professes to satisfy. It teaches—and the doctrine is accepted by all save a small sect, intellectual in character, but numerically insignificant—that, in the person of its Founder, Deity was incarnate; that in the physical frame of Jesus of Nazareth was embodied not only the human psyche in its highest form of development, but also the great universal Spirit, the mysterious First Cause of all things; that these two natures, the divine and the human, were comprised in and constituted one and the same individual being; and that God in such being was manifest on the earth; and the eyes of every mourner have ever since been directed for consolation to the noble figure so revealed. This doctrine, which has its philosophical side, and is not mere theological dogma—being equivalent to asserting that Deity is, viewed from beneath, human; and, conversely, that humanity is, on its highest aspect, divine—belongs to the third kind of knowledge spoken of in § V., the grounds of which are not presented to our direct perceptions, but have to be arrived at by the reason; and it must be considered amenable to the *criteria* there laid down. It may be that such grounds are only perceptible to the eye of faith, being altogether beyond the ken of the reason, which in such case would be incompetent to pronounce any opinion respecting them, whether affirmative or negative. Yet, if it be true that an hypothesis, though not admitting of demonstration, should be accepted as long as it satisfies existing facts better than any other, this doctrine of the Incarnation—this consecration of Sorrow—may be admitted by the most philosophical

mind as readily as by the simplest and least instructed. For the law of life being, as it unquestionably is, that all must suffer, and the highest natures the most; and that such suffering is, in some inscrutable manner, at once the means and the test of goodness; what could more reconcile the heart to such law than the doctrine that this suffering to which the human nature is liable is shared also by the divine nature? With this doctrine of the Incarnation, then, Philosophy has no quarrel. It harmonises with all its facts; it supplies all its requirements; and, viewed apart from historical considerations, on which its verification depends, and with which the writer at present has nothing to do, it cannot on rational grounds be rejected by the philosopher. Yet to entertain it adequately, no common elevation of the vision is required; and, therefore, until by happy training and right discipline, such elevation has been attained, Christianity, however numerous those may be who rank themselves amongst its votaries, must be the creed of the few. To those who have learnt the brave creed that "to suffer and be strong" is a sublime thing, and that in this way, and in this alone, we become partakers of the divine nature, it matters little by what road such eminence may have been reached. But, until such lesson has been learnt, the history of Him who died on Calvary only deepens still more the mystery of Suffering.

The creed of the necessitarian, then, while it complies with the requirement of the intellect, fails to satisfy fully the heart. It presents goodness to the eye of faith, and rests that faith on reason so securely

that no intellectual or moral considerations are able to shake it. But the conceptions of goodness it shadows out are placed so high as to be out of reach: they cannot be *felt*, and even to keep them in view the eye must be detached altogether from earthly things. But the heart goes by feeling, and, moreover few, if any, can maintain the vision always at this lofty elevation. And were it otherwise, such a faculty would be perhaps a questionable merit. Cold-bloodedness and apathy belong to poor and narrow minds; and the larger the nature, the wider and more generous are the sympathies. There may be favoured and exceptional natures, that see so clearly, and whose hearts are habitually set on objects so high and pure, that they are enabled to preserve composure on every occasion; but ordinary persons only catch at exalted moments glimpses of these elevating conceptions, and their path is for the most part depressed, with only patience and hope to sustain them; and it is not until the last enemy, death, has been destroyed that to such the promise will be fulfilled: "Blessed are the pure in heart for they will know" (and therefore love) "God."

Our conceptions then of the spiritual are determined by our views of the physical and the psychical. The growth of the one depends on the growth of the others, of which it is an offshoot. And it follows from this dependence that the conditions which regulate the growth of each and determine its truth and worth are the same. As the value of our conceptions respecting the physical depends on the

accuracy with which we have observed the facts which enter our minds by the senses, and on our having rightly viewed such facts subsequent to their entrance by the light of reason; and as the value of our moral and social conceptions depends on the care and accuracy with which we have as individuals observed the phenomena which our own psychical nature presents, and, applying such knowledge to the circumstances and conduct of our neighbours, have deduced thence our conceptions respecting them; or, as a society, on the attention we have paid to the circumstances of all its classes and members; so does the value of our spiritual conceptions depend on the care and accuracy which we have bestowed on all the facts of the Cosmos on which it rests and from which it is deduced. In each case the law of duty—the duty of giving due attention to the facts and circumstances, and of viewing them by the light of reason—is the right law. If with regard to physical things we have obeyed this law, and, paying attention to the facts as they flow in, have corrected and enlarged our conceptions of the physical accordingly, then is the growth of such conception continuous and harmonious, and by the aid of it we extract from our surroundings physical happiness. If also, in like manner, we were to give due attention to our moral and social relations with each other, then our conception of the psychical would also grow and progress; the discord that unhappily exists in that department of our consciousness would cease; and we should derive thence moral and social happiness. So also with regard to this spiritual revelation, if in forming

it due attention were paid to the moral and physical facts from which it was deduced, and, as new facts come in, adding to, and modifying such, corresponding additions and modifications were made in it; then such spiritual revelation, constantly expanding and becoming more correct with advancing knowledge, would always correspond and preserve a just proportion to the facts of the Cosmos, and so we should be preserved and supported spiritually under all circumstances, and spiritual happiness be secured. If, on the other hand, this law of duty has not been complied with in all the departments of consciousness, then all our mental conceptions, whether physical, psychical, or spiritual, will be of but little avail. Our wrong physical notions applied to practice will lead to physical disaster; our wrong moral notions to social misery; and lastly, our wrong spiritual conceptions, not being rightly deduced from the facts of life, will not agree therewith, and will avail us but little in the conflict with our physical and social difficulties.

As with the physical and psychical, then, so with the spiritual revelation: its value depends on its fidelity to fact—on its *truth;* and to ensure the presence of this essential ingredient constant mental vigilance and rectitude are requisite. In no department of consciousness are the evils caused by the tyranny of unrestrained passion and vicious habits of thought more conspicuous and abounding than in this one. Fanaticism is religious passion. In the spiritual, as in the physical and psychical regions of consciousness, the heart is apt to commit

itself to attractive objects without previously duly considering either their nature or the circumstances in which they are placed. The attracting object may be noble or base, and the character of the persons susceptible of its influence will correspond; but this feature religious passion has in common with that excited by physical and psychical things—that in each case the object of the impassioned person is to gratify personal feeling rather than to understand the nature of the object which excites such feeling. As the low voluptuary seeks only in passion the gratification of corporeal excitement—of his craving for physical sympathy; and as the impassioned sentimentalist seeks only in his object the gratification of his craving for psychical sympathy; so does the religious fanatic seek in his the indulgence of spiritual excitement—the gratification of his craving for spiritual sympathy. In each case the affection is a blind one, the process of disillusion painful, and the awakening sad; they hug their illusions in the dark, resent all attempts to disenchant, and return with reluctance to the light of day with its calm and sober realities.

Spiritual fanaticism differs from the other kinds of passion chiefly in degree. The conceptions which excite it are of a higher order, and involve larger interests; and therefore, in accordance with the law that "the corruption of the best is the worst," it is more inveterate in its nature and more pernicious in its results. In cases of other kinds of passion earthly considerations have usually some weight, but with the eternal interests

with which religious passion is concerned earthly considerations have little to do, and it is only by the rudest shocks, and scarcely even then, that the mind carried away by fanaticism can ever be roused to use its reason. Fortunately it is possible to enjoy our spiritual conceptions without this abandonment of the understanding and of reason, and not only so, but the pleasure derived thence is greater far in this latter case than in the former. The law that the higher the faculty acted upon, the greater is the effect produced, obtains here also. The chastened pleasure that he derives from his spiritual contemplations who, in forming his conceptions, has made truth his sole object and taken due care that they should be purified from all error and falsehood, is as far above the spiritual excitement of the fanatic, as that derived from the exercise of the æsthetic faculty is above the excitement, whether sensuous or sentimental, produced by vulgar sensationalism.

And the evils caused by the bad habits of viewing the spiritual, which are customarily adopted, are even worse than those produced by the more violent outbreaks of fanaticism. The causes that have produced these wrong mental attitudes are not far to seek. In the other departments of our consciousness the authority of reason and the advantages of appealing to it are admitted. With regard to physical things, none but barbarous nations suppose that truth is obtainable in any other way than through the understanding. And although in moral and social questions the subject-matter is so recondite and removed

from view, that attempts to bring the reason to bear on it are comparatively few and rare, and the leaden law of custom rules undisturbed, yet even here it is held in a confused way that for such custom grounds somewhere exist not absolutely inaccessible to reason.

But to the spiritual region the access of reason is not permitted. The subject-matter seems so distinct from that of the other departments of consciousness that no connection is perceived between them: it is supposed to be brought into the mind by a method peculiar to itself—by a direct and supernatural inspiration—and attempts to apply the mental faculties to it, and to view it by the same means which we adopt towards other things are considered profane and sacrilegious. Hence it happens that by almost universal consent reason is shut out, and to the most obscure of the regions of consciousness, in which discord and contention prevail to a degree unknown in any other, the access of this beneficent principle—this mental light which always brings peace and order in its train—is denied.

And it follows that the power of employing this highest mental faculty on spiritual matters is by a large number of mankind altogether lost. The facts are so distant that their powers of vision, weakened by long disuse, are unable to perceive them. They gaze vacantly, perhaps fondly, on the established dogmas, and see nothing else. They *could not* reason if they would. Others, with reasoning powers unimpaired, fear to make use of them. They *dare not* reason. A terrible superstition, having its root in the

false, overshadows them, and, intervening between them and the light, paralyses all their powers of volition. Others again are cowed by a baser consideration—the world's opinion: they fear for their material interests and social *status*. These go with the stream and transfer their facile lip-service to any idol that Fashion may set up. Others again, from long custom, have been so familiarised to their creed that it has become a part of their very nature. In easy circumstances, they have no inducements to change; they shrink from the trouble of investigation, and desire only to be permitted to sleep on without molestation. Many also there are who are held by other attachments. The luxuriant growths of fancy with which time decorates and beautifies all old things hold them to their creed, and hide its truth and falsehood alike. And lastly, there are not a few, perhaps the noblest of all, who are detained by the strong bonds of old association. At an age when the feelings are impressible and suspicion is a stranger to their minds, they have surrendered themselves with the blind generosity of inexperience to the creed which they have received from revered hands; and they hold fast to it thenceforth without examining the grounds of their attachment. Their honour is rooted in their creed. With them obedience is a duty, loyalty a virtue, doubt infidelity, investigation treason; and the more generous the nature, the more complete is the surrender. To such persons the disenchanting process is a very painful one. They cling to their idol as long as one point of attachment presents itself, and by acute suffering

and bitter disappointment pay the penalty that is exacted from all who take goodness on trust. These several classes of persons—the incapable, the servile, the self-seeking, the supine, the æsthetic, and the chivalrous—all combine to oppose the admission into the spiritual region of consciousness of light—the corrector and liberator; and from these various roots spring the great spiritual vice, bigotry, the most hateful and fruitful in evil of all the vices that infest humanity, and deform and degrade the human soul.

A creed is an organic growth. In an ignorant and evil age, when men's minds are tried by adversity, and existing forms of belief fail to give support, in some mind of larger capacity and greater synthetic power than the rest a spiritual conception is formed, based upon and including within its scope all the knowledge and received opinions of the day, and therefore adequate to the circumstances. And such conception admitted into the minds of all whose thoughts are free, being the fittest, by the law of natural selection triumphs over all the previously existing views. Usually the founder himself succumbs, a victim to the resentment of the exasperated adherents of the established systems, and perishes a martyr to his creed; and after a time all record of him is lost in the plentiful growth of myth, legend, and fable which, engendered by his ideas, spring up from his grave. But his creed survives and flourishes, putting forth flowers and fruit abundantly, and giving support and shelter to all who are attracted by its beauty and goodness. But after a

time, it too fails to give satisfaction. Advancing knowledge has revealed facts adverse to the grounds from which it springs and on which its very life depends. The fierce light of reason plays upon it, and its enfeebled conceptions—such of them as are based on error—their vitality gone, wither and perish; and, what is left failing to supply the wants and satisfy the demands which the increased knowledge of the age has created, the whole structure becomes a sapless and dead thing, encumbering and disfiguring the soil which it once adorned. Finally, like all other dead things, it returns to the ground whence it came, is dissolved into its elements, and all that was good in it is embodied in the new growth which, springing from a wider culture and deeper grounds of thought, takes its place, and fulfils, as it had done, the functions of support and shelter.

And between the death of one creed and the advent of another, a dark and dreary period intervenes. In the life of Humanity, like that of physical nature, there are seasons in which the light is feeble and scanty, and, the eye stimulated, and the heart gladdened by no fresh conceptions of goodness or beauty, the mind is torpid. In these wintry periods the conceiving power is weak, and the mental life is maintained almost exclusively by food stored up from the past. A hard and cold conventionalism reigns, and spiritual life, the very essence of which is perfect freedom, languishes. And together with spiritual life all high art languishes also; for such is fed by great and noble truths, and to vitalise it the spiritual

is requisite. Such a period is the season for low pursuits—for mean natures and respectable mediocrities. Such live habitually in the physical, and the physical is always present, with its tangible objects and material interests. But psychical life is weak, for this requires the support of fresh and vigorous spiritual conceptions, and for such requirements the ideals handed down from the past are inadequate. To all noble natures then, who love the contemplative life, these transitional periods are painful and depressing: they crave for something better than that which presents itself, and seek in various ways to find solace for their unsatisfied desires. The weak and feeble try to revive the past by rehabilitating the old creed, and decorate its branches with their manufactured productions; but the fond artifice is seen through, and their Christmas tree imposes on no one. But all honest and manly natures despise such puerile inventions. Some hide their feelings under a cloak of bitter cynicism, and profess disbelief in the existence of that of which their hearts confess the want—or else, mounting to lofty and solitary eminences, look for, and fancy they see, the hoped-for dawn; and others, more brave and practical, betake themselves to the wiser work of preparing the mental soil for the new ideas, and, perhaps, by premature planting, impatiently and imprudently anticipate the coming spring. It comes at last: but its birth is ushered in by convulsion, and its cradle is rocked by many a storm.

We live in a phenomenal world. All things are in perpetual flux. The apparitions come and depart.

The physical, "with all its change of flood and tide, its moving things, its earth and sky," presents a series of dissolving views—of death and resurrection, of disintegration and reconstruction. The vegetable springs up, puts forth its foliage, flowers, and fruit, and then decays and perishes. The passionate and more intense life of the animal terminates in a similar manner. Man too, the highest animal, shares the fate of the humblest plant.

> "Like leaves of trees the race of men are found,
> Now green in youth, now withering on the ground."

His body dissolves and its elements return to the dust whence they sprung. His brain, the point in contact with mind and the cause of mental life, is the first to go—

> "The intense atom glows
> A moment, then is quenched in a most cold repose."

His mind, the sphere of his consciousness, and seat of its phenomena—its lamp of life, the brain, extinguished—is again darkened. The play is ended, the lights are put out, the actors gone; and the spirit, the escaped psyche, flows "back to the burning fountain whence it came, a portion of the Eternal." Even nations and empires obey the same fate. And lastly, creeds. These conceptions of the spiritual which men form and fondly deem infallible, are mere things of time, and go the way of all that is temporal. But the Cosmos is maintained, and remains through all, eternal; the physical Cosmos and the great moral Cosmos, Humanity. For simul-

taneously with the disintegration and decay, processes of renovation and reconstruction are going on. Synthesis keeps pace with analysis. New vegetables, animals, empires, creeds spring out of, and are fed by, the ruins of the old. And be it observed that each change implies advance: progress, not mere repetition. The Cosmos is perpetually developing to perfection: its physical conditions become gradually milder and more benignant, and its vegetable and animal forms advance by slow but sure steps to higher types. And man, its highest psychical production, advances also. His conceptions of truth and of goodness enlarge, his notions of duty become clearer, and his creeds nobler and more expansive. And what we see and know to be true of the psyche that is present, we believe also to be true of that which has disappeared.

> "Nought we know dies. Shall that alone which knows
> Be as a sword consumed before the sheath
> By sightless lightning?"

This too, our reason tells us, will live again,—perhaps in some loftier and more capacious mental sphere, for which this life has been a nursery and a discipline; and, endowed with fuller and clearer inspiration, move nearer and nearer the source of all illumination.

And short as our life is, that of our hopes and joys is yet shorter. We live also in a world of disorder and contention, and, "lost in stormy visions, keep with phantoms an unprofitable strife." Our task is a great and a noble one—the completion of the

Cosmos—the reduction of its discordant parts to order and harmony. But we are too near our work to perceive its nature and meaning, and we know that we shall not live to gather the fruits.

But the past we can see and judge of, and in it is contained all we love most—the good, the noble, the beautiful. To it all that is most dear goes before us and becomes a part, or follows soon after. We have been likened to rowers, who move on with their faces turned towards what they are leaving; and our hearts are in that unknown land, "where all things fair and wise descend."

And underlying all the phenomena, below, within, around—upholding, quickening, and comprehending all things, through time and change unchangeably the same—is the Power

> "Who wields the world with never-wearied love,
> Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above,"

—the Great Universal Spirit, by whom, and in whom all things live, and to whom all things tend—the Lord and Giver of light,—of physical light, the source and cause of all physical goodness and beauty; and of mental light, the source and cause of all psychical goodness and beauty;—Chastener, Sustainer, Consoler,—God!

> "The One remains, the many change and pass;
> Heaven's light for ever shines, Earth's shadows fly;
> Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
> Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
> Until death tramples it to fragments.—Die,
> If thou wouldst be with that which thou dost seek!
> Follow, where all is fled!—Rome's azure sky,

Flowers, ruins, statues, music, words are weak
The glory they transfuse with fitting truth to speak.

"Why linger, why turn back, why shrink, my heart?
Thy hopes are gone before: from all things here
They have departed; thou shouldst now depart!
A light is passed from the revolving year,
And man and woman; and what still is dear
Attracts to crush,—repels, to make thee wither.
The soft sky smiles,—the low wind whispers near:
'Tis Adonais calls! Oh, hasten thither,
No more let Life divide what Death can join together.

"That Light whose smile kindles the universe,
That Beauty in which all things work and move,
That Benediction which the eclipsing curse
Of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love,
Which through the web of being, blindly wove
By man and beast, and earth, and air, and sea,
Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
The fire for which all thirst, now beams on me,
Consuming the last clouds of cold Mortality.

"The breath whose might I have invoked in song
Descends on me; my spirit's bark is driven
Far from the shore, far from the trembling throng
Whose sails were never to the tempest given;
The massy earth and sphered skies are riven!
I am borne darkly, fearfully afar;
Whilst burning through the inmost veil of Heaven,
The soul of Adonais, like a star,
Beacons from the abode where the Eternal are."

(Note P.)

CONCLUSIONS.

The analysis of the phenomena of consciousness is now, as far as the imperfect powers of the writer permit, completed: it remains to sum up the results that have been arrived at, and to see what profit, if any, has been obtained.

The fundamental proposition which the inquiry has elicited, and upon which all the reasoning and deductions are based, is that the view which has been taken by so many metaphysical authorities of high eminence, that all the facts of consciousness are mental phenomena, is the correct one. That objects of sense are as much *within* the mind as are ideas; perceptions as much as notions and conceptions; and that all the facts of consciousness, of every kind—objective as well as subjective—objects of sense and objects of thought, as well as sensations and emotions—are alike modifications only of the mind, and of the psyche or soul;—the former furnishing the substance out of which the objective class of phenomena—the *non-ego*—are formed or fashioned; the latter that which forms the basis of the subjective class: forces proceeding from the material brain, and generated there by impressions derived from the outside world, being in each case the agent of formation.

The notion which has been formed of the mind is

that of a void or hollow sphere, outside, and in immediate contact with which, is the material brain, and beyond this again the persons and things of the material world, with which the brain is connected by nerves distributed throughout the body. Of the nature of this sphere we know nothing: all our knowledge is confined to its contents; and these are the conscious being itself—the psyche, and the various phenomena of which it is conscious. Comprehending, so to speak, these phenomena, the mind does not comprehend itself: it exists outside the sphere of consciousness, of which, in fact, it forms the limitation. Just as our elementary idea of physical organisation is the simple organic cell, with its vivifying, animating nucleus; so our simplest notion of psychical organisation is the mental cell, with its conscious, active psyche. And this analogy between the life-cell and the mind-cell holds good in this respect also: just as the life-cell draws from outside things material which it elaborates within itself into specific products, and, giving them out again, modifies its surroundings thereby; so the mind-cell is acted upon and re-acts on *its* surroundings in like manner, giving back again in an altered form what it has received, and modifying thereby the outer world in which it exists.

Neither do we know anything, absolutely, of the nature of matter—the substance of the brain and outside material world; for this also, not entering into the mental sphere, is not comprehended by it. All that is known about it is conjectural, theory based on hypothesis suggested by the physical phenomena

which represent it in consciousness, and of which we have direct perception. Nor is the nature of the connection between the mind-cell and the *cerebral* matter in which it exists better understood. We know that impressions, derived from outward things, are made on the organs of sense with which they are either directly or indirectly in contact; that nerve-currents, called thereby into action, traverse the nerves of these organs, and telegraph these impressions to the brain; that brain-action is thereby set up, and brain-forces generated; and that these brain-forces play, so to speak, on the mind-cell, and, flashing into its interior, register therein the impressions that have been so transmitted, in characters which seem to be formed out of substance supplied by the mind-cell itself. We know, also, that what are called subjective phenomena—the sensations and feelings to which the psyche itself is subject—are produced in a similar way by brain-forces, and as these subjective phenomena are caused by the objective, we know also that there must be communication between the portions of brain which give rise to the subjective and those which are the source of the objective phenomena, though our present knowledge of cerebral physiology is inadequate to demonstrate either the seat of the organs or the nature of the connection. Further, we know that these two classes of events—brain-action and mind-action—are inseparably associated and co-related; brain-action never occurring outside the mental sphere without mental phenomena presenting themselves within, and mental phenomena never being perceived within unless brain-action is going on out-

side: in short, that all the phenomena of which we are conscious exist within the mind-cell, but that they all depend on brain-action occurring outside such cell. And this is true, not only of sensations, feelings, ideas, and other modes of consciousness which are universally admitted to be mental phenomena, but also of the physical objects of sense which are commonly supposed to be outside the mind. Such things are made up of light, and shade, and colours, of sound, of tactile, gustatory, and olfactory phenomena: all these depend for their existence on brain-action, just as ideas and feelings do; and exist like them within the mental sphere. They are supposed to be outside our minds because they are represented in consciousness as outside our physical body. But this physical body which we perceive is itself a mental phenomenon of the objective class, and only differs from other objective phenomena in being always—in healthy conditions, at least—(Note P) associated with the conscious psyche itself, which is, as we say, incorporated in it, and localised always in the same part of the mental sphere. The term *outsideness*, as applied to physical things, has reference to the psyche, not to the mental sphere. These physical phenomena are, *body* included, outside the psyche, it is true, but both they and the psyche itself are within the mind-cell—*i.e.*, the mind.

The type of a man, from a physical point of view, is the simple ganglionic-cell with its afferent and efferent nerves—the inorganic analogue of which is the simple galvanic battery with its connecting conductors. The human body consists essentially of a

number of sets or series of ganglionic circles differing in extent and function, along the nerve conductors of which, currents of nerve force are transmitted, cells varying in number and kind being interposed along the line of transmission. Of the different sets, that which ranks lowest in the scale as regards consciousness, forming as it were the base of the pyramid, is the one which may be appropriately called the *vital* or *organic ganglionic system.* The numerous ganglionic circles which compose it preside over the functions which are concerned in building up and maintaining in its integrity the structure of the body. Matter introduced from without is the excitant, and the reflex force which is called forth is expended in applying such matter to its proper purpose in the organism, or in removing it when it has served this purpose and by use has become effete. These functions are normally performed without exciting any consciousness in the mind, except perhaps a feeble sense of corporeal existence, and over them the will has no direct influence. When exceptionally exalted or depressed, however, they produce corresponding conditions in the psyche; and if their function is materially interfered with or impeded, they may cause psychical agony so intense as to overcome it altogether. Somewhat higher in the scale are the set of ganglia which may be called the *sensual ganglionic system.* These are in more immediate communication with the outer world, and regulate the import and export of material necessary for the purposes of the body. They preside over the animal appetites, and of their action the mind is habitually conscious, and

over them the will has a certain though limited control. Above these are the ganglia concerned in producing sensuous feelings in the mind—the *sensuous ganglionic system*, and yet again above them the *emotional ganglionic system.* In the former of these an object of sense, in the latter an idea, is the immediate exciting cause, and currents of sensuous and emotional feeling so generated pass through one or more, perhaps a whole chain of ganglia, until they are expended either on the instruments which shape our thoughts, or on those which direct our actions. It is by the actions of these ganglionic circles that all the feelings, affections, and sentiments of the soul are produced, and it is from them that its desires and passions spring. They cannot be obliterated from consciousness, but they may be usually controlled, and within certain limits restrained, by the will; and it should be the object of moral training to keep them in habitual subjection thereto. And the highest of all these circles of nerve-force is the *intellectual ganglionic system:* that circle which is illumined by the pure intellectual light, uncoloured by any admixture of feeling. By its agency the psyche is elevated unto its full height, and taught to recognise its rightful lord, the reason; and its characteristic is this: that whereas in each of the other ganglionic systems the psyche is altogether subordinate, and forms but a secondary link as it were in the chain of events, the motor force proceeding from some outside thing, and the psyche altogether passive—a thing acted upon rather than acting; in this case the psyche itself constitutes the centre and source from which the

motor influence proceeds, and all other forces are controlled and regulated by it. In this system the conception of duty is the excitant; the conscience the source of action; and the motor force is the will. The psyche perceives, judges, determines, or rather is determined by, the preponderating considerations; and wills. Under the moral obligation which the conception of duty imposes, it resists inclination, frees itself from the influence of all undue attractions, and, controlling feeling, elevates itself into the attitude in which it can obtain the best view possible to it, both in the abstract world of ideas and in that of fact and reality in which it exists—the attitude of intellectual rectitude; and so, submitting itself to the best influences, arrives in both cases at the best results attainable; forming the best notions and conceptions of truth and right in the one region, and exhibiting the best conduct in the other: and if it has been taught clearly this right conception of duty, and schooled habitually to obey it, it can, except in abnormal and exceptional cases, always preserve its rectitude, both in the operations of the intellect and in the regulation of the conduct. But this condition of things rarely exists. As a fact there is scarcely any one who is always and at all times absolutely free. Most persons are under the influence of some feeling arising either from some sensuous and selfish considerations, or from some undue bias towards an outward object or purpose, or from attachment to some particular theoretic views which warp their judgment and produce prejudice; and not until mankind have been taught early to preserve their intellect free, and

habitually consult their reason, will it be otherwise. For freedom, even when existing, is always to be—and, in point of fact, always is—taken away, unless the obligation of preserving it is felt. Unless the right conception of duty is present, some feeling or class of feelings soon becomes dominant, and, fed by indulgence, grows stronger every day, while the controlling powers in the same proportion grow weaker; until at last the psyche is hopelessly enslaved to a vicious habit and its liberty permanently lost.

But although the will-force, if habitually exercised rightly, is sufficient under ordinary circumstances to preserve rectitude and secure right conduct, this is not always the case. Its power is limited; and even when put forth to the utmost it is liable to be overcome by the force of feeling. Under the influence of some intolerable bodily pain or mental emotion the strongest soul is compelled, if relying on its will alone, to succumb; and, in such case, it can only preserve rectitude by calling to its aid other considerations and combating the feeling which it desires to resist by other feelings arising from such. And as the psychical law is that the higher motives rule the lower, it is necessary for the preservation of rectitude that the motives which are called in to aid spring from higher considerations than those which are being resisted. Æsthetic considerations enable us to hold in check sensuous and sensual tendencies; considerations of far-seeing and wide-reaching utility have more weight than æsthetic gratification; and theoretic views of truth, which is the foundation of right and source of all goodness and beauty, are

stronger than any other, and support us under and enable us to sustain every calamity. From the influence of this—the highest sentiment of our nature—nothing can release us. Philosopher and bigot alike are in their last resort driven to their creeds; the only difference being that while the creed of the philosopher offers its support unconditionally and leaves him his liberty, with the free use of his faculties,—that of the bigot stipulates as the preliminary condition of its support, the absolute surrender of freedom. With eyes blinded and limbs fettered, he is held to his creed by the bonds of authority, and so is only preserved from other tyrannies by the subjugation of his soul to the greatest one of all. Nor can it be said that this matter of freedom is one of minor importance, and that it signifies little how rectitude is preserved as long as it is preserved. It signifies much; it signifies *all:* it signifies the whole difference between psychical development and psychical degeneration. Truth is mental food. By means of it the soul is nourished. As it enters, the mind expands and the psyche is developed in the same proportion. And with the mental expansion and elevation, the creed of the free inquirer also rises and expands: and although during the transitional periods, while the creed is being adjusted to the new views, the psyche may be for a time inadequately supported, yet this period of uncertainty is only temporary, and may be not unsalutary. On the other hand, in the darkened mind of the bigot, held fast by his creed, no intellectual progress is permitted, and no psychical development possible.

For want of use the intellect grows feeble, until even the very goodness of the creed which he worships is unperceived; and the soul, starving for want of sustenance, is compelled to resort to any low food within its reach. The free inquirer, preferring truth to his creed, gains both of them; the bigot, preferring his creed to truth, loses both: psychical science in this, as in so many other instances, verifying the words of the great Teacher,—"He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake" (*i.e.*, for the sake of truth), "the same shall find it."

All the mental phenomena, then, are the result of impressions made by the outer world on the organs of the brain, and of the response given by the brain to such impressions; in such response the psyche being sometimes the chief factor, in others altogether passive and unresisting.

The human mind may, for the sake of illustration, be compared to a temple, of which the portion occupied by the objects of sense forms the vestibule; and the intellectual region, in which ideas exist, the body of the building. Into this temple the physical phenomena in long array enter through the several gates of the external senses, each kind through its appropriate gate; the human body entering with the rest, and, as it were, heading the procession. And as they arrive at the inner gate of the temple, they divest themselves of the vestments more or less vivid in which, while crossing the vestibule, they were attired, and pass into the intellectual region as colourless ideas. And having entered this region they arrange themselves therein according to their

natural affinities, each idea joining the group to which it belongs, the members of which rise into consciousness to receive it. And, simultaneously with the entrance of the physical phenomena, there enter the temple, through the gate which communicates directly with the psyche, the psychical phenomena; and the two classes of phenomena crossing the vestibule enter the intellectual region together. And, as they pass through the region of sense, they awake and rouse into consciousness the psyche, revealing it to itself as a being incorporated in a physical body; and the two, body and soul, inseparably associated in consciousness, pass into the region of ideas, together with the other phenomena.

And out of the psychical ideas which have thus been presented to its consciousness, the psyche forms its notions and conceptions of other persons, taking its idea of self as the pattern, and, fitting it to their physical frames, making the necessary allowances.

And just as we are ill at ease in our corporeal consciousness, unless the organic conditions which give rise to it are harmonious, so our mental self, of which such corporeal consciousness forms a part, cannot be at ease if discord prevail in any part of the sphere in which it exists. It profits little to be in health, and happy organically, if our relations with our sensuous surroundings are discordant: nor do sensuous and corporeal pleasures suffice for our happiness, if our perceptions are at variance with our ideas of excellence, or if the consequences with which they are fraught seem to be evil: nor do any, or all other enjoyments combined, compensate for

the unrest occasioned by intellectual perplexity and confusion. As long, therefore, as discord exists between the impressions proceeding from without and the organs of the brain which receive such impressions, so long will there be discord in the phenomena within the mental sphere; and as long as there is discord in these phenomena, so long there will be discomfort experienced by the psyche. And this is true of the psychical phenomena equally with the physical. If the ideas or sentiments of the persons with whom we are in immediate contact disagree with our own, then our conceptions of such persons are disagreeable to us, and we experience psychical sensuous discomfort, just as physical contact with disagreeable things gives us physical sensuous discomfort. And in the same way perceptions of intellectual nobleness, moral goodness, and psychical truth give pleasure to our æsthetic, emotional, and contemplative faculties, just as in the case of the corresponding physical things.

And simultaneously with, and as a result of, this entrance of the real, there springs up within the mind, as a growth of its own, the ideal. The confused and disorderly mixture of good and evil which reality presents is separated by the mind into its component parts, and the elements are re-arranged into ideal conceptions, more pleasing and satisfying to the psyche—conceptions of sensuous pleasure, both physical and psychical; conceptions of physical and psychical beauty; of physical and moral goodness; and of physical and moral truth. And these conceptions exercise on the psyche different degrees of

force, according to their nobleness and the elevation they confer on it. And, carried away by the feelings thus excited, the psyche puts forth its active powers, and seeks to realise these conceptions, often without due regard to circumstances, and so perpetuates frequent sins both of omission and commission; until, taught by experience and humiliated by the perception of its folly, its conscience is awakened, and it acquires the habit of self-respect, and practises self-control; and, forming the right conception of duty, views the persons and things around it by the light of reason, and regulates its conduct by the dictates of its impartial judgment.

Lastly, there is made in the mind-cell, to the psyche, a revelation of another kind of existence—the spiritual; and to this all the physical and psychical phenomena point, and indicate its character. Of this existence no direct perception enters the mind: it is not seen, although its influence is felt; but it is represented in consciousness as a conception, partly deduced by reason from perceived or verified facts, and partly resting only on conjecture. This conception completes our notion of the Cosmos by giving us its whence and its whither; to it the psyche is driven by the incomplete and unsatisfactory nature of the things around it; and in it it seeks for a solution of the problems which oppress it. In the spiritual revelation, then, is contained our conception of the whence and the whither of the Cosmos—the source from which it springs, and the goal to which it is tending. And, just as from the expressions and acts of a man we judge of his character and

motives, so from our notions of the Cosmos we judge respecting that to which it owes its origin and direction. And as our notions of the Cosmos grow and expand, it follows that our conception of the spiritual which is deduced from such notions, must grow and expand in like proportion. While our notions of the Cosmos are fragmentary and disjointed, our conceptions of its causes must be fragmentary also; but in proportion as we get to see unity in the effect, in the same proportion do we grow to see unity in the cause; until perceiving that man himself—mind as well as body—forms a part of the Cosmos, constituting a link in its chain of sequences—at once an effect and a cause—our view of the Cosmos as one united whole is completed, and we are compelled by the law of our minds to view it as proceeding from one indivisible First Cause.

So also, if we perceive evidence of adaptation and purpose in the effect, we attribute mind and intelligence to the cause; and as the design becomes more apparent and our notion of the work grows, so does our conception of the Intelligence which has designed it grow and become clearer; and when we have advanced so far in our knowledge as to regard the Cosmos as an unity—an organism which with all its parts, ourselves included, is advancing under certain and fixed laws to perfection—then we form a conception of an all-wise, perfect Creator, developing according to law a perfect mental conception.

And as from our notions of the Cosmos we obtain our conceptions of spiritual truth, so from the same source do we get those of spiritual goodness. We

transfer to the spiritual region those ideals of happiness which we have failed to realise in actual life, and so sustain with hope the longings of the heart. And as our ideals of happiness, like our notions of truth, are formed out of our perceptions of fact, and alter and expand as facts accumulate; so our conceptions of spiritual happiness alter and expand with them. While our perceptions of the Cosmos are limited to self and the things relating to self, our ideals of happiness are also limited to self, and the spiritual conception is of the same character. The Deity is viewed—when such ideas prevail—as a variable and capricious being, actuated by likes and dislikes, and to be won by sacrifice and adulation. But as other persons come into view and considerations of our duties to them enter our minds, then justice is included in our conceptions of what is good, and is added to the spiritual conception.

And with our enlarging perceptions, our sympathies with others increase; we feel for their sorrows as well as care for their rights; in our conception of what is good their happiness becomes a necessary ingredient; we conceive of God as a God of love; and theological theories are invented to reconcile the claims of justice with those of mercy, and harmonise the appearance of evil in the creation with the conception of wisdom and beneficence in the Creator. Lastly, as the intellectual notion of man's nature becomes more accurate, and it is perceived that his will is not absolute and unconditioned, but that it is governed by laws, and his actions determined by circumstances resulting from causes out-

side the mind; that moral evil is not innate in the soul, but is occasioned by the absence of the outside conditions which produce in it goodness; that psychical excellence consists in intellectual rectitude and moral self-control; and that adversity and suffering are liberating and chastening influences tending to purify and elevate the soul and to develop in it perfection; then these qualities, intellectual rectitude and moral self-control, are perceived to be the chief thing to be sought after, as being both in themselves the highest good and also the sure path to every other; and the spiritual conception alters again to meet these enlarged views of truth and goodness: the notions of wrath and purposeless torture—of a Creator wreaking vengeance on a rebellious creation—disappear; and there remains that of a Chastener, purifying and perfecting his work, and elevating it by successive stages to higher and higher degrees of nobleness. Creation becomes intelligible and presents no longer insuperable contradictions to the theoretic faculty; justice is reconciled with wisdom and goodness, and the theological contrivances invented to bridge over the chasm between them, perplex the intellect and afflict the soul no longer. To him who has formed the right conception of the Cosmos—its what, its whence, and its whither—duty becomes delightful, because its object is perceived; evil endurable, for its existence is explained; adversity is encountered with cheerfulness, for its impotence is detected: the psyche, cheered by the prospect of a noble future and supported by the power of the Universal Spirit, like a

traveller bent on a long journey, views this life as but one short stage of his existence, and bears its ills with equanimity.

Spiritual truth, then, like physical and psychical, is deduced more or less directly from our intellectual perceptions. It resembles them in this also: it imposes on the psyche obligations. Religion is to theology what an art is to a science; it is the application of belief to conduct. And, as is the case with every other art, the goodness of its results depends on the amount of truth included in the grounds on which the belief is founded. The religion of the savage is, like his theological conception, sensual, brutal, selfish; consisting in bloody sacrifices; in supplications for mercy, for favour to self and vengeance on his enemies; in mystic rites, charms, and incantations, wherein mere physical things are invested by the imagination with spiritual powers, capable of averting evil influences. Nor are matters much mended even by the introduction of the idea of justice into the theological conception. As long as the belief prevails that the soul is primarily responsible for its imperfections, the higher the standard of righteousness, the more evident the iniquity and the greater the condemnation. Despairing of success in attaining perfection, and therefore of salvation by its own conduct, atonement for its shortcomings and escape from punishment in the next world are sought for by mortification of the body in this; a bar is placed on all the pleasures of the senses; physical asceticism is practised; the divine favour is entreated by abject supplication and servile adulation; and for

the imagination a refuge is provided in a mystical ritualism and symbolism, imposing to the senses and baffling criticism, adapted to suit a more refined taste, but in other respects as irrational as the ruder and coarser forms of magic of the wild savage. And a more spiritualised theology only intensifies the evil. On the soul itself—the primary offender, as it is believed—the visitation of punishment is made. It, with all its belongings, is viewed as tainted with an original, innate depravity. The senses are denounced as corrupt; the intellect is proclaimed foolish; the imagination deceitful; the heart desperately wicked; the will rebellious; knowledge, the food of the soul, is decried as vain; reason, its light, is pronounced misleading; nature is viewed as accursed—a name synonymous with evil; truth is taught to be a thing out of man's reach, the very seeking for which by the human faculties is impious presumption: and the soul, starved by this psychical asceticism, is handed over, chained and bound, a slave to the prevailing theology—a thing supposed to be, not a deduction from facts, but a direct revelation from Deity—and its salvation is made to depend on its swallowing, so to speak, blind-fold, impossible formulæ, involving logical contradictions, introduced into the mind before the intellect is mature, and fenced off, by barriers jealously maintained by authority, from the access of the reason.

Elements such as these enter more or less into the constitution of all existing forms of religion. At variance with each other in almost every other respect, they all agree in hostility to the light of

reason, fearing that thereby the fiction, which enters so largely into the common root from which they all spring, may be exposed. And were the theologian all-powerful, the result would be fatal to intellectual progress. But, fortunately, the theologian is not all-powerful. In every age there have been men bold enough to resist his thraldom and to claim the right to the free use of their faculties. In the exercise of this freedom they are at the present time applying the same method of inquiry to the problems of our psychical nature that has been so successful in solving those of physical nature; and by-and-by, when psychical laws have been ascertained and a science of psychology established, the theological conception will be modified in accordance with such science; and then the forms of religion will alter again. When it is seen that nature is the book—the only book of God, in which His word, truth, is written; that reason is the light—the only light—by which such truth may be discerned; that by its light the human intellect, if rightly used, may discover all the truth that it stands in need of—psychical as well as physical—and may further from such truth, so discovered, deduce right; and that the completion and perfect development of the beauty and goodness of the Cosmos depend on this action of the intellect and will under the guidance of reason,—such perfect consummation being attainable in this way and by no other;—then it will be also perceived that it is the duty of man not to waste his time in idle supplications for that which Providence has given him faculties to obtain for himself, but—following the

example of Descartes—to *search earnestly for truth in order that he may do right.* Praise and adulation will be abandoned as unworthy alike of the Being worshipped and the worshipper. The only appropriate prayer will be for light and strength: the only worship will be the adoration of nobleness and goodness. It will be universally recognised that "*laborare est orare*"—religion will be work.

Lastly, physical, psychical, and spiritual truth have this further agreement—they can neither of them be attained without *intellectual rectitude.* That this is the right method for prosecuting physical research is admitted. To collect facts, as many as lie within reach; to view them impartially by the light of reason, giving to each its due attention and inclining unduly to none, and so educe from them general facts or principles; from these general facts to rise to still higher generalisations—the whole constituting *science;* from these again by a descending process to deduce and arrive at other facts and other combinations and so attain to *scientific art;*—this method, which is what constitutes intellectual rectitude, is acknowledged to be the only one by which physical truth is attainable. But it is also the only method by which psychical truth can be obtained. From the facts presented by ourselves and others we arrive at principles which are applicable to societies generally, and from which new social combinations may be deduced, guiding us in conduct. And if intellectual rectitude is requisite for the attainment of physical and psychical truth, it is every whit as requisite for the attainment of spiritual truth. By viewing the facts of the Cosmos

fairly and impartially as far as our vision extends, and, seeing where they point, accepting the revelation which they indicate; by admitting freely fresh facts with all their import, and making the modification of our former view which such addition to our knowledge demands,—adding to it the new truth which such fresh discoveries bring in; obliterating from it the error which they expose;—by such method our conception of spiritual truth grows and progresses; we derive the mental satisfaction of perceiving that our views of the unknown agree with our notions of fact as far as these extend; and we are supported in our encounter with reality by the belief that we are in harmony with the order of the universe and possess the sympathy of its Great First Cause. But if, through fear, undue inclination, or indolence, we neglect to make such rectification of our creed, then discord exists in our minds between our spiritual theory and our intellectual perceptions; and such discord can have but one of two issues: either our spiritual conception loses its vitality, and, instead of receiving support from it, we advance intellectually, encumbered with the burden of a dead creed; or both our intellectual and spiritual development are arrested, and for our want of rectitude we pay the penalty of mental narrowness and psychical degradation.

The whole matter, then, may be summed up thus:—Man is a part of Nature, her latest and most complete work. His function is to complete and perfect the realisation of the conception of the Divine Mind which is taking place in Nature, and of which divine conception, Nature—*i.e.*, the Cosmos—is the

expression. Just as the Divine Will, acting by and through the vital forces of the plant, causes it to put forth in forms of beauty and goodness its flowers and its fruit; so does the same agency, acting on the mind by and through the human will—having first disciplined that will, and trained it to obedience to and harmony with itself—cause it to put forth and crown and ennoble the Cosmos with *its* flower and fruit in forms of beauty and utility, of nobleness and goodness—both physical and moral. And as the products of the plant are of little value, and often noxious, until it has received training and culture; so are the works of man of little account, and often evil, until his mind has received discipline and instruction. For plant and man equally, to produce good, trainers are necessary: for the one, the scientific horticulturist; for the other, the scientific psychologist; such trainers themselves being instruments prepared for the purpose by the education of Nature. Art itself, therefore, is part of Nature; its outcome and highest expression. And in both Art and Nature there is perceptible the divine hand.

"As all Nature's ceaseless changes
One unchanging God proclaim,
So through Art's wide region ranges
One sole meaning, still the same;
This is Truth, eternal Reason,
Which from beauty takes its dress,
And serene, through time and season,
Still endures in loveliness."

A physical Cosmos, emerging by slow changes and under the action of regulated and unvarying forces, from the general to the special, from the simple to the com-

plex, from the confused to the distinct: its parts deviating from and rising out of each other by regular gradation from the least to the most complex, and coming into contact at their highest point, the brain, with the mind-cell and its inmate, the psyche. Its forces derived from one common force which, distributed through it and divided among its several parts, develops them, and the divisions of which, passing through such developed and specialised structures, become in such passage themselves developed and specialised until, in the brain, they acquire the power of acting upon—perhaps of evolving—the mind-cell and its contained psyche, and give rise to the various mental phenomena, and call into play the will.—A psychical Cosmos, the product and outcome of the physical, emerging, like it, out of a Chaos by slow changes and under the action of developing forces regulated by law; the several psyches composing it presenting every grade of mental capacity, intellectual power, and moral nobleness. Its forces or motor powers proceeding from the various desires that have been awakened in the mind-cells of the psyches which compose it.—A Universal Mind, including and comprehending both the physical and the psychical.—A Universal Spirit, pervading, energising, and animating the whole; originating and directing by its will all forces—both those which act in physical nature and those which, within the mind-cell, call into consciousness and action the psyche.—An informing, illuminating, inspiring Intelligence, elevating by its correcting discipline the psyche to nobleness and rectitude, and

training it to read by the light of reason the truths inscribed on the facts of its consciousness, and to form out of them and express in the Cosmos conceptions of goodness and beauty:—such is the response made by his consciousness to the present writer interrogating its facts to obtain from them their import and significance.

And here it might seem that this essay should close. A theory that claims to be deduced from truth should, it might be supposed, require no adventitious aid to strengthen, but should be left to stand or fall, resting on its proper supports alone. And to them it might be left, were truth loved generally for its own sake. But from this condition we are as yet a long way off. Those who love truth for its own sake are the exceptional few. By far the majority of mankind care only for what concerns directly their own personal feelings and interests. Truth is to them, not the "Goddess great," but the "milch cow of the field," and their only care is "to calculate what butter she will yield." And even of those who, not being altogether steeped in selfishness, are able to perceive nobleness, but few comparatively can discern that higher thing, intellectual beauty. They can perceive the perfections which detached portions of the Cosmos present to the physical eye; they can also perceive moral beauty; but they either cannot, through narrowness, or will not, through prejudice, admit into their minds those larger views—both physical and moral—of the Cosmos which theories of truth present,

and are therefore debarred from perceiving the surpassing beauty of such. To them, in common with the baser sort of minds, the theorist is either a mere impractical dreamer—for they refuse the word *practical* to that which contributes only to the gratification of the highest faculty of all—the theoretic; or else he is an enemy, bent on destroying all that they hold sacred. Such persons are to all new and unaccustomed views of truth either indifferent or hostile. And it is not until the innovator has justified himself in their eyes by contributing some results which, appealing to lower faculties, come within the range of their vision, that they admit his views and appreciate their value.

Only to minds perfectly free and noble, then, will truth be acceptable for its own sake. Moreover, it must be admitted that of mathematical truth alone it can be said that it can afford to dispense altogether with aid derived from probabilities, and to rest absolutely on *à priori* reasoning. And even a mathematical proposition, however specious, is held to be untrue, if contradicted by others already established. It is the nature of all truth to be fruitful in all good results; and we may therefore legitimately and with propriety proceed to inquire what fruits the doctrines that have been put forward would be likely to bear if applied to practice. Should they be found to promise none, the presumption would be against their validity; and should they threaten the destruction of an existing good, they must, however plausible in theory, at once be rejected; for all goodness is based on truth, and truth cannot destroy truth. On the

other hand, should they be found, while harmonising well with all established truth and existing good, to increase our stock of such, they should be accepted. They will have justified themselves by their fruits.

Art is the outcome of science. Out of notions of reality we form conceptions of possible good, and these conceptions we seek to realise by art. The quality of our art, therefore, is regulated primarily by that of our knowledge. The greater our knowledge, the more abundant is our material for art. The more accurate our knowledge, the more correct is our art. Art and knowledge or science, therefore, have a direct relation to each other. Nature is a unity, science is our knowledge or mental conception of this unity. It is therefore one; but it is divided into the several departments which constitute 'The Sciences' to adapt it to our limited faculties, which can only view it in detail.

Our first notions of everything are confused and indistinct—a mental chaos, out of which, as our ideas become clear and distinct, the sciences emerge. And the law which regulates the order of their emergence is that the greater the complexity of the subject-matter of each, the later is the date of its appearance. Our knowledge depends on our faculty of distinguishing. To know and comprehend thoroughly a thing, we must know and comprehend all its parts; and to do this, it is necessary that it should be taken to pieces by a process of mental dissection, and that each of its parts should be viewed separately. It follows from this that the simplest things are understood first; then, as each of these becomes known, one step is

gained towards a knowledge of the more complex things into whose composition they enter. Thus the inorganic or mineral kingdom of nature is learnt first, because it presents itself in forms unmixed with the others: when it has been comprehended, a step is gained towards comprehending the organic kingdom of life into which its material enters. So also the animal kingdom, or that of mind, cannot be comprehended until that of life which is associated with it—from which it springs and on which it is based—has been learnt. Of necessity, therefore, the science of mind is the last of the natural sciences to pass from the chaotic stage into that which—all the parts being understood, and the *ratio* or relations which they bear to each other perceived—may be properly called *rational.*

But there is yet another reason for the law that the simpler and more general phenomena must be known before the more complex and special can be understood. The unity of nature and mutual dependence of its parts is nowhere better shown than in the analogy which runs through the whole—the plan of the more complex and later-developed structure being fore-shadowed, as it were, in the lower and simpler one which preceded it, and out of which it sprung. Thus each department of knowledge furnishes the key which enables us to unlock the one which lies next to it in elevation and order of complexity. *Pure Mathematics* is the most simple and general of the whole, all the knowledge required to start with in it being certain elementary ideas respecting number, space, and quantity. Such elements exist in and belong

to every department of knowledge, and there is good ground for believing that all the processes of nature in every department may be brought under laws capable of being expressed by mathematical formulas. Such a belief seems to be a necessary consequence of the hypothesis of the existence of a perfect and universally directing Spirit. A perfect Intelligence must of necessity order and regulate its work by perfect and undeviating laws capable of being calculated and predicted by intelligences of sufficient capacity; and, as man has been endowed with a mind capable of comprehending the simplest of such laws, and of rising thence by processes of reasoning to higher, there is reason to hope that by means of this faculty, if used fearlessly and with confidence or faith, he may rise ultimately to the highest of all, invade and occupy every department of nature, and wrest from her her inmost secrets: but the process is gradual; and the lower steps must be surmounted in succession before the higher can be reached. By applying our mathematical reasoning to the physical forces which are common to matter in all its forms, whether ponderable or imponderable, we step from the pure mathematics to *Physics*, and reduce this department of science—the next to it in order of simplicity and generality—to a rational form. A knowledge of the physical forces common to matter in all its forms supplies us with a clue to the more subtle forces which give to each of these forms its special peculiarity, and so from physics we pass to chemistry—to *Inorganic Chemistry* first, and thence, applying the mathematical formulæ which explain the more simple combinations of matter

which its phenomena present to the more intricate problems of the organic compounds—to *Organic Chemistry;* and thence again, and by the road which it opens, we advance to *Physiology* or *Biology*, and so enter the kingdom of life and gain an insight into the nature of the vital forces. From Physiology we pass to *Psychology:* in the phenomena which physiological research reveals to us—the organic cell and its nucleus; in the collection of ganglionic masses which constitute the brain; in the nerves which go to and from these masses—the afferent nerves which convey impressions from the body and things outside it to the brain; the efferent nerves through which passes out the force by which the brain re-acts on the body and on outside things—in these phenomena we discover the clue to the mind-cell and psyche, and to the phenomena which occur within it—to the objects of sense and ideas; to the processes of thought; to the feelings and desires which the psyche experiences; to the motives which actuate it; to the will-force which it puts forth; and to the actions which it manifests. And from Psychology we advance to *Sociology.* In the mind-cell, with its conflicting conceptions of good and evil; in the sensitive, emotional psyche, agitated by desires and struggling with feelings flowing from such conceptions; convulsed by passion; enslaved by habit; elevated gradually higher and higher by the several conceptions which, as they form, tyrannise over it in turn until, the conception of duty having been formed, it has learnt to free itself by its own powers, and to practise self-control and maintain rectitude; we

see typified Society with its gradually developing classes and interests, each in turn occupying the seat of government, keeping in subjection the spirit of the nation, and monopolising its powers, until out of this struggle of classes and strife of parties there is developed a national spirit of freedom and self-government, securing justice and liberty to all, and permitting the usurpation of none.

And, lastly, Psychology and Sociology bring us to *Theology*. In man—both the individual and the collective man—we see his Maker. In the individual mind with its indwelling psyche we see imaged the Universal Mind and Spirit. In proportion as our conception of a society approaches the highest ideal of perfection—the national spirit pervading and animating every component part of the society; the national will working through the wills of freemen and carrying out its decrees by their willing agency; distributing to every part impartially, whether small or great, its due:—instruction to the ignorant; correction to the vicious; succour to the afflicted; justice to all; favour to none; but educating and elevating the whole to rectitude; the nation, free and self-governed, guided by the light of reason, progressing secure in its rectitude, and developing to higher and higher degrees of nobleness with each step of advance; —in the same proportion does our conception of the Divine Government of the universe grow and expand —of a Universal Spirit pervading and working in every part of the Cosmos; of a Universal Will controlling and directing every portion, and distributing to each that which is its due—its good; educating,

purifying, and elevating them to rectitude by adversity; testing their patience by suffering, their uprightness by prosperity; and, having thus created in them a free will and a right spirit, informing them by the light of reason, and guiding them to perfection by the action of such light on their free wills so created.

And as the sciences emerge out of the intellectual chaos, the arts emerge with them, and in the same order. As long as any science exists in the confused and conjectural stage, the art which is dependent on it is empirical and liable to error; but as soon as the laws which regulate its subject-matter are discerned, then such laws are applied to the art which is its outcome, and there is introduced into such art calculation and certainty. In proportion as the theory or mental view, therefore, of any department of science is correct or inaccurate, in the same proportion must the results of such theory when applied to practice be good or unsatisfactory. The truth of such proposition is obvious, and it is abundantly borne out by facts. In most of the physical sciences much certain knowledge exists, a number of facts having been collected, and, out of these, general facts or principles educed; and as a consequence, the physical arts are as a fact worked with considerable success. In every department of nature wherein no psychical element exists the triumphs of man are great, and he is able to a great extent to adapt them to his wishes. But whenever the psychical enters he fails egregiously. Thus in the science which treats of the functions of the human body—Physiology

—he possesses much knowledge, but of its highest branch—*cerebral physiology*—he knows nothing; for the function of the organ of which it treats is the exciting the phenomena of consciousness in the mind, and, until such phenomena have been adequately investigated, such knowledge is impossible. Physiology, therefore, stagnates as a science in all its branches in consequence of this defective knowledge respecting its highest one; for the brain is through the nerves connected inseparably with all the other bodily organs, and none of these can be thoroughly known in the absence of accurate knowledge respecting it. And, in consequence of this defective physiology, the art, *Hygiene*, which is based on it, is also defective; for, not knowing thoroughly the physiological law, we are unable to supply all the conditions which secure that perfect performance of all the physical functions which constitutes bodily health. And what is true of physiology and its out-come, hygiene, or the art of preserving health, is for the same cause true of Pathology and its art, *Therapeutics*. For healthy structure must be understood before diseased structure can be made out; and, until diseased structure is made out, diseased action cannot with any certainty be rectified. The arts of *Hygiene* and *Therapeutics* are therefore necessarily in the empirical and conjectural stage of development. And yet more defective are our *Mental Hygiene* and *Therapeutics*, for owing to our defective Cerebral Physiology, that science of which it holds the key, *Psychology*, is in so chaotic a condition that of its subject-matter, mind and soul, we possess no distinct notions of any

kind; all our knowledge consisting of a confused mass of undigested facts in which no plan or order is discernible. Having therefore no rules to go by, we are neither able to regulate our minds with any certainty so as to prevent disorder therein, nor to rectify such when it has arisen. And from this defective condition of our cerebral and mental knowledge both body and mind equally suffer; for body and mind are practically inseparable, and through their connecting medium, the brain and the forces which traverse it in both directions, they mutually affect each other. Not until both physiology and psychology are perfected will that great desideratum, the sound mind in the sound body, be secured.

And if our psychology is imperfect from our defective cerebral physiology, our *Sociology* is still more imperfect from the same cause; for, strange as it may seem, without a knowledge of the physical body in which the psyche is framed, and by and through which its mind is informed and its conduct determined, it is impossible that the social body, of which each psyche is an unit, can be understood. And sociology being on this account in a chaotic condition, of necessity *Politics*—the art which comes out of it—is also confused and blundering; so that no certain statesmanship exists, but even the most advanced societies are divided into adverse and contending parties, having no common and recognised rule of right, but governed by their own interests and feelings, and aiming at totally opposite objects, which each equally thinks is for the good of the society; and seeking to obtain such objects by any

means within their reach—by craft or cunning, by motives addressed to the lowest and basest feelings, and sometimes even by physical force.

And if the sciences of psychology and sociology are dark, that of *Theology* is darker still; for of it these sciences hold the key, and the passage of the light to it is necessarily through them. Once, indeed, it was not so. Formerly, in the night of science, when throughout the whole realm of the intellect only dim, feeble rays were diffused, steeping all things in a weird atmosphere of unreality, suggestive to the fancy, this theological region was the chief source of such misleading illumination, and fertile in spiritual phantoms. But with the dawn of physical science these nocturnal lights have paled their ineffectual fires, and all illusions of this kind have either disappeared or are fast disappearing. Our psychical and spiritual darkness has become very apparent, contrasted with the exceeding brightness of the physical, and men of science, supposing that either such darkness concealed nothing or that what lay hidden there was unknowable, and that all attainable human knowledge was limited to the physical, have for the most part confined their attention to it. Confounding the mind with the brain, they have lost sight—intellectually, so to speak—of the indwelling psyche, and with it also of the Universal Psyche which it mirrored. They have therefore habituated themselves to view theology as a fertile and inaccessible science, to be abandoned to dreamers and sentimentalists. And abandoning the study of the

science, they have—it may be said without implying offence—abandoned also the practice of the art.

Religion, the province of which is to guide men right in their conduct and to solace them in affliction, has become to them valueless. Its forms and ceremonies, handed down from the dark ages of the world, they perceive to be empty and vain—the puerilities of an unenlightened childhood, and they either content themselves with exhibiting an outward conformity to what they inwardly despise, or—more honestly—throw them aside altogether, and manfully confront the problems and difficulties of life, either without any firm foundation to rest on, or supported only by such conjecture as they may have arrived at guided by their feelings and instincts alone.

Returning then to the argument respecting the value of utility as a measure of the worth of truth, the stupidity of *cui bono* objections to theoretical speculation becomes apparent. For if all right action depends on right knowledge, then to discuss whether any particular addition to our knowledge is valuable or not, is absurd. Its value must be commensurate with its range and scope. Judged by this criterion, the value of the propositions that have been laid down, should their truth be confirmed, could hardly be too highly estimated: it would be scarcely too much to say that they would furnish the key to every compartment of science to which at present we have no access, and, supplying us thence with guiding principles, would by-and-by fertilise every branch of knowledge which for lack of such is

now unfruitful. To particularise all the practical benefits that would result from them would be therefore impossible; all that will be attempted will be briefly to indicate some of those which, lying on the surface, are most conspicuous and obvious.

Thus—beginning with those lowest in the scale of value and proceeding thence upwards to the higher—if the cycle of the actions taking place within the mind and the succession of the phenomena have been correctly described—how *perceptions* produce *notions;* how these, by stimulating the psyche, beget *conceptions;* how these conceptions excite *desires* and become *motives* of various power; how the psyche, impelled by such, drifts helplessly and fortuitously along, at the mercy of any object, whether of thought or of sense, that captivates it, until, the right conception of duty being formed, it perceives the necessity of self-control, and, putting forth its will-force, resists the influence of feeling, and, practising rectitude, exercises deliberation, consults reason and forms judgments, and so always makes the best of its opportunity—in the region of thought gaining always the highest conceptions of good that its perceptions enable it to form; and in the region of sense realising of such conceptions always the highest that the occasion will permit;—if this description is correct, then—as all mental phenomena are associated with brain action, and all mental action takes place through the instrumentality of physical organs—there must exist a series of structures in the brain to correspond with these mental activities—there must exist not only organs for perception and for the reception and

conservation of ideas, but also there must be structures through the *agency* of which the reflex and apparently unconscious action takes place between the impressed psyche and the impressing ideas by which such ideas are shaped into conceptions; and others as well, through which the psyche consciously, whether impelled by feeling or guided by deliberation and reason, acts on its thoughts, and, through the muscles and nerves of the body, on the objects of sense. And there is reason to hope that the cerebral physiologist, the mental side of the problem being given, will be thereby furnished with the clue to the physical side, and, knowing better what to look for, will by and by discover such structures and be able to assign to each its proper function; and so the function of the brain will be at last understood. And we may further hope that, through understanding the structure and functions of the brain-organs, he will arrive at a knowledge of the conditions necessary to their perfect action, and learn how, by supplying such conditions, to preserve cerebral health and prevent cerebral and—its consequence—mental disease. And in like manner, the pathologist, applying such knowledge to his department, will be enabled from the symptoms to deduce the structure that is disordered, and the wrong conditions that have induced it; and so learn, by supplying the right conditions and correcting influences, as far as possible to restore health.

Again:—If the doctrine be accepted as true that within the bodily frame there exists enshrined in a cell, a psyche—an indestructible monad, atom, or individual;

that the avenues to such cell are in the body; that by such avenues truth, the food which nourishes and develops such psyche, enters; that from this food it derives nobleness and goodness; and that in such nobleness and goodness its excellence consists; that death is only the escape of the psyche from the material shell which held it, and that its course hereafter is influenced by the degree of nobleness and goodness which it has then attained: and further, that there is a method by which nobleness and goodness can be surely reached—the method of rectitude both in thought and action :—if this doctrine be accepted as true, then to attain such object and practise such method will become the chief care and aim of all those who have formed the right conception thereof, and the highest motive in influencing their conduct; the human body will be viewed by them only as the instrument for supplying food to the soul, and it and all its material surroundings will be considered important only so far as they contribute to this end. And as they will have the further assurance that this object lies within their reach—for all have the power of observing rectitude, and need only the right conception—and that it will be surely obtained, provided that the right method is adhered to, and loyalty to the guiding light, reason, observed;—every one who holds this doctrine will have the satisfaction of feeling that he holds the key to his own happiness, and that no earthly contingency or accident can hurt him, since all such act only on the mortal attachments of the psyche, and cannot destroy, but on the contrary develop, its nobleness and goodness. And

so, as long as they are conscious of their rectitude, they will be at peace within themselves—will be superior to fortune, and hold in their own hands their own fate.

And so with regard to *Politics*—the art by which men regulate their relations to each other as a Society or State. When the conception has once taken root that a nation is a compound man, ruled like the individual man, by motives; that such motives or motor forces emanate from and are constituted by the different classes which have been developed within the nation, and into which it is divided; that as long as any one of these classes, or any combination of them exists which is stronger than all the others, by such class or combination the government will be monopolised over; and that even when an equilibrium has been attained, and, all classes being recognized and represented in the national council, what is called a constitutional government is formed, there will be no peace, no security that such freedom will be maintained until such government be established, not on conflicting class-interests and feelings, nor on the unstable caprice of opinion, but on the principles of equity and justice—a result which cannot be arrived at until a sufficient number of individuals in the nation have attained mental rectitude, and, disregarding all selfish interests and feelings, and intellectual prejudices, have made it the law of their lives to find out truth in order to act right;—when this conception of society has taken root, then every member of society into whose mind this conception has entered will feel himself bound by the holiest sanctions to aid in the formation of such party of right: and in pro-

portion as these multiply in number will the sentiment of justice pervade the community, and find its way into the national council, and statesmen, confiding in the support of such class, will dare to propose measures dictated by rectitude, instead of consulting expediency only; the meaning of the word *equity* will begin to be understood, and not only will every one be recognised as a part of the community, and be free to use his faculties and to regulate his conduct undomineered over by another, but he will be recognised as an *equal* part, and be free to use his faculties on *equal* terms: the weak will not be unduly weighted by the state in the pursuit of either wealth or honours, nor the strong favoured; sympathy will be diffused through the community, and the duty of helping the incapable and unfortunate be recognised, as the conception of the common brotherhood is admitted: and by degrees it will come to pass that for a thing to be accomplished it will be sufficient that it be shown to be just; and the rights of the weakest and least influential will grow to be as secure as those of the strongest and most powerful; for they will be maintained by every lover of justice.

And then will the problems that oppress the nation for want of knowledge, and the evils that afflict it for want of will, be one by one removed. In *education*, when it is clearly seen that the main thing—both for the individual and for the community—is the development of the psyche; that such development is to be accomplished—not by the filling the mind with as great a crowd of ill-arranged ideas as it can be made to hold, nor—as seems to be now becoming the

practice in consequence of the conspicuous failure of such mental cramming—in the mere exercise and drilling of the bodily muscles and nerves, but in the training of the intellect and heart; then such method will be resorted to generally, and education will come to be in reality what it is in name—the educing or drawing out the powers by which the psyche directs and regulates its intellect; the elevating the mental eye to objects of nobleness; and the establishing the habit of rectitude.

In *criminal jurisprudence*, too, the distinction which has been drawn between the soul and the mind, as illustrated by the psyche and the mind-cell which it inhabits, would be practically available. When it is clearly seen that of the wrong conduct which the criminal exhibits not all is caused by wilful stubbornness and depravity, but some part is to be traced to defective mental capacity and to want of instruction; and that even for his sins of wilfulness the criminal himself is not *primarily* responsible, since such depravity of will arises from the want of that right psychical training which has just been spoken of; and that therefore, for the conduct of the criminal, society is as responsible as himself—the cause in both being the absence of the right mental conception—in the case of the criminal, of duty; in the case of society, of the training which would have developed in him the habit of rectitude;—when, we say, these things are clearly seen, then an important advance will have been made in solving the intricate problem how the criminal is to be dealt with; and an additional inducement will exist to introduce into education

psychical training, and so by a system of moral hygiene prevent such vicious psychical conditions. And further, the criminal mind being better understood, better methods will be adopted both to rectify it when detected, and to prevent the contagion of example: correction, painful if requisite, will be administered with a firm yet considerate hand; the good of the criminal himself being the object aimed at, in conformity with the great guiding principle which should rule in all transactions between man and man. And if it should be found, as has been asserted by many psychologists, that there are cases in which long habit has become so deep rooted and inveterate as to amount to disease, so that through indulged inclination the moral stature has become incurably bent and contracted, and the elevating powers, through disease, permanently disabled, and what has been called *moral insanity* induced—the intellect remaining sound and the ideas correct, but the psyche incapacitated from rising or being raised so as to take elevated views—then the existence of such cases must be admitted, and conduct adopted towards them consistent with the safety of the community and the dictates of enlightened humanity. Nor need the timorous fear lest a criminal law, based on rational principles, should be such as would cease to deter viciously inclined persons from crime. It is not found that improved physical therapeutics favour the increase of disease, and there is no reason to suppose that a different result would follow from improved moral therapeutics.

And so with regard to all the other problems

which trouble the mind and discourage the heart of the social reformer: as the habit of intellectual rectitude becomes more general, the more accurate views of truth thence arising will solve and remove them out of his way, and so facilitate his work by clearing his aim and correcting his method. Pre-eminent among such is what is called the *woman question*, which is fast coming to the front, though not one moment before it is due. When this question is taken out of the region of sentiment and divested of the glamour which so plentifully attaches to it, it will be perceived that woman is in mind and soul essentially the same as man; that she is possessed of mental capacity and perceptive intellectual powers, and of sensation, feeling, and imagination; that she is capable of experiencing desires and of being acted upon by motives; and that she has a will-force and mental powers by which she can direct her thoughts and work out her ends. That she also is capable of forming and entertaining lofty conceptions, and of experiencing elevating emotions; of rightly distinguishing between truth and falsehood, nobleness and deformity, goodness and baseness; and of appreciating each at their due value. That she, moreover, possesses a conscience, can feel the sentiment of duty, and the force of a moral obligation; also, by the exercise of her will-force, can resist inclination, exhibit virtue, and attain rectitude: in short, that she possesses all the qualities that characterise humanity and distinguish it from the brute. Possessing, therefore, all the attributes of humanity, it will be seen that she is

entitled to all its rights:—the right of using her faculties freely for her own benefit, and of ascending through their agency to whatever sphere she can rightfully attain, unobstructed by any hindrances placed in her path by society; the right of receiving from society the same help and protection that is accorded to men; and lastly, the right of possessing at her own disposal her affections, of being the sponsor of her own virtue, and the arbiter of her own honour. And while entitled to the same rights as man, in their fullest measure, she is also under the same moral obligations—such being capable of being summed up and included—in her case as in man's—under the one great moral principle of doing under all circumstances the greatest good in her power to all around her. And such obligations society has the right, as far as it can, to enforce: on her as on man. The reasons why woman, as a class, has been later than any other class of the community—even than the negro slave—in attaining emancipation, are not far to seek. They are two:—Man's greater physical strength, and his selfishness. Inferior physically, woman has succumbed in the contest, and remains prostrate, in accordance with the law that has prevailed universally in human affairs and will continue to prevail until rectitude is established, that no tyrannising class ever voluntarily abandon the advantages they think they possess, and that therefore no subjugated class ever emerge from thraldom, until, either by combination among themselves, or by the sympathy and assistance of others, or by both means combined, they

acquire strength enough to compel the tyrant to withdraw. This sympathy, though granted to the negro, woman has failed to obtain, because the majority of men prefer a subservient minister to their material wants to an intelligent companion, and fear that, were freedom conceded, they would lose the convenient domestic drudge. Combination also has been rendered impossible by the fact that a large number of women, broken to harness by long habit, have learnt to hug their chains and to make of abjectness a virtue; while others, more favoured by fortune, are in possession of all they want. Their chains are out of sight, and, at ease themselves, they are occupied with their own personal pursuits, unheeding the wrongs which others endure, and caring little for ills which they do not feel. Nothwithstanding these disadvantages, however, the hour for the liberation of woman is fast approaching. With advancing knowledge, the terrible evils which her serfdom is producing are becoming more and more evident; the conscience of society is awakening, and all persons with minds to comprehend and hearts to feel are beginning to be alive to them. The number of such persons increases daily, and the time will soon arrive when the strange delusion that education of the intellect will vulgarise the female mind, and that liberty will rob it of its grace, will be dissipated; and then woman will be free. Nor need there be any fear that by such liberation, any good which exists in the present relation between man and woman will be lost to either. The vaunted protection which it is the duty of the former to give, will

not be the less appreciated, because it is not imposed. The solace which it is the delight of the latter to administer will not be the less acceptable, because it is not exacted. On the contrary, great gain is likely to accrue to both. When the bonds that have held them down have been removed and the elevating influences admitted, then will the mind and soul of woman rise above the trivialities and frivolities which at present so unduly occupy the one and engross the attention of the other, and expand and develop each to their full extent. What such development may unfold, it is impossible to foretell. The frailest casket sometimes contains the noblest gem; and, when her quick perception and ready sympathies are taken into account, it may well be that the dream of the poet—"the unreached Paradise of his despair"—will at last be realised, and that woman in her freedom may captivate the soul of man by her psychical charms as completely as in her degradation she has enthralled him by her physical. Should such conjecture prove correct, her triumph will be complete: a just retribution will be exacted and Nemesis appeased. In the day of her humiliation, though both are low together (for he who holds another down must himself stoop), yet the degradation is his; for voluntary debasement, not enforced subjection, is disgraceful. In the day of victory, on the other hand, the honour will be hers: for though both rise together, yet from her will emanate the elevating influence. So will a noble vengeance be taken and a worthy recompense returned by woman to him under whose rule she has become what she

now so often is—a household chattel; a marketable commodity; by turns his idol, his toy, his victim, his slave.

However this may be, society cannot afford any longer to lose the help of woman. The most pressing evils that afflict it spring from her side: the most distressing miseries that it presents are endured by her. To cope with such man is altogether unequal, and suffering Humanity waits with impatience the consolations of her intelligent sympathy and ministering hand.

But inequitable social law is neither the only, nor the chief, source of woman's wrongs. There exists for her a yet more inexorable enslaver—himself enslaved—the theologian. Bound fast to a creed which has long been dead, the theologian holds in the same bonds woman also. To this fate, from which man is comparatively exempt, the greater emotional susceptibility of woman, her defective reasoning power from want of adequate culture, her conventionalism and habits of submission to authority—all alike predispose her. By these two powers, Conventionalism and Ecclesiasticism, woman is held enslaved—both hands bound—and were she left to her own efforts alone there would be but scant hope of her freedom. That liberating influences are at work in the theological as in the other regions of thought, getting rid of superstitions by cutting away the ground under their feet, has been already pointed out; and when their work has been accomplished and the theologian has become free, then his fellow-slave, woman, will be freed also. Then will

the theologian resort for truth direct to the same sources which inspired of old the great masters in his science—to nature and the human heart; and in lieu of the worthless refuse which now goes under the name of theology—the metaphysical moonshine which has been transmitted from the past through intellectual channels of constantly diminishing calibre until all the goodness once in it has been removed—he will be able to offer to us a nutritious, invigorating reality; a thing that will stand inspection; the life and support of all things. Then will *religion* be again in fact what it has been in times past —that which teaches us how to live and how to die; an art which men may profess without a blush, and practise without degradation.

The practical benefits, then, that the doctrines which have been put forth would, if verified, produce in the world of fact and reality, cannot be denied: they would let light into the regions of the psychical and the spiritual, and so stimulate every branch of social art.

But their effects would be equally great and beneficial in that department of mental activity to which the term *art* is *par excellence* applied. Our life is two-fold. By the mysterious power of the imagination, which has been already discussed, the psyche is able out of the materials which have entered the mind-cell from without, to create for itself another world—the ideal—and so multiply and intensify existence by surrounding itself with things more stimulating than—and to itself as real as—the actual one.

In sleep and in day-dreams these

> "Combinations of disjointed things
> And forms impalpable and unperceived
> Of other's sight familiar are"—

to vanish at the touch of reality. In madness they also present themselves, and their permanence constitutes of it the well-known characteristic. Such things form the staple of the imaginative artist; through them

> "With nature
> And the quick spirit of the universe
> He holds his dialogues! and they do teach
> To him the magic of their mysteries;
> To him the book of night is opened wide,
> And voices from the deep abyss revealed,
> A marvel and a secret."

And if he possess the "imagination all compact," and is gifted with "the vision and the faculty divine" as well, then he can, working with pen, pencil, or chisel, depict and express in words, colours or marble, these wondrous intuitions, and fill the world with "beings brighter than were there before," and give "a breath to forms which can outlive all flesh." But the artist is, like the artisan, in the exercise of his vocation, limited by his materials. He can only work on what is presented to him, and the result is conditioned by the nature of such. He cannot make bricks of straw. And further, it is a condition necessary to the production of good art that whatever enters into its composition should appear, both to the artist and to those who are to enjoy his work, as true, or, theoretically at least, possible. It must

be conceivable to the imagination. Whatever suppositions it contains must not be negatived by known facts. It may transcend the known, but it must not contradict. To enjoy the ideal fully, belief is requisite.

Hence the historical periods in which art has been greatest have been periods of faith. In sceptical times, when existing creeds are in decadence, great works of art are impossible. The new seed has first to be found, and the ground cleared for its insertion. The seed are the new ideas: it belongs to science to discover them, and it is the part of the artist to develop them into the forms of beauty and goodness which are their flower and fruit. But, until the right period or season has arrived, his art is unavailing for want of materials. However great his faculties, he can only employ them on the old and worn-out ideas. His powers therefore at such times are expended on manner more than on matter: in displaying his own skill, not in expressing great ideas. Homer, Æschylus, Sophocles, Danté, Milton, and Shakespeare were products of believing ages. The present dearth of high and noble art becomes therefore intelligible. We live in a transition period. Our creeds are dead—killed at their root by science —and the seed from which the new growth is to spring is not ready. And with our creeds, the faith and hope which were their fruit, have perished also. Hence the mind of the artist is restricted to few and comparatively low objects—to material nature and the physically sensuous; to events and feelings involving considerations affecting this life only; to

commonplace thoughts and selfish sentiment. The lights kindled by the old masters have burnt out, and enthusiasts in vain seek to revive the dead ashes. Within the circles of the psychical and the spiritual no mighty magician moves, and they are abandoned to the mystic and the charlatan. "The heroic lay is tuneless now:" the spirit when invoked makes no response, or answers only by inarticulate sounds, pregnant with no thought—like the notes of the Æolian harp, fitful and plaintive. The artist is at best—

> "An infant crying in the night,
> An infant crying for the light,
> And with no language but a cry."

Moral beauty is lost sight of; moral motives have no force. Everything is weighed in material scales, and measured by a material standard. A sensational novel interests more than Homer or Shakespeare: murder on a vast scale, perpetrated by weapons of precision—the marvels of physical science—to gratify the conflicting ambitions of monarchs, moves mankind more than the records of a Marathon or a Thermopylæ; a column of a daily newspaper in the public estimation possesses more value than a page of Thucydides.

And if it is objected that the age has produced at least two men of genius of the very highest order, such objection can be admitted without affecting the validity of what has been stated. The poetry of Lord Byron is to a great production of synthetic art as the wild blasts of the winter wind to the disciplined, regulated harmonies of an oratorio. He was the spirit of his time—the *Zeit-geist* incar-

nate. The Revolution breathed in his song and animated its numbers. His muse, like the Angel of Desolation, revelled in the work of destruction—now brooding over the waste, now mingling in the strife of the elements and directing the storm. "The lord of irony," his shafts went to their mark with unerring aim. But his indignation was always a noble one: he warred only with baseness; and while pitiless to the bigot and the hypocrite, yielded to none in reverence for truth and genuine goodness. His life was passion's essence, and of such his poetry was composed. He knew how to make passion beautiful, and, in the dearth of outside material adequate for the requirements of his art, he turned that art inwards; in proud self-abandonment gave himself up for analysis, threw his heart into the crucible, and out of torture evolved immortal song. And, if sometimes he struck lower chords, and, like his own bacchanalian poet who sung "The Isles of Greece," stooping to the level of those whom he had sought in vain to raise to the height of his own stature, adapted his song to the degeneracy of the age, the mockery was very evident, and the scorn plainly legible between the lines.

Shelley was a poet of a different order—of less compass but higher pitch. Of a finer and more ethereal nature, perhaps, than Byron, his spirit seemed to rise above the darkness, and, catching by anticipated glimpses the dawn, to greet it with melodious response, like the fabled statue of antiquity. But such response, however sweet, was scarcely articulate. It was as if the coming day was revealed to him in characters too

faint and delicate to be expressed in coherent and intelligible utterances, save to minds of kindred susceptibility, and so he was compelled to give to melody that for which words were inadequate.

That these two poets produced no great work of creative art like those whose names have been given above, was not from want of power, but of light. They resembled rather the Hebrew prophets, and belong to what in art may be called the *period of the eclipse*, of the gloom of which the brightness of their fires tends to mitigate the intensity. And resembling the Hebrew prophets in character and mission, they resembled them also in their fate. They were in their lifetimes driven out of the social synagogues by the priests and Levites of their day; the people pelted them with stones; in the country of which they are at once the glory and the shame, their names are only whispered; dirt is heaped on their tombs; and while every respectable mediocrity of the age has his monument, their sepulchres remain unbuilt.

In the shadow of this eclipse we are yet moving; its gloom is on us still. And its effect is felt not only in hiding from us our high art ideals, but in lowering our morality as well. The artist is the great moral educator. Truth is the material on which he works, and out of it he elaborates products which move the heart and elevate the soul. Without spiritual instruction there can be no spiritual life; without noble moral ideals there can be no high psychical excellence: and for both spiritual and moral instruction inspired artists are requisite. "The people perish for want of knowledge"—for knowledge is the one thing

necessary for art. The heart of the age, in the absence of this higher knowledge and higher art, is necessarily set on the only good of which it has a complete conception—the sensuous. This, their highest ideal, the masses seek openly by any road—*per fas aut nefas*—and although there are not wanting minds in which, either through innate happy perceptive faculty or favourable circumstances, higher wants have been created, yet such wants remain unsupplied. In the dark uncertainties which surround them they can perceive neither what will satisfy themselves or convince others.

Nor need this condition of things cause any disquietude. If the views that have been put forth respecting the soul and the laws of its development, the intellectual progress of society, and the effect of such progress on the spiritual conception be correct, such temporary eclipse of the source of light must of necessity occur at certain periods in our intellectual, as in our physical sky. And the same motor forces which have brought us to this period will carry us through. We shall emerge with truer conceptions respecting ourselves and our destinies, and the laws which bind us to the things around us and to the universe in which we move. With the return of light the social discord which, engendered by darkness, prevails universally, will cease. Men will no longer be divided into two hostile and conflicting parties, animated by antagonistic motives, each of which would be, in excess, alike destructive to the social organism—the one by consuming its structure, the other by chilling its vitality. (Note R.)

The influence of reason will be felt; the true law of the will will be recognised: the conflict of the liberating and conserving antagonisms of the body politic—its cohesive and repellant molecular activities—will cease: the centrifugal and centripetal influences be reconciled: the several communities, plastic yet coherent, will develop freely—the constituents of each subject to no rule but that of the reason; restrained by no bond but that of the conscience;—and move, each in its appointed path, in obedience to the law of rectitude. Reason will be the great moderator. The Lord of Light will be again, as of yore, the Lord of Harmony. (Note S.)

If, on the other hand, all that has been said respecting the soul and the laws that regulate its development and that of society, is incorrect: if there is no psyche; no law of the will; no ruling principle; no guiding light; but mind and soul are mere compounds of brain-matter; consciousness a physical phenomenon; the will the resultant of the action of fortuitous forces; and society only a concourse of antagonisms: or, on the other existing hypothesis, if the psyche is a distinct monad, with a nature innately good or bad, irrespective of outward influences;—then indeed, on either hypothesis, speculation of any kind is worse than useless; the theoretic faculty has been given to man in vain; reason, the divine gift, is of no effect; knowledge is an evil; wisdom only a form of folly; virtue unavailing; truth a mockery; the universe a failure. Mental culture is a mistake, social improvement a dream. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

The author having now completed the task which he took in hand, the analysis of the facts of his consciousness; and having put forth the conclusions which he has arrived at, with the grounds on which they rest; and further, having shown that such conclusions are both important, and in accordance with the analogies of nature;—this essay here terminates. While engaged on it, he has painfully felt his inability—both from defect of natural faculty, and from want of the requisite intellectual training—of dealing adequately with the large subjects which he has had to handle, and he is conscious that it is full of defects and imperfections which he has not power to amend. He also has no doubt that, besides imperfections, there exist actual errors as well. All he can say on his own behalf is, that he has done his best: his failure arises from want of power, not from want of will. For such errors and imperfections he claims indulgence, and prays that they may be treated leniently so long as they do not affect any important conclusions. Fundamental errors, however, he hopes will not be spared, for by such method truth will best be served. That the whole of the conclusions he has arrived at will stand the test of criticism he does not suppose; and if any portion should go through the ordeal unaffected, his gratification will be great, and he will feel that he has been sufficiently rewarded. And, even should all go, perhaps his labour will not be altogether lost. "False views," says Mr Darwin, "if supported by some evidence, do little harm, as every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness; and when this is done,

one path towards error is closed, and the road to truth at the same time opened." If then the writer, in his attempt at sounding the depths of consciousness, has been too ambitious, over-estimating the length of his line and the weight of his plummet, some other person, more happily circumstanced in these respects, may hereafter succeed; and to his success such failure may contribute, by directing him from misleading fallacies.

In the meantime, however, the writer honestly believes that his conclusions are in the main sound, and challenges criticism. And should exception be taken to any of them as tending to create disturbance by subverting opinions that are at present considered settled, he would demur to this mode of silencing controversies, and would reply in the words of Galileo, if he might without presumption appropriate to his own use the modest expressions of that great man; "Philosophy herself cannot fail to receive benefit from our dispute; because if our views are true, new acquisitions will have been made by her; if false, by their refutation, the existing doctrine will be the more firmly established."

NOTES.

NOTE A, page 6.

ALTHOUGH in the list of those who recognise the fact that the objects of sense are mental phenomena, the name of Mr Herbert Spencer cannot be found, the grounds on which this distinguished psychologist rests his dissent militate in no way against the doctrine involved in the hypothesis of the mind-cell, but, on the contrary, harmonise with it thoroughly. Laying down the propositions that a direct perception is a primary datum of consciousness, and therefore not to be questioned; that an act of reasoning, as it involves a cognition of two or more primary data, is a more complex mental operation than the cognition of a single direct perception; and that complex mental operations must be more uncertain than simple ones, he goes on to reason that, as our conclusion that objects of sense are external to us is based on a single direct perception, while the opposite conclusion that they lie within the mind is the result of an act of reasoning based on several distinct acts of perception, this latter conclusion must have less validity than the former, and, as they are contradictory, must give way. But what if they are not contradictory? In the hypothesis put forth in the text, no collision of the operations of consciousness is involved, and no sacrifice of the one to the other is called for. It teaches that objects of sense are outside the psyche, and is therefore

so far in harmony with the evidence of our senses; but it also teaches that both objects of sense and psyche are alike contained and exist within the mind or mind-cell, and so is in agreement with the conclusions of metaphysical reasoning: and the two schools of thought, idealism and realism, are reconciled. The writer, therefore, ventures to claim for his doctrine the support of Mr Spencer, with whose original and ingenious speculations respecting the analogy existing between physical and social organisms the hypothesis of a mind-cell would seem well to harmonise.

To be in a position to judge whether this hypothesis of a mind-cell has any practical value, the reader should be in possession of the existing state of opinion respecting the mind and its relations to the objects of consciousness. These are, as it seems to the author, as follows :—

It is agreed on all hands that excited condition of brain (whether produced by causes within or outside the body) is a condition essential to all the phenomena of consciousness. With this fact the realist rests contented :—there are outward things which impress, more or less directly through the senses, the brain, in which the conscious being or psyche, in some occult manner, exists, and which, the materialists say, it is; and these outward things and the objects perceived are identical. The phenomenalists, or idealists as they are called, deny the identity of the perceived objects with the real material things, because such things do not come into contact with the brain at all, but only images derived from such; and because the perceived objects are sometimes present when the material thing is absent, and are sometimes absent when the material thing is present;—proving clearly not only that the two things are not identical, but that they are not even necessarily associated as cause and effect: and they further argue that even the images formed in the brain cannot be the perceived phenomena; since these last are represented in consciousness as outside the body, while the cerebral images

exist in the brain. They contend, therefore, that the perceived phenomena are altogether mental,—residing, like ideas, not in the brain, nor in the outside world, but in the mind. To this the realists retort, with apparent truth, that they cannot be in the mind of the conscious being, since they are represented in consciousness as outside not only such being but the body in which it is incorporated. Thus the opposing parties wage a war of mutual destruction; reason and common sense are at variance; and a philosophical dead-lock is occasioned tending to universal scepticism. This dead-lock the hypothesis of the mind-cell, by introducing a distinction between the mind and the conscious being, relieves; and reconciles the views of the contending parties. By representing the perceived objects as outside the psyche, it satisfies the realist; and by representing both objects and psyche as within the mind, it satisfies the idealist; and further, by supplying a datum for the existence of a psyche, it furnishes a ground for opposition to the doctrine of materialism with all its desolating consequences, and takes away from psychology the reproach that it is a science without a subject.

Fitting therefore, as the author contends, all the facts of the case, it fulfils all the conditions which are required of an hypothesis, and claims therefore, as long as it does so, to be admitted as such—at any rate, until a fitter appear. That by it the mystery of perception is unravelled at once, is not supposed. It is at best but a step on the threshold of psychology, supplying ground for further advance. If it is unsound, let it be refuted; but let it be remembered that ridicule is not refutation. The days are past when

"Coxcombs vanquished Berkely by a grin."

NOTE B, page 14.

The importance of the law of the development of science and art seems to be not generally recognised, yet, in the

opinion of the writer, it cannot be too highly estimated; constituting as it does at once an explanation of the past and a guarantee for the future.

NOTE C, page 21.

The immature poet, Keats, sang—sweetly but morbidly—

"Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in Heaven:
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air and gnomed mine,
Unweave a rainbow," &c., &c., &c.

It was a poet of another order who said—

"How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."

NOTE D, page 25.

To class ideas, notions, and conceptions with objects of sense, and include them under the word *physical*, is an arrangement to which perhaps exception will be taken; yet it is made deliberately. It will be shown that ideas, or objects of thought, may—with reference to the things spoken of in the text—be as properly called physical as objects of sense. Both are merely mental phenemona excited by impressions on cerebral substance.

NOTE E, page 66.

The subject of the *organic sense*, though a most important one, is treated very vaguely in physiological works generally,

owing chiefly, as the author thinks, to imperfect analysis of the mental phenomena.

NOTE F, page 82.

The quotation in the text is to be found in one of Mr Ruskin's works. The writer is conscious of many and great obligations to Mr Ruskin, but he hesitates to acknowledge them, lest he should provoke the remark how little, rather than how much, he has profited by the study of that author's most suggestive writings.

NOTE G, page 86.

In physical things, as in psychical, the preservation of composure or composition seems to be necessary for the evolution of light. This may be illustrated by the flame of a candle or lamp. There are in this three cones:—1. An innermost one, consisting of oil or fat which, liquidated by the heat, and drawn up in the wick by capillary attraction, has been thence vaporised and forms the non-luminous dark cone which immediately surrounds the wick. 2. A middle one, the seat of light, composed of the same vapour, but more highly charged with caloric in consequence of its greater proximity to the outer cone in which such caloric is generated; but still retaining its composition, and only manifesting the extra caloric with which it is charged by the light which it emits. 3. An outer, heat-generating one, bluish and scarcely visible, in which the combustible vapour coming into contact with the oxygen of the air undergoes decomposition—loses its composure. This outer cone is the source of all the heat, but, with the loss of its composure, it loses also its power of giving light. So in the brain, when, either from morbid irritability of the organ or from ideas too exciting, loss of composure takes place—manifested physically by increase of waste of the organic material, and psychically by emotion—there is proportional

decrease of intellectual clearness and coherence: the *heat* is increased by the combustion—in the brain as in the candle—but the *light* is lessened.

NOTE H, page 116.

The quotation is from "Dr Armstrong," a novel of singular pathetic power.

NOTE J, page 124.

"Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor."
HORACE: *Liber* I. *Epistolarum, Epistol.* I.

NOTE K, page 134.

A doctrine which affirms that *in the beginning was the Word* ought not to be received with disfavour by those who accept the teaching of the fourth Evangelist; nor would it, were it not that some of the consequences which it involves are at variance with deep-rooted and long-cherished prejudices. The writer once, in conversation with a very intelligent Scotchman, took the liberty to express surprise at the uncompromising manner in which the doctrine of predestination (and, by implication, fate) was taught in the creed of the Scotch Established Church. The north countryman replied—with the canniness of his race shifting the responsibility from himself—that he once heard a very clever man say that "there would be no such great harm in the doctrine of predestination, were it not for that other doctrine with which it is popularly associated,—the doctrine of eternal punishment."

NOTE L, page 137.

The whole fallacy which misleads people at first respecting this question of the freedom of the will arises from the confounding this thing, will, with another altogether different thing, power. I am seated in my chair. I am conscious that

I have the power to get up if I *will:* but I cannot put my will in action without a motive, or, as we say, a reason. If I get up to show my freedom, then my desire of showing my freedom is the motive, and all that has been proved is that the muscles of my body will obey my will: which was not denied.

NOTE M, page 144.

"Unto the upright there ariseth light in the darkness." —*Psalm* cxii. 4.

NOTE N, page 187.

With the view of mitigating the evils which have arisen under its rule, and for which it is in great part answerable, legislation has recently propounded a remedy, than which nothing could better illustrate, at one and the same time, the stubborn tenacity with which men stick to established notions; their hopeless incapacity for seeing from an equitable point of view things which affect their own interests; and the utter absence of moral principle in all the notions that exist on this subject. It has been enacted that the marriage contract is to be held valid and enforced until one of the parties to it has received, and the other inflicted, intolerable wrong; and that only by and through such wrong deliverance may be obtained —perhaps purchased. Further: with a nice sense of equity it has been ordained that the party of the two which is the stronger physically, and is supposed to be the least sensitive mentally, may be relieved by an assault inflicted on the mental feelings only; while the more sensitive and physically weaker party must be retained in bondage until both mental and bodily feelings have been outraged! Is it necessary to add that the laws are made by that party which answers to the former of these two descriptions?

NOTE O, page 248.

The illustration in the text is taken almost word for word from "*Erewhon.*" Nowhere is the doctrine of necessity more clearly stated than in that most entertaining book, which, for ingenious speculation and irony almost too subtle for ordinary apprehension, is unrivalled.

NOTE P, page 295.

No true lover of poetry will complain of the length of this quotation or condemn the introduction of these noble lines, the termination of the magnificent ode in which Shelley offers consolation for the loss of departed genius. Those who know them already well cannot know them too well; those who do not know them cannot too soon make their acquaintance. When will men give up calling the purest spirit and perhaps finest intellect of this century atheist? When will they perceive how much more reverence to his Maker lay in his jealous doubt of the coarse creeds of his day than lies in their blind trust in existing *simulachra*?

NOTE Q, page 299.

In conditions of disease the corporeal objective and subjective phenomena are sometimes dissociated.

NOTE R, page 349.


The author takes the opportunity of stating explicitly, what he hopes has been sufficiently implied in the whole course of this essay, that it is by no means his intention to suggest that the words liberality and rectitude are terms that belong exclusively to either of the two great political parties into which all states —whether modern or ancient—seem to be divided. To the social organism, as to the physical, solution of continuity is as fatal as arrest of development. The Conservative who is

solicitous to preserve unbroken the connection between the past and the present, and to permit the destruction of nothing in which any vitality can be discerned, is as much a promoter of progress as the Liberal who is bent on pruning and lopping off every excrescence and dead part of the social organism, and on opening and expanding every portion to its utmost limits and diffusing its benefits throughout the whole structure. The Liberal, who in his hatred of wrong passionately and fanatically cuts away all alike, living and dead, is as much a violator of the law of rectitude as the Conservative who, with equal fanaticism, worships dead similitudes, and in his slavish idolatry for some cherished and time-honoured social growth, is blind to all its imperfections and loses sight of the objects which it was intended to serve. Liberality is a term which has reference properly to a man's mental attitude, not to his opinions; and the narrowest Conservative who has freed his mind from the influence of feeling and prejudice, and who is honestly striving to ascertain what is true in order to do what is right, is a greater friend to progress, and a better citizen, than the most advanced Liberal who, infatuated by some ideal of social good which he is seeking to realise, has forgotten his duty to the circumstances of the hour.

NOTE S, page 350.

Apollo, the God of Knowledge, was also the God of Music.

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